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DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Analysis of Formal and Informal  
Systems of Performance Evaluation:  
The Case of the Office of the  
Prime Minister of Lithuania

SOCIAL SCIENCES,  
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MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY  
*In cooperation with Lund University*

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ANALYSIS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL  
SYSTEMS OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION:  
THE CASE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME  
MINISTER OF LITHUANIA

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*DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS*

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*The completed thesis is a testament to the intellectual and emotional test I have passed in my life. Looking for a research problem, working in libraries until the morning, discussing with colleagues and writing the thesis – what seemed like an eternity – have finally become a tangible result. Being an extravert who gets the best ideas when talking to people rather than sitting with books, I have to admit that the people surrounding me, discussions with them, their comments and support are the key reasons that allowed me to reach this point.*

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Aistė

April 2014, Vilnius, Lithuania

*Pabaigta disertacija liudija apie išlaikytą intelektualinį ir emocinį išbandymą mano gyvenime. Mokslinės problemos paieškos, darbas bibliotekose iki paryčių, diskusijos su kolegomis ir, atrodytų, visą amžinybę trunkantis disertacijos rašymas, pagaliau įgavo apčiuopiamą rezultatą. Būdama ekstravertiška asmenybė, kuriai geriausios idėjos dažniau kyla bendraujant su žmonėmis nei sėdint tarp knygų, turiu pripažinti, kad aplinkiniai žmonės, diskusijos su jais, jų komentarai ir palaikymas yra esminės priežastys, leidusios man pasiekti šiandieninį etapą.*

*Per šiuos penkerius disertacijos rašymo metus išgyvenau skirtingus etapus, nuo „viską žinau“ iki „nežinau, nesuprantu, kodėl?, kas iš to?“ ir, galiausiai, „žinau, darom“, kurių metu mane lydėjo skirtingi žmonės. Visų pirma, noriu padėkoti savo darbo vadovui prof. dr. Tadiui Sudnickui už palaikymą ir toleranciją mano nuolatos besikeičiantiems pradedančios doktorantės ieškojimams. Ypatingai noriu padėkoti savo antrajam darbo vadovui dr. Māns Svensson, be kurio niekada nebūčiau išbridus iš „nežinau“ stadijos, už supratimą, darbą kartu, detalius komentarus, nuolatinės diskusijos Skype'u, būnant skirtinguose pasaulio kampeliuose, ir tą gerą vidinio žinojimo „kaip“ jausmą, kuris aplankydavo kaskart po mūsų pokalbių. Taip pat noriu nuoširdžiai tarti „ačiū“ kolegoms iš Lund universiteto Teisės sociologijos departamento už vertingus komentarus ir akademiškai jaukią atmosferą bei Lietuvos mokslo tarybai, finansavusiai mano vizitą šiame universitete.*

*Disertacijos tyrimas nebūtų atliktas be Vyriausybės kanceliarijos (buvusios Ministro Pirmininko tarnybos) Viešojo valdymo skyriaus patarėjos Godos Aleksaitės-Stabingienės ir Personalo skyriaus vedėjos Renatos Sadzevičiūtės bendradarbiavimo bei visų darbuotojų geranoriškumo. Už vertingus patarimus rengiant disertaciją ir moralinį palaikymą noriu išreikšti padėką prof. Aelitai Skaržauskienei, prof. dr. Ritai Žukauskienei, prof. Kęstučiui Masiuliui ir doc. dr. Mantui Bileišiui. Taip pat dėkoju savo draugams doktorantams Ramunei, Adomui, Justei, Anai Mariai ir Peteriui, leidusiems pajusti bendrumo dvasią rašant disertaciją ir ištverti viena tvę bibliotekose.*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

**OPML** – Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania

## INTRODUCTION

**Research problem.** Human resource management and its initiatives are a part of public sector everyday activities. The paradigm of new public management advocates the implementation of the principles of private sector management into the public sector by emphasizing results-based government, performance measurement and performance evaluation. Currently, under the flag of results-based government, performance evaluation is conducted in the majority of the so-called “performance measurement regimes”: the UK, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the US (Pollitt, 2008). Quantitative expression of performance measures and results creates the possibility to control the productivity of employee performance and motivate those who exceed the expectations. Lithuania has also chosen this direction (Nakrošis, 2008). The Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) provided instructions and criteria of performance evaluation and rewards.

The object of work motivators or, in other words, work incentives is within the field of human resource management. Extrinsic work motivators are the basis of the employee rewards system, which is connected with the system of performance evaluation<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, appropriately chosen work incentives enhance the level of employee motivation and lead to improved results of individual performance and positively correspond to overall organizational productivity. Finally, the growing body of research emphasizes the relation between increased motivation of employees and higher rates of job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviour<sup>2</sup>, commitment and loyalty (Herzberg, 1966; Mobley, 1977; Smither, 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; Wang, Howell, Hinrichs & Prieto, 2011; Kovach, 1995). As a result of that, decreased level of absenteeism and employee turnover is also noticed.

Although these tendencies are applied to both private and public sector organizations, there is a solid amount of studies revealing a motivational difference between the employees in these two sectors. The main distinction lies in the forces driving employees for work performance. Intrinsically motivated<sup>3</sup> employees working for the wellbeing of the community and society are less motivated by the extrinsically driven organizational reward systems than those who work in private companies (Perry & Porter, 1982; Perry, 1996, 1997; Perry & Wise, 1990; Brewer, Selden, Facer & Rex, 2002; Wright, 2001; Vandenabeele, Depré, Hondeghem & Yan, 2004). In addition, the specific nature of public sector employee motivation is defined by organizational mission not only as a central element in the system of organizational strategic management but also in the process of

- 
- 1 The system focuses on performance assessment of an individual employee and usually is related to the distribution of performance rewards and/or suggestions for professional development considering the results of appraisal.
  - 2 Voluntary attempts of an employee to enhance the effectiveness of an organization without expectations to receive performance reward under the organizational system of performance motivation.
  - 3 An intrinsically motivated employee performs his/her work driven by the internal satisfaction of doing the tasks, while an externally motivated person focuses on the rewards related to the outcomes of performance.

individual motivation of all the levels of employees (Kaplan & Norton, 1996a; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999).

The fact that employees in public and private sectors can be differently motivated does not mean that there is a practice of distinct systems of performance evaluation. The processes of performance measurement and evaluation are similarly applied in both public and private sector organizations. The key feature of the systems of performance evaluation is grounded by the ideas of goal-setting theory aiming to define specific, measureable, attainable, relevant and timely goals for employees (SMART criteria). Since the main reasons for the application of SMART-based performance evaluation systems are work planning and accountability, their motivational strength is rarely discussed in the academic community. Those, however, who analysed this topic, focused only on the private sector and noticed a positive impact of performance evaluation system only on extrinsically motivated employees while in the case of the intrinsically motivated ones the impact was found to be negative (Roopnarain & Lau, 2012; Oh & Lewis, 2009).

The motivational success of the system of performance evaluation also depends on psychological characteristics of the evaluated employees. According to the trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000), an individual is intrinsically motivated if the performance of a particular task satisfies the need of his or her individual personality traits. Therefore, it can be inferred that a performance evaluation system and the way it functions in an organization will differently motivate/demotivate employees depending on their personality characteristics. On the basis of this principle, psychometric instruments are developed and successfully applied in the processes of human resource management: employee selection, development, career planning, etc. (e.g. Cattell & Mead 2008; Ashton, 2013). The psychological personality type is a result of the categorization of personality traits. According to it, a certain structure of workplace procedures can be adapted in order to reach a mutual benefit: organization productivity and employee motivation. Though personality assessment is a significant part of the field of human resource management, there still is a lack of research into the possible relations between personality characteristics and the systems of performance evaluation.

The lack of studies on various aspects of performance evaluation in the public sector is especially noticed while concentrating on the Lithuanian experience. The initiative of Ramūnas Vanagas and Aurimas Tumėnas (2008) to analyse the system of performance evaluation as a part of the Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) could be an exception rather than common practice. Possible mismatches between the formal regulations and daily practice were noticed by these authors. This phenomenon is highly researched in the discipline of the sociology of law and known as the “the gap problem”<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless, Tumėnas and Vanagas did not focus on these issues and their study was not empirically based.

Similarly, during the last decade, performance measurement in public service met challenges in all countries of “performance measurement regimes”. Even the supporters of the new public management confirm the growing tendency of significant gaps between the results generated by performance measurement systems and the real situation, especially this is noticed on the macro organizational level (Norman, 2002; Metawie & Gilman, 2005;

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4 However, the sociology of law does not deal with performance evaluation.

Bevan & Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; Radin, 2006; Thomas, 2006; Hood, Dixon & Wilson, 2009; Hoque & Adams, 2008; Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Goh, 2012).<sup>5</sup>

The “gap problem” was encountered while conducting the empirical part of this research in the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania (the OPML). A conceptual model explaining the relationship between the system of performance evaluation, the competencies of employees and work motivators/demotivators was developed at the beginning of this study. However, the initial results indicated that the informal system exists beside the formal one. This information was taken into consideration and the conceptual model was redesigned.

**Research purpose.** This research aims to contribute to the practice and theory of public management and administration by developing 1) a better understanding of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the public sector and work motivators/demotivators in both of the systems as well as the motivational/demotivational impact of these systems on civil servants of different personality types, 2) a conceptual interdisciplinary research platform presenting the intersections of public management (civil servants and the process of their performance evaluation), the sociology of law (formal and informal systems of performance evaluation) and personality psychology (different types of personality).

**The main research question.** To what extent the informal system of performance evaluation exists beside the formal system of performance evaluation and how do they operate as work motivators/demotivators for civil servants of different psychological types?

**Research questions.** The research questions are split into three subsequent parts:

#### **Part I**

Q1. What is the formal system of performance evaluation and its’ role in the civil service of Lithuania?

Q2. What is the informal system of performance evaluation and its’ role in the civil service of Lithuania?

Q3. How are the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation related together in the OPML

#### **Part II**

Q4. What are the personality traits of advisers working in the OPML?

Q5. What motivates advisers of different psychological types in the OPML?

#### **Part III**

Q6. How do advisers of different psychological types perceive the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML?

Q7. What are the possible consequences of their perception towards these systems on their work performance motivation?

**Previous research.** There are two main research fields covering the core of this dissertation: performance evaluation and work motivation. The reviewed literature on

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<sup>5</sup> Currently, the official title is the Office of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. However, at the time of the research it was the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania; therefore, this title is used to refer to the organization in this thesis.

performance evaluation focuses on the systems of personnel evaluation in the public sector and—what is important in the context of this thesis—includes not only the components of the formal system but also the manifestations of the elements attributed to the informal one. Similarly, the reviewed research on work motivation emphasizes the specific features of the public sector, although it also includes the analysis of the relationship between the perception of motivators/demotivators and the personality traits of an individual that is common to both the private and the public sector. In the forthcoming sections, the general trends of research into both of these subjects are presented.

**Systems of performance evaluation in the public sector.** The processes of performance evaluation and performance measurement supplement each other. Discussions about the overlapping between the measurement and evaluation as well as the integration of them are comprehensively described by James C. McDavid and Laura R.L. Hawthorn (2006). The evaluation of a programme, personnel or the entire organization cannot be done without measurement at the initial stage. Both of these processes are directly linked to the paradigm of new public management.

Though public sector performance measurement traces back before the birth of new public management (Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2010; Ridgway, 1956; Williams, 2002, 2003, 2004), only with the beginning of this movement the programmes of performance evaluation on the organizational and individual levels came into the practice of everyday life of public service organizations. The vast majority of the current research into performance measurement in the public sector analyses the Anglo-Saxon experience on the results-based management as a part of the implemented reforms of new public management (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Highly cited authors such as Christopher Hood (1991), David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1993), Michael Barzelay and Babak J. Armajani (1992) were among the pioneers who contributed to the spread of managerial ideas in the literature of public administration. They emphasized the need to evaluate performance results in the public sector as a fundamental mean to achieve better overall organizational effectiveness. However, their specific interest was in the overall organizational performance rather than the evaluation of personnel performance. New public management boosted a wide array of empirical studies on the implementation of the systems of performance measurement (e.g. Brignall & Modell, 2000; Goh, 2012; Greiling, 2010; Hoque & Adams, 2008; Norman, 2002; Poister, 2003; Sen, 2007; Wang & Berman, 2001). The diversity of opinions about performance measurement in the public sector leads to growing visibility of the critiques of this phenomenon (e.g. Adcroft & Willis, 2005; Hood & Peters, 2004; Hood, 2006; Pollitt, 2008). The gathered empirical evidence brought scepticism towards performance measurement with the emphasis on setting unambitious targets (target gaming) and minimal effect of improving the quality of public services. The practice of private sector management had a strong influence on new public management. Business-oriented models of strategic management were the major source for the trends to the systems of performance measurement in the public sector. Growing scholarly interest in performance measurement systems, investigation of the importance of different elements, which have to be included in the general framework of overall organizational performance measurement, has been noticed since the beginning of 1990s (e.g. Kanji & Moura, 2010; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Kaplan, 2001; Neely, Adams & Crowe, 2001; Neely, Gregory & Platts, 1995; Neely, 2005). These ideas were transmitted from the business sector and adapted to the public sector (e.g. Klingner, Nalbandian &

Llorens, 2010; Kaplan, 2001; Nigro & Kellough, 2014). Both business and private versions of the systems of performance measurement emphasize result-based measurement and recommendations how to cascade the organizational objectives to the lower employees' levels (Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996a; Kaplan, 2001). In addition, there is a wide scope of academic literature of management and administration which stresses the importance of raising concrete objectives and choosing appropriate tactics in evaluating performance progress within the period of a year (e.g. Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978; Dixon, Nanni & Vollmann, 1990; Eccles, 1991). The same objectives are necessary elements in the systems of performance evaluation in both private and public sector organizations.

Systems of performance evaluation, also known as systems of performance appraisal, concentrate exclusively on personnel evaluation, what is intensively discussed in the field of human resource management. Reactions of raters (superiors) and ratees (subordinates) to the process of performance evaluation were studied by Glenn A. Bassett and Herbert H. Meyer (1968), Brian D. Cawley, Lisa M. Keeping and Paul E. Levy (1998), Amit Dhiman and Manjari Singh (2007), Lisa M. Keeping and Paul E. Levy (2000), En Moren (2013), Ivan T. Robertson, Militza Callinan and Dave Bartram (2002), Aharon Tziner, Richard Kopelman and Christine Joanis (1997). For example, empirical findings prove the higher sense of ratees' satisfaction in case of their participation in the process of evaluation (Cawley et al., 1998). The effect of the rater's personal characteristics on the systems of performance evaluation was analysed by Kenneth N. Wexley and Margaret A. Youtz (1985) who presented empirical evidence that the beliefs of raters have a measurable impact on the accuracy and leniency of evaluation. The relation between the systems of performance evaluation and motivational theories of work was investigated by Angelo S. DeNisi and Robert D. Pritchard (2006), Tziner and Kopelman (1988). DeNisi and Pritchard (2006) proposed a motivational framework for the interpretation of the systems of performance evaluation which emphasizes the idea of performance improvement rather than result measurement. The influence of the systems of performance evaluation on the motivation of employees was among the topics of the works by Donald J. Campbell, Kathleen M. Campbell and Ho-Beng Chia (1998), Michael A. Mulvaney, William R. McKinney and Richard Grodsky (2012). Mulvaney, McKinney and Grodsky indicated positive correlations between the implementation of the system of performance evaluation and a higher level of employees' motivation to work. Koen Dewettinck and Hans van Dijk (2013), Roger C. Mayer and James H. Davis (1999a) studied perceived fairness of the system of performance evaluation by the ratees. They found that trust in the system of performance evaluation has an impact not only on the success of the system itself but also on a higher level of the sense of trust of the top management and the whole organization. John F. Kikoski (1999), Ahron Tziner and Gary P. Latham (1989) analysed the influence of effective communication and feedback system on the effectiveness of the system of performance evaluation. The results of their study revealed that effective communication is one of the key issues determining the success of the system of performance evaluation.

Numerous examples of the drawbacks and success of the system of performance evaluation are described in the works of Stephen J. Carroll and Craig E. Schneier (1982), Larry M. Coutts and Frank W. Schneider (2004), Daniel R. Ilgen and Jack M. Feldman (1983), David C. Martin and Kathryn M. Bartol (1998), David W. Rees and Christine Porter (2003, 2004), Mike Schraeder, Bret J. Becton and Ron Portis (2007), Barbara Townley (1999). Empirically-based recommendations for the improvement of such

systems are given by Kathryn M. Bartol, Cathy C. Durham and June M. Poon (2001) and Linda S. Pettijohn et al. (2001). The investigations of the systems of performance evaluation in the public sector are presented in the studies of Silvia Horton (2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007). The main goal of these studies is to demonstrate the growing role of the systems of performance evaluation as well as to emphasize the impact of different tools and techniques of evaluation on employees and organizations.

**Work motivation.** In the second part of the literature review, research into work motivation is presented from the perspective of the sciences of management and psychology.

To begin with, Michael Armstrong (2001), Peter F. Drucker (2007), Gerald R. Ferris et al. (1995), and David Stern (1982) argue that there is a high managerial interest in work motivation as a way to improve organizational effectiveness by increasing the productivity of employees. The leading question in the academic community of management is how to control and enhance individuals' motivation in order to reach overall organizational goals (e.g. Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Arnold & Schoonman, 2002; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Herzberg, 1966; McCann & Buckner, 1994; McClelland, 1987; Vroom, 1967). Since the beginning of 1990s, numerous research papers have been published confirming the basic ideas of Frederick Herzberg's two factor theory, Victor H. Vroom's expectancy theory or David C. McClelland's theory of need achievement. The correlation between higher work motivation of employees and better results of their performance was illustrated by the studies of Kenneth A. Kovach (1995), Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham (2002) and Barton A. Weitz et al. (1986). Maureen L. Ambrose and Carol T. Kulik (1999) reviewed more than 200 investigations on work motivation and concluded that the main premises of the major motivational theories "received considerable empirical support" (p. 278). More specifically, the research proved the existence and impact of certain motivators (e.g. McClelland's need of power) on individuals' motivation to work.

The studies of Marco van Herpen, Mirjam van Praag and Kees Cools (2005), Alexis H. Kunz and Dieter Pfaff (2002), Kenneth E. Merchant and Wim A. van der Stede (2007), Seong Soo Oh and Gregory B. Lewis (2009), Alan R. Webb (2004) and Ketvi Roopnarain and Chong M. Lau (2012) are among those which deal with the motivational outcomes of the implementation of the systems of performance evaluation for the employees in organizations. For instance, Roopnarain and Lau (2012) discovered positive correlations between the installed system of performance evaluation and certain dimensions of employee work motivation. However, the results of Oh and Lewis' (2009) quantitative analysis revealed less optimistic results saying that there is a remarkable harm of the systems of performance evaluation to the motivation of intrinsically motivated employees. Intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation, which are influenced by various practices of the systems of performance evaluation, were also extensively discussed in studies of van Herpen, Praag and Cools (2005) and Webb (2004).

Motivational differences between private and public sector employees were emphasized in the works of Gene A. Brewer et al. (2002), Philip E. Crewson (1997), Christoph Demmke (2005), Lloyd W. Warner et al. (1964), Sean T. Lyons, Linda E. Duxbury and Christopher A. Higgins (2006), James L. Perry and Lyman W. Porter (1982), James L. Perry and Lois R. Wise (1990). The underlying idea behind these studies is that public sector employees are driven by a different understanding about various forms of rewards, i.e. prestige and belief in the importance of a job is a stronger motivator for civil servants than monetary



rewards (Emmerich, 1964). In addition, there are many authors claiming that public sector employees are motivated intrinsically rather than extrinsically (Georgellis et al., 2011; Perry & Porter, 1982; Perry & Wise, 1990). In 1990, Perry presented the measurement scale of public service motivation, which attracted academic interest and boosted the scope of research into this area. A solid number of studies were conducted with the aim to test this scale and find possible correlations between public service motivation and various managerial constructs. As a result, the link between a higher level of public service motivation and organizational commitment, job satisfaction as well as organizational citizenship behaviour was revealed (Brewer et al., 2002; Coursey & Pandey, 2007; Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Wright & Pandey, 2008; Crewson, 1997; Jung & Rainey, 2011; Kim, 2006; Pandey et al., 2008; Boardman & Sundquist, 2009).

Although both public service motivation and the systems of performance evaluation are high on the agenda of the academic community, there is a limited number of attempts to analyse the impact that the systems of performance evaluation have on work motivation, particularly in the public sector. The main works contributing to the filling of this gap are related to the role of human resource management in new public management (e.g. Bach & Kessler, 2008; Ingraham, 2007; Immordino, 2009). The leading academics working with this topic concentrate on a wider scope of subjects (e.g. performance management) and do not explicitly investigate the link between public service motivation and the systems of performance evaluation. Similarly, there is a limited number of authors who focus on the relations between public service motivation and goal commitment, organizational control or other elements that could be reflected in the system of performance evaluation. The study of Craig Matheson (2012) is one of the few illustrations of the analysis of the link between different orientations towards work and public service motivation. In addition, Seok E. Kim and Dian Rubianty (2011), raised the question of how perceived fairness of the system of performance evaluation influences intrinsically motivated employees. Moreover, these authors also discussed whether the system of performance evaluation itself can serve as a motivator for public service employees.

The debates about the dichotomy between differences of public and private sectors employees did not receive similar attention in the field of personality psychology, namely, personality trait theory. There are just a few examples of comparisons between personality traits of individuals working in the public versus the private sector. For example, Dimitris Bourantas and Nancy Papalexandris (1999) revealed some differences in the needs for security and pay as well as in protestant work ethics (reflected in Weber's bureaucratic values). In another study, Sue A. Frank and Gregory B. Lewis (2004) also analysed the relation between protestant work ethics and these two groups of people, and found no significant difference between private and public sector employees. On the other hand, Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda (1995) present theoretical assumptions influencing different reactions to the same motivator and discuss the role of personality traits in respect of motivation. In addition, a number of personality assessment instruments validated by various empirical research, e.g. Raymond Cattell's 16PF (Cattell & Mead, 2008) or Katharine Myers' and Isabel Briggs' MBTI (Bayne, 1997), confirm that different personality traits of people arouse different reactions to the same motivators, i.e. the same incentives cause motivation of different levels or even leads to demotivation.



## 1. THEORY

In this chapter, organizational control will be presented as a unifying theoretical concept bridging the perspectives of human resource management, the sociology of law and personality psychology into one coherent framework of research. Eric G. Flamholtz, T. K. Das and Anne S. Tsui (1985), academics in management and business administration, were among the pioneers of integrative multidisciplinary studies of organizational control. They proposed an interpretation of organizational control “as attempts by the organization to increase the probability that individual will behave in ways that will lead to the attainment of organizational objectives” and operationalized it by “personal supervision, standard operating procedures, position descriptions, performance measurement and reward systems” (p. 35). This explanation represents the managerial understanding of the system of human resource management control mechanisms; however, it neither provides enough information for answering the research questions reaching beyond the formal level of control nor devotes sufficient attention to the reactions of an individual employee to different forms of performance regulation.

In fact, while dealing with the mechanisms of organizational control, human resource management faces a challenge to integrate interdisciplinary perspectives together and to minimize the gap between formal and informal systems of performance evaluation or at least widen our knowledge about the latter. Consequently, in this chapter, sociological and psychological insights supplementing the perspective of human resource management are emphasized in order to meet the challenges and fulfil the research tasks of the thesis. Interdisciplinary focus on organizational control contributes to the holistic understanding of this phenomenon as well as opens an area for multilevel interpretations of control mechanisms and their impact on those whose behaviour is being controlled.

### 1.1. Sociological, administrative and psychological considerations on organizational control as equivalents of macro, meso and micro levels of analysis

Sociological origins of organizational control mechanisms are traced in today's bureaucratic organizations and play an important role in understanding the outcomes of the managerial way of controlling employees' behaviour, evaluating their work results and predicting future performance. Max Weber (1992), one of the founding fathers of sociology and theorists of public administration, applied the metaphor of “the iron cage” (originally “*stahlhartes Gehäuse*”) by emphasizing the mechanisms of control within the social life (Weber, 1978). On one hand, Weber discussed formal control as a distinctive feature of a modern organization (“bureaucracy”). He mentioned that “modern officialdom functions” on the basis of “the principle of official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws and administrative regulations <...>” and that “the management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned” (Weber, 1978, p. 956). In this context,

the type of regulation characterizes the difference between bureaucracy governed by modern and formal rules and other organizations managed on the basis of informal rules. In other words, Weber emphasized the positive features of a bureaucratic organization, its formal rules and administrative order. Moreover, he presented bureaucracy as the superior form of organization leading to the stability, responsibility and quality of work. On the other hand, Weber mentioned the threats for bureaucracy to develop into inflexible and dehumanized systems of organizational power and control. Though the formal way of organizational control is attributed to modernity, it not necessary results in higher quality of performance and positive outcomes for individuals. For instance, Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott (2002), in their analysis of people trapped into “the iron cage”, investigated the mechanisms of organizational control and their impact on the regulation of an employee’s identity.

In today’s bureaucratic organization, “the iron cage” represents administrative rules, standards, systems of performance evaluation and measurement as well as many other processes of organizational control. The formal mechanisms of control are treated as a contrast to the informal ones and their mutual relation is a complex issue for the academic community. Numerous interpretations on “the iron cage” as an illustration of organizational control have emerged since Weber. One of the works emphasizing the relevance of Weber’s works for the society of the twenty-first century is Sung Ho Kim’s (2004) book *Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society* where he analysed Weber’s ideas, including the phenomenon of the modern “iron cage” and its latest manifestations. Moreover, Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (2000) in the article *The Iron Cage Revisited* also developed the topic of control based on Weber’s ideas about society. They explained that the aim of the members of an organization (“rational actors”) is to increase its effectiveness and, therefore, they chose to implement “institutional isomorphism and collective rationality” by following the structure, culture, output as well as the main practices of human resource management of the successful examples (p.147). In other words, organizations have a tendency to model themselves on the pattern of already existing similar administrative bodies rather than making decisions to become different. Particularly, this is a case in public sector institutions (Ashworth, Boyne & Delbridge, 2009). In this context, the authors present three types of the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change (coercive, mimetic and normative) leading to the result that organizations become similar to each other. There are different conditions related to the emergence of each of the isomorphism. Briefly, coercive isomorphism emerges when one organization is dependent on another and the society dictates its expectations on their performance results. In such situations, the subordinate organization absorbs the core principles of functioning from the main organization. Mimetic isomorphism comes when an organization operates in uncertain or ambiguous situations, unpredictable environment or when it has no clear goals, vision and mission. Under such circumstances, a common experience is to borrow ideas from the “best practice” examples. The third, normative isomorphism, is closely related to the professionalization of organization members, its consultants as well as all other people influencing the organization. To put it more clearly, DiMaggio and Powell (2000) understood professionalization as “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work” (p. 152). Educational system, training

courses and professional associations share similar programs, ideas, goals and values, which later are transmitted and implemented in organizations.

The Weberian “iron cage” symbolizes the macro level of organizational control with an emphasis on its regulatory function in the society. As Flamholtz, Das and Tsui (1985) claimed, the sociological interpretation of control is “essentially macroscopic in nature” and focuses on “the entire organization and the larger groups within it” (p. 37). The distinction between different levels of control is closely related to the object of the present research and, consequently, to the theoretical approach. Das (1993) stressed the importance of the macro level within the nature of organizational control in terms of such sociological paradigms as social factism, social behaviourism and social definitionism. The author divided the studies on organizational control processes into three clusters: cybernetic/goal perspective, power/authority perspective and cultural perspective. However, Das also mentioned limited capabilities of these perspectives to explain the nature of organizational control and stressed the necessity for a more comprehensive view on this type of regulation. He claimed that “certain aspects of organizational control that cannot be accommodated within these traditional perspectives need to be recognized and incorporated into a more holistic approach” (p. 385).

Formal and informal systems of performance evaluation, as a form of the mechanism of organizational control as well as a type of isomorphism, cannot be systematically analysed without getting a deeper perception of the external environment, organizational culture and structure. Neither of these systems can be thoroughly investigated without the integration of administrative (organizational) and psychological (individual employee) perspectives into the theoretical framework of research. Both meso and micro levels of organizational control contribute to the holistic understanding of the phenomenon of performance evaluation—a form of “the iron cage” in every bureaucratic organization.

Consequently, the system of performance evaluation is a major source of organizational control implemented by the departments of human resource management. Being between macro (social) and micro (individual) levels of analysis, employee performance regulation is an object of research in human resource management, which interprets organizational control from the meso level perspective. Four basic elements compose the core system of organizational control according to this paradigm: planning, measuring, feedback and evaluation (Flamholtz et al., 1985; Flamholtz, 1996). Each of them has different purposes related to the effectiveness of the system of performance evaluation. More precisely, the main aspects of planning include the establishment of goal standards, i.e. the process of individual–organizational goal congruence, participation in goal setting and goal clarity are the most important components in this category (e.g. Latham & Yukl, 1975; Simon, 1964). Measurement concentrates on the administration of a performance evaluation system as well as the validity and reliability of methods measuring behaviour and results of individual and organizational performance (e.g. Flamholtz, 1979; Hofstede, 2001). The evaluative feedback reflects the directive function of organizational control and highlights its corrective features on employee performance behaviour (e.g. Seligman & Darley, 1977; Becker, 1978; Ilgen, Fisher & Taylor, 1979). The evaluation–reward mechanism encompasses both intrinsic and extrinsic motivational elements of people’s work performance, reward contingency, valence and equity (e.g. Adams, 1963; Vroom,

1967). Graphic representation of the adapted Flamholtz, Das and Tsui (1985) model of organizational control is demonstrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Sequence of organizational control

Each of these elements in the sequence of organizational control not only indicates the mechanisms of performance regulation but also functions as a process which forces an individual personality to meet the performance requirements of an organization and the society. The micro (psychological) level of control has an impact on planning, feedback and evaluation–reward stages of organizational control. Individual differences in personality-related dimensions (such as attitudes, values and traits) not only affect the results of work performance (Tannenbaum & Allport, 1956; Barrick & Mount, 1991) but also influence different employees’ understanding of work motivators lying within the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. An employee of any bureaucratic organization experiences the state of being in “the iron cage” and at the same time encounters the real interpretation of that cage, what leads to the problem of a gap and flourishes in different colours depending on the eyes of the observer.

To sum up, the macro, meso and micro levels of control correspond to different perspectives regarding the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as mechanisms of organizational control. Sociological, administrative and psychological aspects or human performance regulation are closely interconnected and compose a holistic view of this phenomenon. Their interrelation is shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Different perspectives of organizational control

## 1.2. Formal and informal systems of social control, socio-legal norms and organizational culture/the sociology of law perspective

Robert C. Ellickson (1994), professor of law at Yale University, is one of the key figures analysing the role of the informal system of social control in organizations. The analysis of the informal systems of social control existing in parallel to the formal ones receives exceptional attention in the socio-legal research tradition connecting law and society into one coherent object of study. In the book *Order Without Law* (1994), Ellickson investigates the system of social control by emphasizing the importance of informal norms which, in his assessment, often not only replace the order established by the law but also provides an answer to the question how and why the existing formal rules are overshadowed or even changed by the informal ones. “The subsystem of informal enforcement of norms” is what helps people to ensure the functioning of groups and organizations (Ellickson, 1994, p.123).

Donald Black (1980), an American sociologist, applied the theory of the sociology of law in his study of police behaviour and highlighted that social environment or “social space”, as he called it, is a highly influential factor determining the decisions of this powerful organization of formalized social control. Social space reflects the idea of Black’s social geometry and is composed of five dimensions: horizontal (characterizes the intensity of interactions between people), vertical (corresponds to the level of uneven distribution of wealth), corporate (embodies the strength of organizing individuals into groups), cultural (shows the frequency of symbolic expressions) and normative (demonstrates perceived authority and social control) (Black, 1995). The informal system of social control emerges from the contact between people living in a social space and the rule of law establishing a framework of control of their behaviour. Following this line of reasoning, it can be inferred that the informal system of control contains some traits of the formal one (a kind of a hybrid system), whereas the strength of the impact of the formal control system on the real life practice depends on the acceptance of its content among group members. To put it more clearly, the level of the congruity of formal control with individual perceptions, beliefs and values of group members describes how much of the formal system of control will be implemented into the everyday life of the organization.

The mismatch between the formal and informal or, as Roscoe Pound (1910) wrote, “law in books and law in action” encourages the community of the sociologists of law to apply their interdisciplinary approach and knowledge in order to contribute to the minimization of the distance between these two dimensions. Pound concluded that a higher level of integration of the real practice of law into the legislation system is a necessity for effective functioning of both law and society. David Nelken in a similar context argued that existing “‘discrepancies’ or ‘disjunctions’ between promises or claims held out for law and its actual effects, a concern, <...> is often described as the ‘gap problem’” (Nelken, 1981). The author summarized that the gap problem can be reasonably treated as a starting point of the sociological investigations of law.

The gap problem also occurs when legal and social norms clash and an organization becomes a victim of a compromise between them. The essence of norms in sociological context is explicitly analysed as one of the elements of the sociological theory (e.g. Habermas, 1992; Parsons, 2010) and as the underlying reason of the gap problem (e.g.

Banakar, 2011; Ehrlich, Pound, & Ziegert, 1936; Nelken, 1981; Pound, 1910). Norms as societal constructs are responsible for the regulation of human behaviour and appear in any kind of analyses where an individual meets group demands to accept social standards.

Emile Durkheim (1982), the father of sociology, mentioned norms in the context of social facts which he understood as being “general over the whole of a given society <...>” (p. 55). Since Durkheim (1982) interpreted social facts through the lens of collective society, he emphasized beliefs, tendencies and practices that come from the community, consciously or unconsciously affect individuals, and play an important role in developing the mechanisms of social constrain. Such a type of socialization is guided by any norms and values that are the examples of the representation of social facts. Mathieu Deflem (2008), in his review of the major accomplishments of the sociology of law, also mentioned norms and values in the same line of reasoning. In addition, the author made a clear differentiation between these two concepts and indicated a direct link between norms and control by saying that “values are conceptions about desirable ways of life, whereas norms are sanctionable standards of conduct” (p. 198). The regulatory function of norms leads to the result that norms are of greater interest in the sociology of law than values, especially in the studies that focus on the mechanisms of social control. Moreover, socio-legal norms can be operationalized to tasks and goals which are incorporated into various managerial tools of organizational performance evaluation. For example, this is the case in the institutions of public administration where personnel management is regulated by the Law on Civil Service. Thus the multi-functionality of norms opens more possibilities for interdisciplinary research.

Though understanding tendencies, underlying reasons as well as consequences of the development of norms is the major interest in the sociology of law, there is still no consensus regarding the definition of this concept (Horne, 2001; Hydén & Svensson, 2008). Scandinavian sociologists of law Håkan Hydén and Måns Svensson (2008) explicitly analysed the concept of norms and concluded that the norms of the socio-legal type combine the elements of legal standards (what they called the internal view of norms) and those derived from the social environment investigated by various disciplines of social sciences (external) into one. From the perspective of the sociology of law, legal norms do not exist in a vacuum as their enforcement is influenced by the social norms, while the clash between them generates new demands for research, definitions of concepts as well as academic interpretations. Svensson (2013) has chosen a way of concentrating on ontological and psychological dimensions of norms and developed a multi-dimensional definition of this concept by emphasizing that all types of “norms have three properties in common, they are imperative, yet social facts and in the end always subjective” (p. 10). His description of norms combines the perspectives of law, sociology and social psychology and, therefore, is easier adaptable in other theoretical disciplines, e.g. human resource management. Hydén (2011) discussed different types of norms by classifying them into three levels in a hierarchical order: the micro level marked by the lowest intensity of formal regulation is noticed in mutual human relations; the mezzo level refers to the internal organizational rules and is incorporated into the strategy of the resource management of a company, whereas the macro level reflecting the collective interests of the society is embodied in the legal documents of a state and represents the most rigid form of normative regulation. Hydén introduced a “Collection of essays from doctoral

candidates from different academic subjects and different parts of the world” dealing with the issues of the norms of law and society. His attempts to stimulate academic discussion on legal rules related to norms also illustrated that in spite of different research objects, normative discourse is a relevant issue in all the disciplines of social sciences. For example, Julija Naujėkaitė’s thesis dealing with the implementation of international climate change agreements on the local level combines the perspectives of multi-level governance and the sociology of law in the same research. To conclude, society, social norms and legal rules compose an integrated scheme of the sociological research of law where the real life practices of creating an order with and without law are incorporated into different academic fields of study.

The macro (organizational) perspective of analysis dictates that the Law on Civil Service, social norms of an institution and internalized norms or beliefs of employees play the key role in the construction of the culture of public sector organizations by integrating formal (law-determined) and informal (employee-determined) sources of information. According to Richard A. Peterson (1979), the sociological understanding of culture involves norms, values, beliefs and expressive symbols (any aspects of material culture). The managerial definition of organizational culture implies the same elements and they are treated as attributes of an organization (e.g. Armstrong, 2001; Cheyne & Loan-Clarke, 2005; Gary Dessler, 2011). From this point of view, organizational culture is like a litmus paper of internal institutional norms.

Roger Cotterrell (2006), a British professor of legal theory, investigated possible intersections of law and culture. He described culture as “the content of different types of social relations of community and the networks (combinations) in which they exist” (p. 97). The author explained possible relations between law and culture via six variations: a) “law’s dependence on culture”, b) “law’s recognition of culture”, c) “law’s domination of culture”, d) “law as an object of cultural competition”, e) “law as a cultural projection” and f) “law’s stewardship of culture” (p. 98–102). Providing the system of organizational performance management in the public sector as an example, in such institutions there is always an aim to form their culture marked by a strong domination of the law on civil service though in reality the situation is different and informally formulated social norms have a tendency to become a critical source of power in strategic as well as personnel decision-making.

Direct linkage between norms and culture was also witnessed by the American sociologist Garry Alain Fine (2001) who claimed that via encoded social order culture satisfies people’s psychological needs for predictability. In particular, he investigated group culture. Culture, according to Fine, can be treated as a routine that minimizes the tension of uncertainty and satisfies the wish of an individual to forecast other people’s behaviour. Moreover, a conscious understanding that one’s behaviour is right and appropriate enhances the sense of comfort of a person and the society around. In addition, normative behaviour is encoded in culture and transmitted by the continued mechanism of taught and control. Thus, socialization aligns individuals encompassing culturally defined standards that incorporate different levels of norms, values and beliefs into one coherent system.

The mechanism of control is encoded in the ontological meaning of norms in all cultures and is closely related to the effective functioning of society. The issue of control



is relevant as a theoretical aspect of research and as a criterion of the effectiveness of any kind of a system, e.g. time consuming organizational control systems negatively correlate with the amount of hours employees can devote to their direct responsibilities at work. Hydén (2011) argued that “slightly roughly you can generalize <...> and say that the greater the distance between the actual norm in society and the legal rule the higher the cost of controlling the enforcement of rule” (p. 11).

The systems of control require a set of rules and remedies for the implementation and support of socio-legal norms in the society. Ellickson (1994) discussed three categories of human actions: deviant (have to be punished), surpassing (need to be rewarded) and ordinary (do not require any kind of reaction). Rewards and punishments of employees in civil service institutions are strictly regulated by the rule of law, whereas the measurement of the progress or damage is often performed at the informal level of control.

Sharyn L. Roach Anleu (2009) emphasized the normative character of law that is overshadowed by the informal structures of the implementation of social control. James J. Chriss (2013) described social control as “<...> all those mechanisms and resources, by which members of society attempt to assure the norm-conforming behaviour of others” (p. 18). For Chriss, social control is epitomized from norms and inherent to any situation where an individual encounters the social environment. The author divided social control into three categories: informal that covers interpersonal relations (it is functioning under the regulation of micro-level norms), medical that characterizes the control of more general situations irrespectively of the relationships between persons (the meso level of norms are dominating in this context) and legal control (the law and the legal system are the drivers of this form of control). While analysing performance management in the civil service as an example of social control, not only the clash of norms but also conjunctions of different social control mechanisms, namely, legal and medical (as they were explained by Chriss), have to become the target of study. Furthermore, in such a case, the gap problem could be reformulated considering the content of different types of organizational social control.

To sum up, the sociology of law comprehensively concentrates on the investigation of formal and informal systems of social control, socio-legal norms and organizational culture—all of these interrelated elements were presented to reflect my research problem. The conflict between the law-regulated system of performance evaluation and the informal real life practice leads to the clash between norms and forms a certain type of the culture of public sector organizations. Formal and informal mechanisms of social control regulate the whole system of human resource management and affect the motivation of the employees of different personality types. To cover these aspects of research, the perspectives of human resource management and personality psychology will be discussed in the following sections of the thesis.

### **1.3. Systems of performance evaluation (appraisal)/the human resource management perspective**

Human resource management, particularly the part of performance management, constitutes a solid part of the theoretical framework in analysing the systems of performance evaluation (or appraisal) as the main research object. Leading academics in human resource management emphasize its exceptional focus on issues related to



an employee, an employer or an organization (from the meso level perspective) in the development and implementation of performance evaluation systems (e.g. Armstrong, 2000, 2001; Beardwell, 2003; Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Boxall & Purcell, 2011; Woods & West, 2010; Colquitt, LePine & Wesson, 2012).

John Storey (2007) divided human resource management into two distinctive categories: “soft” and “hard”. The “soft” is described by the categories of employee–employer relations such as employee commitment, work satisfaction and motivation. The “Harvard Model” of human resource management is the most prominent analytical framework dealing with the soft issues within this field (Beer et al. 1984). The “hard” is characterized by “human resource policies, systems and activities with human resource strategies”, what could be largely ascribed to strategic human resource management (p. 15; 37). Following this line of reasoning, a system of performance evaluation can be analysed at least from two perspectives: as a practice of human resource management affecting employee feelings, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour within an organization (e.g. work motivation) or as an integral part of strategic human resource management responsible for the employee–organization alignment (e.g. investigation of compatibility between organizational goals and the criteria of a performance evaluation system).

Tom Redman (2006) also discussed two distinct forms of performance evaluation, though in a different manner. He accentuated two forms of performance evaluation: “judgmental” and “developmental” (p. 157). The former is linked to the distribution of performance rewards and thus has direct consequences on employees’ salary, while the latter concentrates on the identification of future potential and training needs of each member in an organization; therefore, its impact on employees’ financial benefits is indirect. Besides, Redman (2006) indicated that the judgmental form of performance evaluation is recently the dominating one, meaning that the system of performance evaluation becomes an administrative tool for ranking and categorizing people rather than a recommendatory instrument for their development and growth.

Similarly, Scott Snell and George Bohlander (2007) argued that the systems of performance evaluation are applied for two groups of reasons: “administrative” (concentrating on organizational-level topics such as documentation of personnel decisions, identification of poor performance and determination of promotion decisions) and “developmental” (giving priority to employee-level issues such as face to face performance feedback, identification of individual goals and training needs); however, the authors did not contrast these two types of evaluation forms and claimed that both of them supplement each other. John Bratton and Jeff Gold (2007) also suggested an analogous opinion and entitled these two forms of evaluation as “control” and “development” (p. 282). Additionally, organizational performance effectiveness, in their view, is directly related to the successful combination of these two forms of evaluation.

As a field of study, human resource management does not focus on the issues of informal evaluation. Rather than the analysis of informal systems it stresses the concept of “evaluation bias” explaining it as “a negative condition that inhibits evaluators or evaluations from finding true, pure and genuine knowledge” (Encyclopedia of Evaluation, 2005, p. 33). Evaluation bias is highly influenced by the subjectivity and prejudice of the evaluator. Contrast error, positive and negative leniency, halo and recency effects, central tendency, false attribution, stereotyping and negative approach are mentioned among the

most frequently noticed causes of the biases in performance appraisals (Bretz, Milkovich, & Read, 1992; Feldman, 1981; Redman, 2006). It is important to highlight that the informal system of performance evaluation is not a combination of errors. It is a separate system influencing those who receive as well as those who provide the appraisal rather than a false version of the formal one. Consequently, in the context of the research into the informal system, the answer can be found in organizational theory complementing the studies of human resource management.

Philip Selznick (1948) is considered to be one of the most influential scientists in the sphere of the theory of organization who successfully disclosed the relation between the formal and informal systems of bureaucratic organizations. He understood a formal organization as a “structural expression of rational action” which is influenced by “non-rational elements of organizational behaviour”. Employees, their individual personality, numerous habits and different commitments to various interest groups describe the non-rational asset of the informal organization within the formal one. Selznick stated that “in large organizations, deviations from the formal system tend to become institutionalized, so that ‘unwritten laws’ and informal associations are established” (p. 25).

It should be noted that the system of performance evaluation in public sector organizations is an integral part of what Selznick called the “formal system” and is characterized by formal attributes influenced by the elements of informal social control. For instance, one of such formal attributes is encoded in an organization’s tasks and vision to meet its short-term and long-term goals. Specifically, the author emphasized that formal organizational goals are often in conflict with the goals of individual employees, which are influenced by the “informal and unavowed ties of friendship, class loyalty, power cliques or external commitment” (p. 25–27). Goals of individual organization members have a direct impact on the system of formal organization and play a role in the formal system. Selznick argued that in certain cases an organization even transfers and integrates the elements of the informal system (formulated by individual employees) into the formal one. He called this principle the “cooptation” and explained it by an intention of an organization to prevent informal elements from becoming a threat for its existence. Cooptation arises as a result of a growing tension between the rational organizational system and its non-rational members and epitomizes a possible solution for the reestablishment of control and stability of the formal authority (Selznick, 1948, p. 25–27; 34). Thus by recognizing the influence of the informal system on the whole organization Selznick (1948) emphasized that every formal organization is an adaptive and constantly changing body. These insights have inspired further academic discussions in the field of management and, later, in human resource management.

William G. Ouchi (1979), an American professor in business management, also analysed the formal and informal levels of management by describing different types of control. Ouchi specializes in organization management and explicitly analyses the mechanisms of organizational control or, as he explained, the “mechanisms, through which organization can be managed so that it moves towards its objectives” (p. 833). The author divided the mechanisms of control into three distinct types: market, bureaucratic and clan. Each type can be implemented as a separate mechanism of control, though the combination of them in one organization is also possible.

Market control concentrates on the highest performance efficiency in terms of the proportion between incomes and expenses. For example, Ouchi (1979) states that the work of a purchasing agent might be efficiently evaluated by comparing the prices of the bids and the final purchase. Typically, the mechanism of market control is combined with the well corresponding reward system, in which performance rewards are distributed taking into account the direct impact of employees' contribution on the final performance result for the unit or the whole organization. While market control originally comes from the business type employee–organization relations, the elements of this mechanism can also be found in public sector organizations, especially in those organized in line with the ideas of the new public management, e.g. the number of attracted investments and their monetary benefit for the state.

The second control mechanism—bureaucratic control—is defined by the rules for the output and quality of organization's performance. It contains similar traits as Weber's bureaucracy; legitimate authority and ordinarily distribution of the official power are essential elements of the mechanism of bureaucratic control. The implementation of control is performed exclusively by the "close personal surveillance of subordinates by superiors" (Ouchi, 1979, p. 835). It means that bureaucratic control requires superiors' observation of employees' behaviour as well as translations of organizational rules into behavioural standards of performance in a most comparable way.

Ouchi and Maguire (1975) revealed that market and bureaucratic mechanisms of control correspond to different goals; the first one "occurs in manager's need to provide legitimate evidence of performance" and the second is experienced "when means–ends relations are known" and well realized by the manager (p. 559). Besides, there are more essential differences between these two forms of evaluation, e.g. rules (bureaucratic control) unlike prices (market regulation) are not so easily comparable. Taking the system of performance evaluation as an illustration, the competency evaluation part is an example of bureaucratic control, whereas the quantitative result stands for market regulation. As a result, a comparison between different levels of employees' competencies in bureaucratic organizations is a time and energy consuming process. Besides, bureaucratic control places more responsibility on the superior's shoulders as he or she is the key person making sure that the climate among the subordinates is positive and employees accept the fact of being surveyed and compared with others. Moreover, the superior is the key figure in the reward system as he or she makes the decisions regarding performance results and the distribution of incentives. In spite of the shortcomings of this control mechanism, the majority of large hierarchical organizations, especially in public sector, have no sufficient conditions (i.e. only a small part of performance evaluation results can be measured by market prices) to rely only on market control and then the bureaucratic type of regulation becomes one of their options. In his light, Ouchi (1977) commented that there is a relation between organizational structure and its control mechanism and both behaviour and output forms of evaluation are necessary for large-scale hierarchical organizations in order to maintain control.

Ouchi (1979) indicated "clan control" as the third type of control mechanisms, which is found in the "informal social structure" of an organization (p. 836). The author presented it as the most suitable when the transmission of certain values and indoctrination are among the main priorities of an organization. Under the conditions of uncertainty, in ambiguous

situations or when output-directed performance measurement fails, clan control helps to assure the continuity of the same managerial traditions in an organization. The criteria of performance evaluation system are encoded in organizational values and conveyed by a relatively stable number of loyal employees.

It should be noted that the author did not describe the control of informal social structure as an anomaly or a sort of the bias of management (as it is treated in the theory of management). On the contrary, he argued that it might be the only option when the first two types of control mechanisms cannot be implemented. For instance, it can effectively serve for saving time and costs by selecting the “right” candidates for particular tasks instead of auditing and surveying their performance results. Clan control principles are grounded on mutual social agreement among the members of an organization who share common attitudes, values and beliefs. It requires a higher level of organizational employee commitment and membership stability than the previous two types of control. In this regard, traditions, ceremonies and stories are an integral part of clan control constituting its culture and internalizing common values. Thus the elements of clan control could be often found in governmental level institutions such as ministries and other influential public sector organizations.

In a similar manner, a decade later Scott A. Snell (1992) investigated the link between the elements of strategic human resource management (e.g. organization size) and administrative application of human resource management control system. He applied the principles of managerial control for the investigation of human resource management control. Snell (1992) divided managerial control into three distinct categories: behaviour (similar to Ouchi's bureaucratic), input (corresponding to Ouchi's clan) and output (equivalent of Ouchi's market) control and claimed that all three categories of control comprehensively depict regulatory mechanisms within the field of human resource management. The author concluded that organizations having different strategic postures apply different types of control and mix them together. Likewise, Yao-Sheng Liao (2005) analysed control in human resource management with reference to the managerial tradition and generalized that systems of human resource management control should be aligned with an organization's strategic goals in order to maximize its performance effectiveness.

Both Ouchi and Snell were influenced by the works of Arnold S. Tannenbaum, professor of psychology, focusing on social psychology in organizations. Tannenbaum (1962) interpreted control as “any process in which a person or group of persons or organization of persons determines what other person or group or organization will do” (p. 239). He analysed the nature of power in formal organizations, its effect on employees as well as relationship with their performance effectiveness. The author not only emphasized the specific psychological meaning of control as emotionally charged restrictions of individual freedom, different individual reactions to the same type of control and people's reactions to those who hold the rights of authority but also indicated a direct positive correlation between higher rates of total organizational control and an increased level of a company's productivity. To put it more clearly, Tannenbaum (1962) concluded that when all levels of organization hierarchy exercise control of a higher strength, the overall effectiveness of the organization significantly increases. He interpreted higher performance effectiveness as a direct outcome of increased participation of the members of an organization in

performance initiatives. In addition, Tannenbaum (1962) claimed that a higher level of organizational control has a positive impact on employees' ego-involvement, organizational loyalty and identification, work motivation and job satisfaction. The manifestation of each of these employee–organization related facets contribute to the higher level of employees' conformity to the organizational requirements embodied via the mechanisms of control. However, the author also stressed that in order to reach positive outcomes of control, an organization cannot let the regulatory function become an overwhelming feature of organizational culture, and the balance between control and freedom should always be considered as the most important feature of the organizational management system.

From the perspective of organizational behaviour, control embodied in any method of performance evaluation and exercised by the supervisor has an effect on the needs and expectations motivating people to work (e.g. Mullins, 2007, p. 445; Kreitner & Kinicki, 2012; Colquitt, LePine & Wesson, 2012). Moreover, it also has an influence on the quality of appraisal. In addition, a number of the purposes of performance evaluation result in a variety of methods applied for the construction of performance appraisal system (e.g. competency-based appraisal, 360° performance appraisal, appraisal based on management by objectives) which arouse different reactions and have different impact depending on each individual employee. Furthermore, a combination of a few methods within the same company or institution enhances the measures of the systems' validity and reliability; consequently, performance evaluation applying different approaches and tools is a common practice in organizational performance management. At the same time, the more comprehensive the system of performance evaluation is the higher level of control it may generate and the higher influence it may have on employees and their motivation to work (Tannenbaum, 1962).

Wendy R. Boswell, Alexander J.S. Colvin and Todd C. Darnold (2008) studying the relations between organizational systems and employee motivation emphasized the importance of person–organization fit in terms of the alignment of individual employee goals with the organization's strategic objectives (what they called the “line of sight”) as the key opportunity to motivate workforce (p. 371–373). Correspondingly, Michael L. Nieto (2006) stated that performance evaluation may equally lead to employee motivation as well as demotivation, depending on how they perceive performance objectives and the process. He also mentioned organizational culture as an important aspect determining the success of the motivational capabilities of a performance evaluation system. Likewise, Robert L. Mathis and John J. Jackson (2010) even talked about “performance focused organizational culture” and the general integration of performance appraisal into the system of performance management as the essential criteria deciding upon whether the system of performance evaluation will result in higher employee work motivation, satisfaction and better performance results (p. 329; 355–357).

#### **1.4. Understanding and predicting employee work behaviour/the personality psychology perspective (the trait approach)**

Gordon W. Allport (1937), one of the pioneers of personality psychology, defined personality as “the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment” (p. 38). In this light, the

formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as an integral part of organizational environment are differently interpreted depending on the individual personality of an employee (micro level of analysis). In order to characterize human personality, Allport, also being a founder of trait theory of personality, suggested the concept of “personality trait” (Allport, 1927, 1931) and defined it as “generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment” (Allport & Odbert 1936, p. 26).

Further development of the trait theory and its concepts are largely related to subsequent studies of Allport. He introduced the distinction between the ideographic (emphasizing the unique individual) and nomothetic (highlighting the general tendencies) way of studying people in personality psychology and, as an example of the first one, coined the concept of “personal disposition” meaning “generalized neuropsychic structure (peculiar to the individual) with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and stylistic behaviour” (Allport, 1961, p. 373). For Allport, traits were either common (describing people within a particular cultural environment, e.g. liberal versus conservative) or individual (accurately characterizing human personality). Personal disposition is an equivalent of the individual and thus the personality trait. Additionally, Allport (1937) divided personal dispositions into three distinct categories: cardinal traits—the dominant ones (typically there are just one or two cardinal traits of one individual; they are especially significant and frequently expressed), central traits—the general ones (usually there are five or six characteristics of one person; often they are those few adjectives people use to describe the person he or she knows), and secondary traits—the hidden ones (the number of them might differ depending on the individual; these traits can be noticed only in certain situations under specific conditions). Multilevel and multi-facet personality traits serve as the main research object in the trait theory focusing on human personality as the centre of an individual and aiming to explain individual differences encoded in the traits.

Allport’s interpretation of the trait theory received criticism starting from the definition of the concept and ending with the lack of evidence of traits being the most important centre of a personality (e.g. Carr & Kingsbury, 1938; Hunt, 1965). These ideas encouraged the author to write an article *Traits Revisited* (1966) where he argued that the same assertions about personality traits constructed in the beginning of theory development were still valid four decades later. Specifically, he stressed the eight points claiming that trait “has more than nominal existence; is more generalized than a habit; is dynamic, or at least determinative, in behaviour; may be established empirically; is only relatively independent from other traits; is not synonymous with moral or social judgement; may be reviewed either in the light of the personality, which contains it, or in the light of its distribution in the population at large; acts, and even habits that are inconsistent with a trait are not proof of the nonexistence of the trait” (p. 1).

Allport, together with his colleague Odbert, were among the first scientists who applied lexical hypothesis, saying that the differences in personalities are encoded in their words of natural language, and, following the logics of it, they assessed the personality traits of individuals (Allport & Odbert, 1936). Consequently, it means that personality traits can be measured by giving an individual a list of words, questions or items and asking him or her to select the ones that best correspond to his or her everyday behaviour. Later this

assumption became the basis for many personality assessment questionnaires, including HEXACO, 16PF and NEO PI-R. Allport's theoretical and empirical argumentations significantly contributed to the validity and reliability of the personality trait theory and, therefore, had an impact on the scientific recognition of the trait approach within the field of psychology. Moreover, the empirical establishment of personality traits emerging from the possibility to assess them made the personality trait theory not only a widespread topic in the academic community but also a favourable subject for the practitioners of personality assessment.

Personality assessment and its mathematical representation in terms of factor analysis were extensively analysed by Raymon Cattell who applied statistical research methods while studying human personality. Cattell (1943) also presented the idea of splitting personality traits into two groups: primary and global factors (the latter is composed from the former ones), demonstrating the multilevel and hierarchical structure of the trait. Following this line of reasoning, Cattell developed a questionnaire that measures sixteen primary personality factors (16 PF), all of them composing five global factors. 16 PF as well as other tools of personality trait measurement is grounded on the notion that traits can predict such aspects of people's lives as academic achievement, results of work performance and motivational preferences, e.g. self-assertiveness positively correlates with good performance results in social studies, meaning that those individuals who have a highly expressed personality trait of self-assertiveness are more motivated to be engaged in the activities satisfying their needs of demonstrating this trait, i.e. becoming the leader of the group or participating in debate clubs (Cattell, 2008).

Cattell was not the only who raised the question of the precise number of traits composing human personality. Statistical analysis and large-sample empirical studies of personality took the dominant position in the field of the trait theory in the second part of the twentieth century. Following the ideas of Allport and Cattell, a few decades later Warren T. Norman (1963) concluded that five factors are the "adequate taxonomy of personality attributes". In addition, Lewis R. Goldberg (1982), after a large number of empirical studies, introduced "a compelling taxonomy of personality-descriptive terms" later entitled as "The Big Five" factors leading to "the universal representation of individual differences" (Goldberg, 1981, p. 233). Goldberg systematically analysed different models of personality traits (including Cattell's, Norman's, Eysenck's) and revealed that even though the names of personality factors usually are different, the meaning encoded within them is the same, and what needs to be done is to decode the tower of Babel and to understand the general elements of the taxonomy of personality traits (for the different names of the personality factors see Table 1. At present, "The Big Five" personality factors often are entitled as Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (abbreviated as OCEAN; McCrae & Costa, 2010, p.159).



Table 1. Names of personality factors suggested by different authors

|                         |              |               |                   |                     |                        |
|-------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| <b>Cattell</b>          | Exvia        | Cortertia     | Superego Strength | Anxiety             | Intelligence           |
| <b>Norman</b>           | Surgency     | Agreeableness | Consciousness     | Emotional Stability | Culture                |
| <b>McCrae and Costa</b> | Extroversion | Agreeableness | Consciousness     | Neuroticism         | Openness to Experience |

Source: Goldberg, 1981, p. 158; McCrae & Costa, 2010, p. 159.

The current understanding of the trait theory is significantly influenced by the research of Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa (1987). Their contribution to the five factor branch of psychology studies was recognized after presenting the work on the validation of the Five Factor Model of Personality. McCrae and Costa constructed a personality assessment instrument “NEO PI-R” for the measurement of the five factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992c), which was tested in numerous diverse studies in clinical and “normal” environment (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b; McCrae et al., 1998). The main difference between the “The Big Five” and the Five Factor Model is that the former defined personality factors by analysing the adjectives of personality, while the latter derives the factors of personality from questionnaires (Srivastava, 2013). Although it is worth to mention that in many studies that are not aimed at working out the models of personality factors, the concepts of the Five Factor Model and “The Big Five” are used interchangeably. The significance of McCrae’s and Costa’s studies for the theory of personality is not limited to the Five Factor Model, as the authors also developed a Five Factor Theory of personality aiming to “organize findings to tell a coherent story, to bring into focus those issues and phenomena that can and should be explained” and in this way to explain the role of the five factors in the theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 2010, p. 159).

Michael C. Ashton and Kibeom Lee (2004) have opened a new page in the studies of the trait theory by introducing “a personality inventory designed to measure six major dimensions of personality derived from lexical studies of personality structure” (p. 329). By applying the findings of the personality lexicon from different languages (first of all Korean and later various European languages, e.g. see Ashton, Lee, Marcus, & Vries, 2007; Boies, Yoo, Ebacher, Lee, & Ashton, 2004; Vries, Lee, & Ashton, 2008; Lee & Ashton, 2008) the authors proposed and validated a new model of six personality traits not only assessing “The Big Five” but also incorporating “consistent new findings” (Lee & Ashton, 2012, p. 16). The new model was entitled HEXACO where H stands for “Honesty-Humility”, E for “Emotionality”, X for “Extraversion”, A for “Agreeableness”, C for “Consciousness” and O for “Openness to Experience”. Ashton and Lee revealed that “The Big Five” neither reflects such aspects of human personality as “truthful, frank, honest and sincere” (named as “Honesty”) nor sufficiently represents the opposite part of them, e.g. “sly, calculating hypocritical, pompous, conceited, flattering and pretentious” (named as “Humility”) (Lee & Ashton, 2012, p.16). A number of studies have shown a correlation between the evaluation in the scales of HEXACO personality inventory and values, political attitudes and religiosity of large samples of respondents (e.g. Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010; Aghababaei, 2012; Leone, Desimoni & Chirumbolo, 2012; Leone, Chirumbolo &



Desimoni, 2012). In addition, in studies related to human resource management, the H factor of personality was especially emphasized as being the crucial point in understanding and predicting employee behaviour. For example, Reinout E. de Vries (2012) discovered the link between H and the practice of ethical leadership; Joshua S. Bourdage et al. (2012) stressed the relation between H and organizational citizenship behaviour; Ingo Zettler, Niklas Friedrich and Benjamin E. Hilbig (2011) found a direct connection between H and work commitment; Megan K. Johnson, Wade C. Rowatt and Leo Petrini (2011) indicated that H is “as a unique predictor of job performance”, particularly in care-giving roles of employment (p. 857).

Gregory J. Boyle, Gerald Matthews and Donald H. Saklofske (2008a) in an overview and assessment of the personality theory incorporated the latest trends in the research of personality theories and models and highlighted four basic principles of the trait theory composing the foundation of its strength and a wide range of the possibilities of interdisciplinary application: stability, heredity, generality of trait expression and interactionism. The first principle is about the permanence of the traits of adult personality in spite of different situations or circumstances; a rare exception might be only if one experiences life changing psychological crises. The meaning of the second principle is that at least some of personality traits are inherited. The third principle stands for universality by reflecting that personality traits are universally expressed across different countries and cultures. In the process of the translation and adaptation of personality trait assessment tools for different languages and cultures, this argument remains a strong support for the spread of the trait theory. Additionally, the element of universality opens a space for comparative studies within this field and helps to create a common language between the scientists and practitioners applying the theory of personality traits. The last principle specifies that personality traits are activated only in the situations that overstep individual threshold, i.e. the strength of situational stimuli determines whether a certain trait will manifest or not. For example, Robert P. Tett and Dawn D. Burnett (2003) developed a trait-based interactionist model of job performance which presents three different levels of trait-relevant cues: organizational, social and task.

The topics of person–situation interaction and motivation are directly related to the trait theory from its very beginning. Allport (1961) discussed personal dispositions by stressing the motivational power lying inside of them. The impact of environment as a source of situations pressing the manifestation of traits was always among the main uncontrollable problems in the theory of personality trait. Person–situation interaction was comprehensively discussed by Henry Murray (1938) in his work *Explorations in Personality* analysing human “needs”, their differences in the personality of individuals and situational factors arousing behaviour. Murray understood “need” as a “disequilibrium which stresses toward equilibrium” or as “organic potentiality or readiness to respond in a certain way under given conditions” (p. 61; 67). The author highlighted different motivational tendencies of needs varying according to the individual personality and the importance of the link between personality structure (including traits) and the situational environment. Murray’s research into human needs plays an indispensable role in the humanistic approach of the personality theory (its emphasis on the motivational aspects of individual personality, the impact on McClelland’s theory of achievement motivation are just a few examples of it); however, the dispositional approach to the “need” as the

main performance motivator stressing the unique structure of individual personality composed via its needs draws a direct connection between Murray's studies of human needs and Allport's personal dispositions and thus the perspective of the trait approach. Currently, in the field of work and organizational psychology, both of these perspectives are comprehensively discussed subjects involving motivational elements, personality traits and organizational environment.

### **1.5. Multilevel interdisciplinary interpretation of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation and their motivational impact on employees/research model**

In the previous sub-sections, theoretical guidelines for the development of a research model were presented. First of all, the concept of organizational control linking different levels of analysis was introduced in the context of this thesis. Secondly, three theoretical perspectives (the sociology of law, human resource management and personality psychology) were discussed in terms of their different locus of expertise:

- society, its culture and socio-legal norms (to answer research questions related to the formal and informal systems of control);
- administrative organization and management of its human resources (to analyse managerial aspects of performance evaluation system);
- individual human being and his or her personality (to understand individual differences between employees and thus the different impact of motivators/demotivators on individuals).

In this way, a more integrative view of employee–employer–organization relations in the field of human resource management was demonstrated and its relation to other disciplines of social sciences was highlighted. Motivational aspects encoded within the practices of human resource management, in particular, performance appraisal, its procedures as well as extrinsic and intrinsic rewards were mentioned in relation to the differences in the personalities of employees. Therefore, psychological and managerial research paradigms were applied for answering questions related to employee motivation/demotivation and their workplace behaviour in the organization.

A research model showing macro, meso and micro levels of the analysis of performance evaluation systems and their motivational impact on individual personalities of employees depicts the socio-cultural environment representing the sociological level of analysis and influencing the systems of performance evaluation as well as formal and informal systems of appraisal generating different performance motivators/demotivators depending on a type of employee personality it is practiced on. A graphic illustration of this research model is presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Research model

## 2. METHODOLOGY

In this section, methods applied for the empirical research are presented. The first sub-section deals with changes and development of my own understanding about the research object, its components and the thesis in general. In the second sub-section, the OPML as a research setting for the case study is briefly introduced. Finally, the third and fourth sub-sections focus on broader theoretical perspectives of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches, tools and techniques used in this study with the emphasis on the ethnographic method and psychometric testing. Descriptions of each of the methods are followed by detailed illustrations of the empirical study, e.g. procedures and participants. The present section, in general, deals with mixed research approaches, methods and techniques leading to the answers of the research questions.

### 2.1. Pre-study or how research into the formal system of performance evaluation switched to the investigation of the informal system and how the research topic became as it is

The empirical research into the system of performance evaluation in the OPML started on 30 November 2010. It is important to emphasize that at that time the research was concentrated on the formal system of performance evaluation only, as only later I realized the existence of informal performance appraisal and the level of its impact on the whole process of performance evaluation in the OPML. There were four major goals of the study:

- a) to analyse the system of performance evaluation regulated by the Law on Civil Service;
- b) to find out whether the competencies of civil servants assessed by applying the official form of performance evaluation correspond to the results extracted from the competency model developed specifically for the advisers of the OPML<sup>6</sup>. My initial plan was to develop a competency model for the advisers of the OPML, use it to assess their competencies and to compare the obtained results with those of the official evaluation reports;
- c) to investigate the link between performance appraisal results (both official and gathered using the new competency model) and the final recommendations to award certain advisers for good performance. To be more precise, my aim was to verify whether a higher evaluation of the competencies of civil servant to his or her promotion or other motivators as it was stated in the Law on Civil Service (2002)<sup>7</sup>;
- d) To assess the personality traits of advisers using the HEXACO PI-R personality assessment instrument and to determine whether there is any relation between personality characteristics and the results of performance evaluation.

The first three research goals coincided with the main goals of the OPML human resource policies as well as the efforts of the fifteenth Government to reform civil service

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6 Not political trustees, civil servants.

7 For more information about this Law and its consequences on the system of performance evaluation see section 3.

management.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the study on the system of performance evaluation was considered as mutually beneficial by the official representatives of the OPML. As a result, it was agreed to start the cooperation between the OPML and Mykolas Romeris University in the context of this research.

During a couple of months of work with the employees of the OPML, I confronted with number of difficulties signifying the malfunction of the formal system of performance evaluation. The first hints of the inadequately functioning formal system of performance evaluation emerged during the analysis of the results of the official reports. Specifically, the reports of performance appraisal revealed that after the assessment of all the criteria of all the competencies the absolute majority of advisers were given the same evaluation grade “4”. Second, the focus group with the civil servants of the OPML for the development of the competency model<sup>9</sup> further strengthened my suspicions. Namely, some participants openly expressed their ideas about the difference between what “was” and what “should be” evaluated applying the system of performance evaluation. According to them, both competencies and performance results indicated on the basis of the formal system did not reflect the real life practice of performance evaluation in the OPML. Third, the relations between the results of the official performance evaluation, the outcomes of competency assessment conducted using the new model and the distribution of performance motivators did not have any logics and could not be explained by any theory. Fourth, I tested the majority of OPML civil servants at the adviser level applying the personality assessment tool HEXACO PI-R; however, no links between the received data and the results of the performance evaluation of OPML employees were found.<sup>10</sup> As a result, in the final analysis it was impossible to find a solution for these theoretical and methodological problems of the research. I understood that the managerial theoretical framework and research tools that were applied at that time were not comprehensive enough to offer a solution. It was obvious that the analysis of the formal system of performance evaluation cannot provide answers to the research questions and the study had to be rethought and restructured incorporating new theoretical insights and data.

At this point of the research, I went for an internship to Lund University in Sweden, Sociology of Law Department where I familiarized with the theory of the sociology of law explicitly dealing with socio-legal norms usually closely related to the occurrence of informal systems within organizations. In the case of the issue under investigation, it was the informal system of performance evaluation that could be revealed only by applying research methods different from those usually used in the science of management.

When I understood that the informal system of performance evaluation distorts the results obtained on the basis of the formal system and the latter becomes a formal facade imitating performance appraisal rather than a real practice, I took into consideration the possible impact of this fact on employees working in the OPML. Namely, such questions as whether all of the employees would agree with this idea of two systems existing side by side, whether it had an impact on their performance motivation and whether there

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8 The discussion on this issue is presented in sub-section 2.2.

9 The focus group was conducted by my supervisor Prof. Dr. Tadas Sudnickas and me.

10 Though former studies (e.g. Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tannenbaum & Allport, 1956) proved a correlation between Consciousness (which is also measured by HEXACO PI-R) and performance effectiveness.

were any differences in their perception and interpretation of this situation depending on their personality characteristics arose. These questions encouraged me to develop the research topic and framework incorporating formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as well as focusing on motivational capacities of both systems influencing employees of different personality types.

My decision to conduct an ethnographic study on the system of performance evaluation was highly influenced by the limited results of the pre-study as well as the particularity of the institution and the situation. Bearing in mind that document analysis (official reports of performance evaluation) identified only the malfunctioning of performance evaluation forms but not information on the actually applied performance criteria and considering that the OPML is a highly politically influenced organization regularly having changes in some of the top level employees<sup>11</sup>, ethnographic observation and informal interviews were expected to be the most appropriate research tools and give answers to the research questions. Furthermore, the application of the ethnographic method in the context of performance evaluation created the possibility to see a broader picture of the evaluation system instead of focusing on details. In my case, the choice of an ethnographic research was an opportunity to go beyond the numbers of formal forms of performance evaluation and unlock the corridors of a relatively latent organizational life of the OPML civil servants. I understood that if both systems of performance evaluation were functioning at the same time in one organization, their characteristics would be noticeable in the organizational culture and would be grasped using such techniques of the ethnographic method as participant observation and informal interviews.

## **2.2. Research setting: the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania**

Since the pre-study of this research, the choice of the OPML for the case study was based on several reasons that remained relevant even after the transformation of the research into an ethnographic one. First of all, at that time, the result-oriented approach that well corresponded to the precise implementation of the formal performance evaluation procedures was strongly promoted in the OPML. The top-level OPML employees were willing to improve the system of performance appraisal and establish organizational culture based on the formal competency and result assessment. Second, the OPML, its functions and the formal system of performance evaluation are similar to many other public sector institutions in Lithuania and the European Union; therefore, this case can be generalized and referred to as an example. The details about the OPML—its organizational structure and projects related to performance effectiveness—are described below.

The OPML is a budgetary institution assisting the Prime Minister and the Government to perform their functions. In December 2012, there were 210 employees in this institution; 69 of them advisers (all of them career civil servants)<sup>12</sup>. The OPML was established by the centre-right wing Government in 2009 as a replacement of the Chancellery of the Government. The major differences between the Chancellery of the Government and

11 For more information about the political situation and other conditions influencing performance evaluation see sub-section 2.2.

12 Data is taken from the official website of the OPML [www.lrv.lt](http://www.lrv.lt) (05-01-2013). Since the end of January 2013, the title and functions of the OPML have been changed by the present centre-left wing Government.

the OPML were that the latter puts emphasis on active participation of the OPML in the process of developing the strategy of the state and the initiation of the reforms considering the programme of the Government rather than administrative coordination of ministries and government agencies, what had been the main focus of the Chancellery of the Government. In this respect, the OPML could be divided into two huge blocks: the first representing strategic initiatives, reforms and communication, and the second concerned with administrative and organizational matters. Heads of the departments of the OPML as well as Vice-Chancellors are political appointees.

These changes had a prominent impact to the organization, its culture, employees and all the practices within the system of human resource management, including performance evaluation. The main initiative characterizing the new face of the former Chancellery of the Government was the VORT project designed to improve performance-based management of the Government and its subordinate institutions and implemented by the OPML between 2009 and 2012. The first part of this multilevel project stressed the measures of effective performance on the individual and organizational levels as well as the methodologies of performance assessment and monitoring. The system of the formal performance evaluation of civil servants regulated by the Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) and explicitly described in the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 1960 of 29 December 2010 “On the Amendment of the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’” prepared by the OMPL was highly affected by the VORT ideas.<sup>13</sup>

### **2.3. Ethnographic research method, the issues of its validity and reliability**

Bronisław Kasper Malinowski, professor at Yale University, is considered to be the pioneer in ethnographic research. His masterpiece study analysing the trading system of Trobriand Islanders focuses on social organization and economics and became an example of ethnographic investigations based on the application of the method of participant observation in the first part of the twentieth century. Since that time, the practice of ethnography is associated with a “theorized account of the culture studied with ethnographic methods”, specifically, participant observation and informal interviews (Delamont, 2007, p. 218). Similarly, Michael Angrosino (2007) states that ethnography is “primarily concerned with the routine, everyday lives of the people” (p. 15) and especially suitable for unfolding patterns of culturally and socially determined interactions in an organization. The ethnographic method is characterized as being inductive, concentrating on a small number of cases, providing a holistic portrait of the studied nature of social phenomena, field-based, combining different techniques of data collection, requiring long-term researcher–participant(s) interactions and involving in-depth interpretations about the meaning of human actions (Angrosino, 2007; Becker, 1998; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2010; Merriam, 2009; Silverman, 2007).

The ethnographic research approach is widely applied in sociological and anthropological studies emphasizing the idea of “ethnography [as] a work of describing

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13 For more information on this topic see section 3.

culture” (Spradley, 1979, p. 3). Being the main method to investigate cultural elements within the society, ethnography also enters the world of other disciplines, including management, administration and psychology. David Silverman (2007) even moves a step further and states that “ethnography is today the main method of qualitative research and observational data material is the main data source” (p. 37).

Belonging to the perspective of qualitative research methodology, ethnography shares the same principle declaring the necessity to be close to people and to reflect their world from the insiders view. Katarina Sjöberg (2011) notes that “to ethnographers, one basic purpose is to understand people on their own terms. Important ingredients are to listen to people’s voices and give priorities to their understanding of their own practices, even to perceive them as experts” (p. 11). Participant observations, formal and informal interviews in the field enable the ethnographer to document the rituals, habits and values of an organization. Openness to the new experience and reflectivity of researcher is a must for ethnographic encounter. One of the main figures in the studies of qualitative research methods and ethnography Bruce L. Berg (2007) argues that “the researcher’s frame of mind when entering the natural setting is crucial to the eventual results of a study. If you strike the wrong attitude you might well destroy the possibility of ever learning about observed participants and their perceptions” (p. 139). He states that an ethnographer cannot come into the field with a conviction of the right truth or theory; instead, a preliminary framework of study and ability to accept everything as it is, is the major condition for the success of a research.

The analysis of organizational control, particularly in the field of human resource management, is closely related to the studies of organizational culture, which is successfully unfolded via ethnographic methods. In fact, culture is the main concept bridging ethnography to the practices of organizational control. Formal and informal systems of performance evaluation are strongly reflected in organizational culture and, therefore, it is difficult to grasp it without the intervention of the ethnographic method. Nevertheless, performance measurement and evaluation are typically investigated applying quantitative research methods and ethnographic research is still of limited spread in the managerial studies of organizational control mechanisms. Michel Rosen (1991) claims that “although a body of work focusing on organizational culture has been emerging within administration science, research based on ethnographic fieldwork is almost totally absent from the administration science literature” (p. 22). A few of rare examples of the application of the ethnographic method in human resource management studies are the works of Stephane J.G. Girod (2005), Al-Karim Samnani and Parbudyal Singh (2013), some aspects of performance appraisal were also investigated by David Silverman and Jill Jones (1976) and Eva Nadai and Christoph Maeder (2006).

The emphasis in ethnographic research is set on the insider’s perspective and interpretation of social phenomenon, what is called the “emic” approach (e.g. Erving Goffman’s “Asylums”, 1961). As an opposite to the “etic” (outsider’s) approach, the “emic” approach gives the highest priority to participants “perceived as actors, rather than passive objects, and the ethnographers use the people’s own categories, expressions and words as the basis for their analysis” (Sjöberg, 2011, p. 12). Therefore, the ethnographic method predominantly focuses on the naturally observed social interactions, beliefs and moral standards expressed in any type of an organization. Depending on the researcher’s



stance or, as Sara Delamont (2007) claims, the researcher's immersion, i.e. the distance between the ethnographer's "Self" and the participant's "Other", the style of ethnographic report is constructed. Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson (2010) explicitly discuss recent trends of rhetoric's and representation within ethnographic reports. The authors analyse two opposite traditions of ethnographic representations: the "realist" standing for very clear detachment between the "Author" and the "Other" versus the "postmodern" "seeking to dissolve the disjuncture between the observer and the observed" (p. 256). The epistemological distinctions between the interpretations of the observer-observed relations also result in different writing styles of ethnographic reports, ranging from very personal literary rich descriptions to detached and rather impersonal "more scientific" illustrations. A number of variations of different forms of ethnographic representations is noticed between these extremes, but the general tendency indicates that the postmodern type is currently taking its own turn and becoming widespread (Atkinson, 1990; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2010; Tyler, 1986).

The challenge of ethnographic representations, especially the postmodern ones, is to maintain the balance between rhetoric and science as well as to ensure the quality of the final product, which is basically dependant on such components as thick descriptions and researcher's ability to reflect critically upon the situation. In this case, internal and external validity as well as reliability of research is an issue in academic discussions, varying depending on the approach of the scientists (qualitative vs. quantitative). The differences arise even in terms of the terminology; to be more precise, in qualitative research the concept of "credibility" can be applied instead of "internal validity", "consistency" instead of "reliability" and "transferability" instead of "generalizability"<sup>14</sup>. Though qualitative and quantitative researchers have different epistemological approaches, the underlying question in both cases remains the same: "How to conduct high quality academic studies?"

An ethnographic research and its data collection techniques receive criticism in the academic community; often this criticism is expressed against the qualitative research methods in general. Positivists argue that qualitative research, including ethnographic studies, has limited reliability and generalizability (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Blaikie, 2010; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2010). Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (2011) even state that "the work of qualitative scholars is termed unscientific, or only exploratory, or subjective by the positivist or post-positivist representatives of the 'hard' type of science" (p. 10). In addition, participant observation is criticized as being a biased technique of data collection, highly affected by the observer's personality, values, beliefs and limited scope of attention. Though a detailed analysis of the debate on the qualitative versus quantitative research is beyond the scope of this study, several strategies leading to higher validity and reliability of qualitative studies, especially those of ethnographic research, will be presented in this section.

Qualitative research methodologists share a number of strategies promoting the validity and reliability of ethnographic studies (Patton, 2002; Berg, 2007; Gobo, 2007; Merriam, 2009). Sharan B. Merriam (2009) summarizes the essence of them into eight key strategies:

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14 For more of this discussion see Sharan B. Merriam's *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*.

- the principle of triangulation: application of multiple sources and techniques of data collection for the investigation of the same phenomenon;
- member checks: providing data to the research participants it was gathered from and asking them whether it makes sense;
- adequate engagement in data collection: length of time spent in the field considering the particularity of the situation;
- researcher's position or reflectivity: critical evaluation of the emerging situations in the field as well as the researcher's self-reflection;
- peer review/examination: discussions with the academic community, colleagues and supervisors in the context of the field study;
- audit trail: a detailed methodological representation of the study;
- rich, thick descriptions: providing comprehensive descriptions on the context and details of the study;
- maximum variation: variation in sample selection in order to maximize the transferability of the study.

All the aforementioned strategies were applied in the empirical part of this study. Multiple data collection methods from multiple data sources, different departments and people working there were used in this ethnographic study (official report analysis, participant observation and interviews). The adviser-level civil servants were selected as the main target group in this thesis as they constitute the majority of the employees of the OPML. Member checks were also applied by asking OPML representatives to assess the list of the elements of the informal system of performance evaluation that were identified during this ethnographic research. Moreover, the duration of the study was prolonged in order to gather enough data for the interpretation (in ethnographic terms, “saturated” data). Besides, during the process of the empirical study, I translated written draft documents of observations and interviews into English and sent the translations to dr. Māns Svensson who has significant experience in ethnographic research methodology and practice and who continuously provided consultations during all the period of this empirical study. Finally, in order to keep a detailed history of the research process, I carefully recorded all aspects of every-day observations and interviews in a research diary. I put down all thoughts, reflections and interpretations regarding the events in the field in a separate part of the research diary allowing to raise new questions but also providing the possibility to critically evaluate them when reading after a period of time.

These strategies enhanced the internal validity or credibility of the research aimed at capturing the elements of the informal system of performance evaluation reflecting the reality of the OPML organizational culture, as well as made the research data more valid externally or transferrable to other public sector institutions in Lithuania, the European Union and other countries. Furthermore, the profound descriptions and documentation of the empirical process also contributed to the reliability or consistency of this study, even though it cannot be crucial as “human behaviour is never static” and cannot be repeated identically (Merriam, 2009, p. 220).

Further in this section, theoretical and empirical illustrations of participant observation as well as the most important elements within this technique are presented. First of all, participant observation as the main data collection technique in an ethnographic research

is introduced; afterwards, the stages of “preparation for” and “getting in” the field setting are presented. The section is finalized with a discussion on research ethics and the application of quantitative approaches in ethnography.

### **2.3.1. Participant observation**

Participant observation is the most frequently used ethnographic data collection technique designed to investigate how people understand their social world by “spending long periods watching people, coupled with talking to them about that they are doing, thinking and saying” (Delamont, 2007, p. 218). In a similar manner, Angrosino (2007) indicates that “ethnographic research is predicated on the regular and repeated observation of people and situations, often with the intention of responding to some theoretical question about the nature of behaviour or social organization” (p. 54). Meanwhile, Silverman (2007) describes observation as the best way “to see remarkable things in mundane settings” (p.16).

Participant observation by its nature strongly emphasizes the researcher’s role within the ethnographic study. To be more precise, it stresses the importance and even necessity of the researcher’s integration in the group. There are four types of researcher’s involvement in observation: the complete participant, the participant as observer, the observer as participant and the complete observer (Gold, 1958). In the case of this study, I took the role of an “observer as a participant” in the OPML, being a researcher rather than a group member. In addition, such membership in the group could also be defined as “peripheral” (Adler & Adler, 1987).

The fact that I had my own office let me carefully fill the observational notes during the day, although it limited my interaction with OPML members. Moreover, each employee in the OPML also had his or her own separate office, which was a constraint rather than an advantage for me as a researcher. For this reason I asked the representatives of the OPML to organize a half-an-hour meeting with all the heads of units and their subordinate advisers with the aim to explain my role in their working place for several weeks. During this meeting I presented the idea about the competency models for each of the units as well as my working methods and research interests regarding the systems of performance evaluation. OPML employees were also told about my plans to visit them in their offices, to interview about competencies, performance evaluation and similar issues as well as to observe the general atmosphere in the organization.

Merriam (2009) interprets observation as “the best technique to use when an activity, event, or situation can be observed firsthand, when a fresh perspective is desired or when participants are not able or willing to discuss the topic under study” (p.119). In the case of the present research, the informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML could not be revealed; therefore, participant observation was applied as a long-term, detailed and systematic tool of research enabling to be in the field of study and test the reality of the performance appraisal in the OPML by seeing, hearing and even touching the elements of the organizational culture of this institution. In order to convey my experience in a scientific manner, I followed strict rules of planning, recording and documenting the observations.

### **2.3.1.1. Preparation for the observation**

The preparatory stage of participant observation prevents the researcher from information overload by focusing his or her attention on the most important objects or actions and by providing the basic guidelines for what to observe. Usually, it is just a few basic instructions or questions as in the cases of Sjöberg's encounter with the Wall Street brokers (2011) or Anderson's ethnographic observation in the Jelly's place, but it also might be a more comprehensive preparation (see Merriam's recommendations, 2009).

My participant observation in the OPML was based on questions prepared in advance on the basis of the data and experience from the pre-study and the theoretical framework. Following the aforementioned strategies of enhancing validity and reliability in ethnographic research, the first version of the observation questions were presented to both of my supervisors and improved with reference to their comments.<sup>15</sup> All questions were categorized into different sections describing different aspects related to the informal system of the OPML. Naturally, in spite of the preparation before the research, some of the questions were updated and some replaced depending on the situation in the field.

The following categories of questions were developed for participant observation:

- a) Elements of behaviour. The questions concentrate on the behaviour appreciated by the employees of the OPML;
- b) Elements of the formal system of performance evaluation. The questions concentrate on the formal system and its accuracy from the perspective of employees, including their explanations about evaluation bias and other issues of performance appraisal;
- c) Elements of performance motivators. The questions concentrate on the informal forms of performance motivation related to the informal system of evaluation;
- d) Elements of informal status in the organization. The questions concentrate on the manifestations and benefits of informal status in relation to performance evaluation;
- e) Elements of the informal and formal systems of performance evaluation. The questions concentrate on the informal system of performance evaluation and its links to the formal one;
- f) Elements regarding the current situation in the OPML and the status of this institution.

The questions concentrate on OPML prestige and visibility in the public sphere.

### **2.3.1.2. Getting in the field**

Berg (2007) explicitly discusses the meaning of "getting in" the stage of ethnographic research, which is central for all the practitioners within this field. The author mentions not only the difficulties of reaching the group in the physical sense (e.g. military institutions) but also problems in revealing the essential processes lying behind the official surface. Howard S. Becker (1998) incorporates and elaborates this issue in the context of "how to think about the research while doing it". The researcher's tactics and social skills enabling him or her to choose the best time for entering the field, to become a member of the group as well as to stay within it, are the influential factors for the final quality of the study.

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15 The final version of the questions for the observation are presented in Appendix 1.

My participant observation started on 10 December 2012. This particular period of time was chosen for observation because of the annual order in the Lithuanian civil service institutions to carry out performance evaluations at the end of each calendar year, meaning that this time was the most suitable in order to observe the desired behaviour. At that time I had close contacts with some of the representatives of the OPML (in ethnographic terms, the gatekeepers), especially with those who participated in and supported my first research initiative.<sup>16</sup> In relation to that initiative, I suggested to investigate the criteria of performance evaluation that really works in the OPML. In order to make our collaboration more beneficial to the OPML, I was asked to develop competency models for each of the OPML units and to instruct the heads of units about the usage of these models in their daily organizational management.

Since that day, I spent two working weeks in the OPML, from Monday, 10 December 2012, morning to Friday, 21 December 2012, afternoon, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. every day. At the beginning it was agreed on one week of observations; however, this period was prolonged in order to spend more time in the field and get more empirical data. During the two weeks, I had numerous informal interviews, lunches and meetings with the employees (usually, advisers and heads of units) of the OPML and carefully registered it in the research diary. This particular period of observation was exceptional for the OPML because of two reasons. First, the Parliamentary elections held in October in Lithuania proved to be a success for parties from the opposition what meant that until the end of December all politically appointed personnel had to leave their positions. That is, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellors and Directors of the departments had to be replaced. Second, according to the existing law, civil servants' performance evaluation must be carried out at the end of each calendar year; however, at the end of 2012, because of the change of the Government, the Personnel Unit informally requested to finish it until 20 December.

From the very beginning of the participant observation, I re-established the contact with one of the employees of the OPML who cooperated during the pre-study and who later introduced me to the basic formal and informal OPML rules; other employees accompanied me during the first few lunch breaks as well. In a few days, when people stopped looking at me as a stranger-outsider and began to greet me as well as to talk to me in the corridors, I started to visit advisers and heads of units with the aim to communicate with them about competencies, performance evaluation and its system. For some of the employees I had to call and ask for meetings, while with others a knock on the door was enough. This step enabled me to establish contacts with the employees and enter the inside life of the organization. I spent all the time outside my office communicating with different people during lunch or coffee breaks as well as organizing group meetings and discussions on the topic of performance evaluation. When I had no assigned meetings, I was observing employees passing by or talking with each other in the corridors of the OPML.

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16 See sub-section 2.1.

### 2.3.2. Ethnographic interview

Ethnographic interview is an informal, open-ended, face to face, in-depth conversation between a researcher and an interviewee; as Jonathan Skinner (2013) states, “a form of talking partnership” (p. 53). Likewise, James P. Spradley (1979) describes this type of interviews “as series of friendly conversations, into which the researcher slowly introduces new elements to assist informants<sup>17</sup> to respond as informants” (p. 464). Unlike other forms of interviews, the ethnographic interview is distinguished by the quality of relationship between the scientist and the respondents, which enables the researcher to unfold the meanings of the interviewee’s social reality (Fielding, 2006).

In this research, two types of ethnographic interviews serving two different purposes were conducted. An unstructured interview aimed at discovering the informal system of performance evaluation and a semi-structured interview was focused on the civil servants’ (advisers’) perceptions of work motivators lying within both systems of performance evaluation. During the participant observation, I had a number of informal unstructured interviews with the heads of units, advisers and other civil servants lasting from several minutes to a couple of hours. The total number of such interviews exceeds 30, as in order to get more information about performance appraisal in this organization I intentionally started every conversation with a member of the OPML with daily issues and gradually led it to the questions prepared for participant observation.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted in a less informal manner, precisely following the prepared questions and noting down the most important facts while still being with the respondent, although this practice is not common for ethnographic interviews. In spite of that, I interpret these interviews as ethnographic because they were conducted simultaneously with the participant observation<sup>18</sup> which influenced my stance as a researcher, the respondents’ as well as our mutual relations. Consequently, these interviews correspond to the ethnographic understanding of an interview as a friendly conversation or mundane interaction (e.g. Spradley, 1979; Rapley, 2007) and at the same time incorporate structured open-ended questions. Nalita James and Hugh Busher (2012) indicate that a semi-structured interview is the most suitable “when the researcher knows enough about the topic or phenomenon to identify the domain but does not know and cannot anticipate all of the answers” (p. 197). During participant observation I not only gathered the information about the informal system of performance evaluation but also developed initial understanding about the motivational aspects of civil servants performance appraisal, i.e. I included the section of “the elements of performance motivators” in the pre-observation questionnaire with the aim to construct the basic framework for the next part of the empirical work—semi-structured interviews for discovering work motivators.

Before the interviews, open-ended questions covering two broad sections on the motivational capacities of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation for OPML employees were prepared. The questionnaire was based on the results of the

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17 An informant, in ethnographic terms, means “a person with comprehensive knowledge of the group of people” (Sjöberg, 2011, p. 16).

18 The first interview was conducted on 20 December 2012, while the last day of participant observation was 21 December 2012.

participant observation, pre-study and the theoretical framework. Following the strategies of validity and reliability in qualitative research, I sent the draft version of the questionnaire to my supervisor dr. Måns Svensson and improved it after his constructive comments<sup>19</sup>.

Categories of the questions of semi-structured interviews:

- a) Evaluation of the existing formal system of performance evaluation and its motivators for the interviewee. The questions deal with the respondent's perception about the elements, functions and practices of the formal system of performance evaluation and its motivational potential in his or her personal case;
- b) Evaluation of the current informal system of performance evaluation and its motivators for the interviewee. The questions focus on the respondent's perception about the elements, functions and practices of the informal system of performance evaluation and its motivational potential in his or her personal case.

Interviews with 8 advisers of the OPML were conducted during the period between 20 December 2012 and 16 January 2013. The advisers to be interviewed were selected on the basis of their personality type.<sup>20</sup> In order to get more reliable answers, it was decided not to record the interviews. This decision was taken considering politically influenced general atmosphere in the OPML<sup>21</sup> and the recommendations of OPML employees. Specifically, I started to conduct the interviews at the end of the participant observation period during which employees' fear and uncertainty about the future were on the verge of reaching the maximum level. People were not willing to share their opinions about sensitive issues (my questions in one or another way were related to the informal system of performance evaluation which was interpreted controversially) as they were not sure about the possible consequences of such conversations. After several private conversations with the advisers of OPML on this issue during which I presented my interview questions, it was suggested to abandon the idea of tape recording for the sake of the quality of answers as well as for the possibility to interview those persons whom I selected instead of those few who would have agreed to participate. In spite of this technical difficulty, I managed to take notes during the interviews as well as to write the reports from the conversations straight after every meeting with a new respondent.

### **2.3.3. Ethical issues in the ethnographic research**

Ethical issues are an indistinguishable part of any academic study, though in ethnography they are especially sensitive, i.e. during participant observations or in-depth interviews, the line between the private and the public is particularly thin. Anne Ryen (2007) stresses that "fieldwork is constantly ridden by ethical challenges" which may be at least partly solved by following the Western ethical research discourse statements (p. 230). Most of ethnographers share similar standards of research ethics and mention such basic elements as: informed consent, confidentiality, trust and the main principle of not causing any type of harm for human subjects (e.g. Angrosino, 2007; Bruce L. Berg & Lune,

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19 For the final version of the questionnaire see Appendix 2.

20 For more information about the technique and procedure of selection see sub-section 2.4.3.

21 It was discussed in sub-section 2.2.



2011; Bruce Lawrence Berg, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Kaiser, 2012; Merriam, 2009). In this context, only the researcher's personal values and intentions to behave humanely and fairly with respondents or participants can guarantee the ethical implementation of empirical studies.

During the ethnographic research in the OPML, I informed the employees from the Personnel Unit as well as some other representatives of this organization, including the informant, about my intentions to conduct an investigation on informal performance evaluation. I also presented some of the ideas about my research project during the general meeting at the beginning of the research. However, I was not presenting to or reminding every person I was talking to that I was not only a consultant of competency-based management but also a researcher. Finally, while filling the research diary and taking interview notes, I used a codified system to maintain the anonymity of the respondents.

#### **2.3.4. The use of quantitative approaches within ethnography**

The use of numbers and statistics within ethnographic studies is not a widespread practice in the academic community. To begin with, the emphasis on “why” and “how” research questions in qualitative studies require in-depth understanding of human actions typically developed through long-term observations, formal and informal interviews as well as other methods of qualitative data collection, while quantitative research typically focuses on “what” questions and generates knowledge through the use of statistical criteria, measures and numbers. In this context, ethnography, as a form of qualitative research, holds epistemological and methodological differences from any other quantitative research method.

In spite of the differences between the qualitative and the quantitative approach, a combination of both is also possible. Some of ethnographers discuss the application of quantitative measures within their studies as not only a suitable solution in certain circumstances but also a way of enriching the research findings and contributing to the final research. For instance, Silverman (2007) presents his ethnographic study on the HIV-test counselling and argues that “quantification can sometimes help us to sort fact from fancy and, thereby, improve the validity of qualitative research” (p. 110). Similarly, David F. Fetterman (2010) shares his ethnographic experience of working with Stanford University School of Education in the field of programme evaluation. Fetterman incorporates the use of statistical methods of data analysis in the ethnographic studies of evaluation principles and even claims that “ethnography has an ample use of experimental designs, quasi experimental designs, and associated statistical analyses, including multiple regression analysis and factor analysis” (p. 109). However, it has to be noticed that both authors also discuss the problematical side of the incorporation of numbers and statistics within ethnography. The nature of the problems of ethnographic studies (e.g. the elements of organizational culture or informal systems within the society) as well as methodological constraints (e.g. a small research sample) are presented among the main reasons for the rarity of the cases of such integration.

The ethnographic study is supported by the quantitative approach in this research. An ethnographic method implemented via participant observation and semi-structural interviews was applied for gathering data about the informal system of performance



evaluation as well as civil servants' perceptions towards performance motivators. Respectively, respondents were selected considering the results of the personality test HEXACO PI-R, a psychometric tool for personality trait assessment, adapted to the Lithuanian language and applied in order to measure the personality traits of civil servants working in the OPML.

## **2.4. Psychological measurement of personality**

Psychological measurement or psychometrics refers to the quantitative evaluation of human related characteristics (e.g. skills, abilities, attitudes, interests, personality traits, etc.). In other words, psychometric research is defined as a study "on how psychological variables are operationalized for purposes of measurement, particular measurement of individual differences among people" (Vogt, 2005, p. 252). Mathematical and statistical approaches, methods and models constitute the core of psychometrics and provide the general framework for the development, revision, modification and adaptation of the inventories of personality trait assessment (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2011). The quantitative part of the empirical research of this thesis is based on the Lithuanian version of HEXACO personality inventory revised (HEXACO PI-R) which was used for the evaluation of the personality traits of OPML civil servants.

Quantitative studies are built on the statistical and mathematical models particularly emphasizing the measurement of reliability and validity criteria. A number of strategies like Cronbach's alpha coefficient, alternative form record, test-retest method, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis are applied to ensure the validity and reliability of different questionnaires, included those constructed to assess personality. It is recommended to measure Cronbach's alpha coefficient and carry out a confirmatory factor analysis as the main instruments of the reliability and validity of psychometric test adaptation (Urbina, 2004; Cohen, Swerdlik, & Sturman, 2013); therefore, both of these methods are applied in this research.

Cronbach's alpha coefficient is the most pervasive measure of the internal consistency of tests. It varies from 0 to 1; the higher the number of Cronbach's alpha, the better the internal consistency of the test. Lewis R. Aiken (1979) states that the test can be treated as reliable when its alpha coefficient is not less than 0,65, and David G. Giles (2002) claims that a test is highly reliable when its alpha coefficient is not lower than 0,8. The structural validity of a test is evaluated using the confirmatory factor analysis, which "involves the a priori specification of one or more models of the relationships between test scores and the factors or constructs they are designed to assess" (Urbina, 2004, p. 179). To put it differently, confirmatory factor analysis assesses the underlying correlations between the items indicating whether the internal structure of a questionnaire corresponds to its prior theoretical hypothesis, e.g. whether the items of HEXACO PI-R measure all six personality-related dimensions. The correlations may vary from -1 to 1; the closer it comes to the negative or positive extreme, the stronger positive or negative dependability to a certain factor (or dimension) the item holds.

### 2.4.1. HEXACO PI-R

HEXACO PI-R is a psychometric instrument developed by Kibeom Lee<sup>22</sup> and Michael C. Ashton<sup>23</sup>, following the lexical studies of personality structure. The instrument measures six major dimensions of human personality: Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality (E), Extraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C) and Openness to experience (O) (Lee & Ashton, 2004a). Each of the HEXACO PI-R dimension is composed by 4 facets (narrow traits) contributing to the comprehensive representation of individual personality (see Table 2)<sup>24</sup>.

Table 2. Structure of HEXACO PI-R

| <b>Honesty-humility</b> | <b>Emotionality</b> | <b>Extraversion</b> | <b>Agreeableness</b> | <b>Conscientiousness</b> | <b>Openness to experience</b> |
|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Sincerity               | Fearfulness         | Social Self-Esteem  | Forgivingness        | Organization             | Aesthetic Appreciation        |
| Fairness                | Anxiety             | Social Boldness     | Gentleness           | Diligence                | Inquisitiveness               |
| Greed Avoidance         | Dependence          | Sociability         | Flexibility          | Perfectionism            | Creativity                    |
| Modesty                 | Sentimentality      | Liveliness          | Patience             | Prudence                 | Unconventionality             |

Source: (Lee & Ashton, 2004b)

HEXACO PI-R was developed as an alternative for personality assessment instruments based on the Five Factor Theory (e.g. NEO PI-R or 16 PF). It emphasizes the importance of the H factor which is not measured by any other questionnaire.<sup>25</sup> There are three versions of HEXACO PI-R composed of 60, 100 and 200 items.<sup>26</sup> The authors of HEXACO PI-R recommend to use the long version scales of 200 items because of their higher reliability and validity measures, though the application of the short versions are also appropriate when time allocated for the assessment is very limited (Ashton & Lee, 2009; Lee & Ashton, 2004b). All three versions of questionnaires are provided for the research participants either in self report or in observer report<sup>27</sup> forms.

The analysis of the psychometric properties of HEXACO PI-R demonstrates high measures of validity and reliability of this instrument measuring in all six dimensions of personality traits in different cultures and languages (e.g. Boies et al., 2004; Lee & Ashton, 2004, 2006; Vries, Lee, & Ashton, 2008; Ashton & Lee, 2009; Hopwood & Donnellan, 2010; Kaniushonytė et al., 2011, 2012). Currently, HEXACO PI-R is translated and adapted

22 Professor, Ph.D., at Calgary University (Canada).

23 Professor, Ph.D , at Brock University (Canada).

24 Detailed descriptions of each of the personality dimensions and their facets are presented in Appendix 3.

25 For theoretical discussion on HEXACO PI-R see section 1.

26 The scale of 200 items covers the same items as the scales of 60 and 100 items.

27 The observer fills in the questionnaire about the person he or she knows, e.g. works together.

to 16 languages including Lithuanian (it is important to highlight that translation and adaptation of HEXACO-P-R to Lithuanian was as an integral part of this thesis)<sup>28</sup>.

#### 2.4.2. Psychometric characteristics of the Lithuanian HEXACO PI-R

HAXACO PI-R was translated into the Lithuanian language and adapted for the scientific purposes in Lithuania (Truskauskaitė et al., 2011, 2012) following standardized academic procedures (Hambleton & Jong, 2003; Hambleton, Merenda, & Spielberger, 2006; Sireci, Yang, Harter, & Ehrlich, 2006; Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996). In addition, the translation and adaptation of this inventory were performed consulting with its authors.

1. *License agreement.* The license agreement for the translation and adaptation of HEXACO PI-R to Lithuanian as well as its further application in Lithuania was signed with the Canadian scientists Kibeom Lee, Ph.D., and Michael C. Ashton Ph.D., owners of the HEXACO-PI-R rights, on 18 April 2011.

##### 2. *Translation.*

- a) Two independent professional translators having experience in working with psychology-related texts performed forward and back translations of the 200-item questionnaire.<sup>29</sup>
- b) Discussions among both translators and the researcher was organised to develop the draft Lithuanian version of the questionnaire.<sup>30</sup>
- c) The final English version of the back translation was sent to the authors of HEXACO PI-R. When their comments on items No. 11, 26, 42, 46, 47, 53, 60, 66, 78, 121, 123, 134 and 158 were received, another discussion with the same participants was organized.
- d) Following the results of the discussion, the final Lithuanian version of the HEXACO PI-R was developed.

##### 3. *Adaptation.*

- a) The questionnaire was delivered to 369 students of Mykolas Romeris University and Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences in order to test the inventory on the Lithuanian sample. The testing was performed in June and September 2011.
- b) The reliability of the Lithuanian version of HEXACO PI-R was evaluated measuring the Cronbach's alpha coefficient.<sup>31</sup>
- c) Structural validity of the inventory was evaluated running the confirmatory factor analysis.<sup>32</sup>
- d) After the psychometric analysis of both of these measures, the following conclusions were made: a) all 6 dimensions of the questionnaire are strongly reliable; b) 18 out

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28 Inga Truskauskaitė, Goda Kaniušonytė, Rima Kratavičienė, and Aistė Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė did the adaptation of HEXACO PI-R to the Lithuanian language. Articles on the psychometrical analysis of the short and long Lithuanian versions of HEXACO PI-R are published in these academic journals: *Psichologija*, Vol. 44, p. 104-117, 2011.; *Educational psychology*, No. 23, p. 6-14, 2012.

29 Back translation was done by giving the translators each other's texts.

30 The author of this thesis as well as both translators were participating in the discussion.

31 The data of Cronbach's alpha coefficient measurement is presented in Appendix 4.

32 The data of the confirmatory factor analysis is presented in Appendix 5.

of 24<sup>33</sup> facet level scales are adequately reliable; c) the questionnaire is valid in terms of its factorial measures indicating high structural validity<sup>34</sup>.

#### 2.4.3. Personality types of OPML advisers measured by HEXACO PI-R

The Lithuanian version of HEXACO-PI-R was delivered to all 69 advisers (civil servants) of the OPML. The results of the questionnaire were processed with SPSS 15.0. In order to select the interviewees, standard scores (z scores)<sup>35</sup> of personality-related dimensions were counted for every adviser. According to the z scores, advisers were sorted out from those who got the lowest evaluations to those who scored the highest in terms of three domain level scales<sup>36</sup>: Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. These scales were selected because of the following reasons: a) the correlations between higher rates on Honesty-Humility and lower rates on egoism, pretentiousness, and machiavellianism (Vries et al., 2009; Vries & Kampen, 2010; Lee et al., 2012); b) the correlations between higher rates on Conscientiousness and higher rates on performance effectiveness (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Vries, Vries, & Born, 2011a); c) the correlations between higher rates on Agreeableness and higher rates on reactive cooperation (Hilbig et al., 2013).

Two personality types<sup>37</sup> of advisers were constructed: ORGANIZED (those who got higher scores in Conscientiousness and Honesty-Humility and lower scores in Agreeableness) and FLEXIBLE (those who got higher scores in Agreeableness and lower scores in Conscientiousness and Honesty-Humility). The stronger the trait, the higher the possibility of behaviour indicating a certain personality trait. If the scale is dichotomous, as in the case of Honesty-Humility, the first word describes the high scorers and the second the low scorers.

In total, 10 respondents were labelled as ORGANIZED<sup>38</sup>. This personality type is characterized in terms of the following traits<sup>39</sup>:

- High scores on honesty and humility: avoid manipulating others for personal gain, feel little temptation to break rules, are uninterested in lavish wealth and luxuries and feel no special entitlement to elevated social status.

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33 For the rest of the facet level scales Cronbach's alpha coefficients were: 0,62 (Flexibility); 0,60 (Prudence); 0,59 (Liveliness); 0,57 (Modesty); 0,47 (Inquisitiveness); and 0,36 (Anxiety). The interpretations of these results are published in *Psichologija*, Vol. 44, p. 104-117, 2011.

34 These data were also published in *Psichologija*, Vol. 44, p. 104-117, 2011.

35 Z scores enable the researcher to make a comparison of individual scores across different variables (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2011, p. 17).

36 It was decided to use the domain rather than facet level scales because of their higher Cronbach's alpha coefficients.

37 It has to be stressed that in this context personality type is understood as a combination of different personality traits selected by the researcher rather than the result of cluster analysis.

38 This name was given considering the content of personality trait dimensions which compose the type.

39 The description of each of the dimensions is presented in the official website of HEXACO PI-R; [www.hexaco.org](http://www.hexaco.org).

- Low scores on agreeableness: hold grudges against those who have harmed them, are rather critical of others' shortcomings, are stubborn in defending their point of view and feel anger readily in response to mistreatment.
- High scores on conscientiousness: organize their time and their physical surroundings, work in a disciplined way toward their goals, strive for accuracy and perfection in their tasks and deliberate carefully when making decisions.

4 respondents were labelled as FLEXIBLE<sup>40</sup>. This personality type is characterized in terms of the following traits<sup>41</sup>:

- Low scores on honesty and humility: flatter others to get what they want, are inclined to break rules for personal profit, are motivated by material gain and feel a strong sense of self-importance.
- High scores on agreeableness: forgive the wrongs that they suffered, are lenient in judging others, are willing to compromise and cooperate with others and can easily control their temper.
- Low scores on conscientiousness: unconcerned with orderly surroundings or schedules, avoid difficult tasks or challenging goals, are satisfied with work that contains some errors and make decisions on impulse or with little reflection.

Eight respondents were selected for the interviews focusing on work motivators (four respondents for each of the personality types). The decision on the number of interviewees was taken considering the data saturation criteria of qualitative research methodology (e.g. Berg, 2007; Merriam, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) and the general sample of advisers of each of the personality types. One semi-structural interview lasting for approximately one hour was conducted with each of the respondents.

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<sup>40</sup> This name was given considering the content of personality trait dimensions which compose the type.

<sup>41</sup> The description of each of the dimensions are presented in the official website of HEXACO PI-R; [www.hexaco.org](http://www.hexaco.org).

### **3. FORMAL CONTEXT OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN THE LITHUANIAN CIVIL SERVICE**

This section deals with the formal context of the system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service. Two different layers are selected as the milestones of getting a comprehensive view of the formal system of performance evaluation. First, the Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania, accompanying legislation and their appendices are analysed. In particular, this section is focused on the article regulating performance evaluation in civil service. Second, the roles and functions of the main institutional bodies, namely, the Government, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Service Department, related to the development and enforcement of the Law on Civil Service and the system of performance evaluation are investigated.

#### **3.1. The Law on Civil Service of Republic of Lithuania**

The Law on Civil Service consists of 52 articles describing the most important elements of the life of a civil servant: “the basic principles of the civil service, the status of a civil servant, responsibility, remuneration, social and other guarantees as well as the legal basis for the management of the civil service” (Article 1). This Law is equally applied for career civil servants, civil servants of political confidence, public managers and acting civil servants. The exceptions exist only for statutory civil servants (Articles 4, 6). Also, it has to be noted that the Law does not apply to state politicians, judges, prosecutors, servants of the Bank of Lithuania, heads of public institutions and agencies, chairmen of state commissions, councils, their deputies and members, servicemen of the professional military service, employees of state and municipal enterprises, employees of public establishments and those who work under employment contracts (Article 4). Thus, the system of performance evaluation that is analysed in the present thesis is not applied to these particular groups of the employees of civil service.

The system of human resource management in the Lithuanian civil service is regulated by the principles of ethics based on “the rule of law, equality, loyalty, political neutrality, transparency and responsibility”. Article 3 explicitly describes the necessity for every civil servant “not to seek benefit for himself, his family and friends while performing the duties of a state politician or carrying out official duties” as well as the requirement to “be objective and avoid personalities in taking decisions”. Respect for the state and the society as well as responsibility for the decisions made are also among the main principles to be followed by a tolerant and orderly civil servant constantly improving his or her performance.

Conscientious work for the state and the society guarantees civil servants not only their rights to holidays, social insurance and pension but also the right “to a career in the public service according to their qualifications <...>, to receive remuneration as set out by laws and other legal acts <...>, to training in accordance with the procedure prescribed by this Law financed from the state and municipal budgets” (Article 16). These aspects of the Law are enforced by the system of performance evaluation comprehensively described in Article 22. The main aspects of performance evaluation regulated by this Law are:

*a) the role of an immediate superior and the grades of evaluation*

“The performance of a career civil servant during a calendar year shall be evaluated by his immediate superior, while the performance of the head of an institution shall be evaluated by the appointing authority or a person authorised by the appointing authority. At the end of each calendar year, the immediate superior of a civil servant or the appointing authority or a person authorised by the appointing authority shall evaluate the performance of a civil servant as excellent, good or unsatisfactory. If the performance of a civil servant is evaluated as excellent or unsatisfactory, the civil servant shall be evaluated by an evaluation commission” (Article 22).

*b) the role of the evaluation commission*

“A career civil servant may be promoted without competition by a decision of the appointing authority only if the career civil servant is evaluated by the civil servants’ evaluation commission” (Article 18).

If “<...> the performance of a civil servant is evaluated as excellent or unsatisfactory, the civil servant shall be evaluated by an evaluation commission” which is “<...> set up by the head of a state or municipal institution or agency” and consists of civil servants.

*c) possible decisions of the evaluation commission (the description below is suitable for career civil servants and institutional managers; there are some differences regarding acting civil servants)*

The evaluation commission can reward outstanding performers in these ways: to assign the third or higher qualification class; to promote; to promote and grant not higher than the current qualification class; to retain the same highest qualification class and to pay a lump sum equal to the amount of the salary of the civil servant; to issue a note of acknowledgement; to grant a personal gift or pay a lump sum.

The commission can motivate good performers by a note of acknowledgement, a personal gift or a lump sum payment, while for satisfactory performers the commission can suggest one of the following options: assignment of a lower qualification class; revocation of the third qualification class and improvement of qualification; improvement of qualification.

Unsatisfactory performers can expect suggestions to cancel their qualification class or to improve their qualification (for those who do not have a qualification class); to demote them; to demote them and to improve their qualification (Article 22).

If the performance of a civil servant is twice evaluated as unsatisfactory, the evaluation commission suggests dismissing him or her from civil service (Article 22).

*d) the possibility of extraordinary performance evaluation*

“Where any doubt arises concerning the performance of the head of an institution or a career civil servant or where a civil servant requests in writing to be promoted, an extraordinary evaluation of a civil servant may be carried out on a reasoned written proposal from his immediate superior and by the decision (order) of the appointing authority. In addition, an extraordinary evaluation of a civil servant may also be conducted on the proposal from his immediate superior to assign qualification class 3 or a higher qualification class to the civil servant. An extraordinary evaluation of a civil

servant may be carried not earlier than 6 months after the date of his regular evaluation” (Article 22).

*e) exceptions of performance evaluation*

For example: “Pregnant or breast-feeding civil servants shall be evaluated by the evaluation commission only at their request” (Article 22).

The Law on Civil Service stipulates that the system of performance evaluation is closely related to the remuneration system. A civil servant may be promoted for outstanding performance, i.e. to receive a higher basic salary or bonuses. “The basic salary shall be determined for the category of the position and shall be the same for all positions in the same category” (Article 24). Civil servants are paid bonuses for the length of service, qualification class or qualification category (under Article 21, there are three qualification classes of civil servants, the first qualification class being the highest one and the third qualification class being the lowest one), for an official rank or for a diplomatic rank (Article 25).

Another type of a monetary reward is called “additional pays”. It is mainly granted “for work on days off, holidays and at night; for work under harmful, highly harmful and hazardous conditions; for activities which exceed the usual workload or for performing additional assignments beyond the established working hours” and is given as a lump sum payment (Article 26). In a similar manner, incentives and awards are granted “for irreproachable performance”. It might be “a note of acknowledgement; a personal gift or a lump sum in accordance with the procedure established by the Government”. It should be mentioned that “incentives and state awards given to a civil servant” should be “entered in his personal file” (Article 27).

Another link with the system of performance evaluation is the system of employees’ training and development. During the process of performance evaluation, the superior of a civil servant analyses his or her competencies and performance results and recommends the trainings, e.g. improving administrative capacities or leadership and communication skills. In this way, the performance evaluation system is connected to employees’ qualification development and should contribute to the higher objectivity of training selection. Trainings are carried out by the Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration and other institutions responsible for qualification improvement approved by the Minister of the Interior. In has to be stressed that under the Law, “training programmes for civil servants” are developed “in compliance with the requirements prescribed by the Minister of the Interior” (Article 45).

The Law on Civil Service formulates the basic principles and process of performance evaluation, while the methodology of the system of performance appraisal is regulated by the accompanying legislation<sup>42</sup>. Since 2002, eleven amendments of this legal act have been adopted. The changes of performance evaluation form according to the abovementioned legal act and its appendices are presented in Table 3.

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42 Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’.



Table 3. Dynamics of the forms of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service

| Year                           | 2002   | 2007   | 2010  | 2012  |
|--------------------------------|--|--|---|---|
| <b>Criteria for evaluation</b> | <p>The same criteria are valid for all levels of civil servants.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Workload</li> <li>2. Quality of performance</li> <li>3. Complexity of tasks</li> <li>4. Ability to apply the expertise and skills in performing the functions laid down in the job description</li> <li>5. Communication and co-operation skills of the civil servant while performing the functions defined in the job description.</li> </ol> | <p>There are different criteria for public managers and career civil servants, acting civil servants.</p> <p>Each of the criteria is explained by specifying its content.</p> <p>Criteria for public managers:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Management (e.g. it includes personnel management, financial resource management, material resource management, technology management)</li> <li>2. Implementation of organization's strategic goals</li> <li>3. Leadership</li> </ol> <p>Criteria for career and acting civil servants:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Productivity</li> <li>2. Competence</li> <li>3. Quality of performance</li> </ol> | <p>There are two criteria for evaluation: Results and qualification/competencies. The same criteria are applied for all levels of civil servants, though there are three different descriptions for each of the competence depending on whether the evaluated person is: a public manager, a civil servant having subordinates or a career civil servant having no subordinates. In addition, civil servants having no subordinates are not evaluated in terms of competencies No. 6, 7 and 8.</p> <p>Results can be evaluated as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Exceeded all the goals according to the plan – 5</li> <li>2. Exceeded some goals and completed the rest of them according to the plan – 4</li> <li>3. Completed all the goals – 3</li> <li>4. Completed some goals according to the plan and there were shortcomings in his or her performance – 2</li> <li>5. Did not complete goals according to the plan and there were obvious shortcomings in his or her performance – 1</li> </ol> <p>List of evaluated competencies:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Leadership</li> <li>2. Human resource management</li> <li>3. Programmes and projects management (assessment criterion only if the institution has a project management system and civil servants participate in it)</li> <li>4. Finance management</li> <li>5. Analysis and reasoning</li> <li>6. Communication and public relations</li> <li>7. Strategic thinking</li> <li>8. Performing supervisory functions over natural and legal persons (assessment criterion only if the institution performs supervisory functions)</li> </ol> | <p>The new version of the evaluation form is similar to the one of 2010.</p> <p>The major differences are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. New form of the evaluation of skills:</li> <li>1. Universal information management</li> <li>2. Efficient time management</li> <li>3. The most rational choice of the method to perform the functions of a civil servant</li> <li>4. Other evaluations of a civil servant</li> </ol> <p>II. 4 instead of 5 levels of results' evaluation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Exceeded some goals and completed the rest of them according to the plan – 4</li> <li>2. Completed all the goals – 3</li> <li>3. Completed some goals according to the plan – 2</li> <li>4. Did not completed goals according to the plan – 1</li> </ol> <p>III. There are no descriptions of the competencies.</p> |
| <b>Scales of evaluation</b>    | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unsatisfactory</li> <li>2. Good</li> <li>3. Outstanding</li> </ol>   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unsatisfactory</li> <li>2. Satisfactory</li> <li>3. Good</li> <li>4. Outstanding</li> </ol>  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unsatisfactory</li> <li>2. Satisfactory</li> <li>3. Good</li> <li>4. Outstanding</li> </ol>   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unsatisfactory</li> <li>2. Satisfactory</li> <li>3. Good</li> <li>4. Outstanding</li> </ol>   |

It should be emphasized that since 2002 there have been significant developments of the criteria and form of performance evaluation. At the beginning, there was no detailed written form of performance evaluation at all. Given criteria of evaluation were not comprehensively specified; therefore, direct supervisors had more freedom to express their own personal opinions and realize their own interpretations. Only in 2010 a new and significantly different managerial form of performance evaluation was presented to the Lithuanian civil service. One of the differences between this form and the previous ones was the expanded evaluation of performance outcomes. Results were not only evaluated and measured (if possible) but also planned for the forthcoming year, i.e. a civil servant together with his or her supervisor had to plan estimated work outcomes for the upcoming year. Moreover, the elements of competency evaluation such as competency model and ranking according to it were introduced in this form. The latest version of the form of performance evaluation includes the same elements of appraisal. Besides, it is additionally supplemented by the table of the evaluation of the skills of civil servants. In spite of that, in this version of the evaluation form, there is a visible tendency to minimize the descriptions of the criteria and to simplify the form itself.

### **3.2. Institutions related to the enforcement of the Law on Civil Service**

In the Law on Civil Service, the Ministry of the Interior together with the Government are referred to as the main figures in the general management of civil service in Lithuania. As stipulated by the Law: “The Government shall: 1) implement civil service policies; 2) perform other functions of general civil service management set out in this Law and other legal acts.” and “The Minister of the Interior shall: 1) submit to the Government draft legal acts related to the civil service; 2) co-ordinate control over the implementation of this Law and related legal acts; 3) perform other functions of general civil service management set out in this Law and other legal acts” (Article 48). The role of the Government is supported and partly realized through the activities of OPML. At the time of the research, this organization was “an advisory expert institution that helps the Prime Minister to ensure effective and timely implementation of the work priorities and programmes defined by the Government as well as to participate in the public administration reform implemented by the Government”<sup>43</sup>. The OPML was developing the new form of performance evaluation in 2010, thus it could be summarized that the civil servants working in this institution contributed to the improvement of the system of performance evaluation.

Moreover, both the OPML and the Ministry of the Interior were involved in long-term and wide-scale projects aimed at improving the administrative capacities of civil servants and the overall effectiveness of public administration. Even though these projects were not directly related to the system of performance evaluation, they have an indirect impact on civil servants. To be more precise, participation in trainings, conferences and discussions organized in the framework of such projects helps civil servants to understand the role of performance appraisal and the way this managerial tool influences organizational systems of performance, strategic and quality management.

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43 <http://www.lrv.lt>.

At the beginning of 2010, the Ministry of the Interior launched the project with the aim to develop an electronic system of the monitoring of public administration. It is going to be finished at the end of 2013 and should concentrate on the monitoring and evaluation of changes in public administration ([http://vakokybe.vrm.lt/lt/Stebesenos\\_sistema](http://vakokybe.vrm.lt/lt/Stebesenos_sistema)). The system will contribute to other already implemented methods of quality management in the Lithuanian civil service institutions, e.g. the Common Assessment Framework. At the same time, OPML launched the initiative of the Improvement of Performance-based Management (VORT). The project is meant “to improve performance monitoring and accountability, functional analysis and programme evaluation as well as decision impact assessment”.

The implementation of the Law on Civil Service is also largely related to the Civil Service Department. It was established in 2002 (following the new wording of the Law on Civil Service) and set up under the Ministry of the Interior (until the end of 2010). Currently, it is accountable for the Government of Lithuania. As the Ministry of the Interior remains involved in the regulations of civil service in Lithuania, both organizations have an impact on some of the functions performed by the Civil Service Department, including the development of the system of performance evaluation.

In the Law on Civil Service, the Civil Service Department is referred to as the Agency for Civil Service Management and its functions are laid down: “[to] exercise control over the implementation of this Law and related legal acts; [to] manage the register of civil servants; [to] draft legal acts related to the civil service; [to] ensure a uniform system for personnel management and career advancement of civil servants; [to] approve training programmes for civil servants; [to] co-ordinate the implementation of the strategy for the training of civil servants; examine disputes related to the status of civil servants and submit conclusions and proposals on these issues to state and municipal institutions and agencies; [to] prepare information about the civil service and submit it to state and municipal institutions and agencies; [to] perform other functions set out in this Law” (Article 49).

The Civil Service Department is involved in many initiatives of human resource management. Performance evaluation, its procedure and subsequent actions, the strategy of personnel training programs, career development as well as other basic functions of human resource management are the integral part of this department’s underlying tasks. The data in the official website of this Department shows the development of this institutional body by emphasizing the impact of international cooperation<sup>44</sup> and participation in various projects funded by the European Social Fund Agency<sup>45</sup>.

To ensure that the system of performance evaluation is an integral part of human resource management in the Lithuanian civil service is among the responsibilities of this Department. In the annual reports of the Civil Service Department, a separate chapter is dedicated to a discussion on the situation of performance evaluation; however, it is

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44 e.g. knowledge-sharing meetings with experts from the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, France and other, mostly EU, countries; involvement in the network of the European Personnel Selection Office; Eastern Partnership; Nordic Mobility Program.

45 e.g. in 2009, the project for the improvement of the system of the selection of civil servants was launched; in 2010, another initiative aiming to analyse civil servants’ competencies and develop a catalogue of the description of civil servants’ positions was presented by the Civil Service Department.

limited to the presentation of statistical data concerning performance evaluation results<sup>46</sup>. Statistics from the official reports of performance evaluation and conclusion remarks of the evaluation commissions rather than an analysis and interpretation of the existing data and the system itself is the main locus of interest of these documents. The system of performance evaluation is treated as a tool for the categorization of civil servants into outstanding, good, satisfactory and unsatisfactory performers, instead of being a driving force for employee motivation and professional development.

Besides, in its annual reports, the Civil Service Department highlights the statistical figures of evaluated civil servants as well as the cases of promotion and downgrade. Consequently, only the reports of unsatisfactory and outstanding work performance—the minority of all the evaluations—are taken into account, meaning that the majority of evaluations as good are excluded from the analysis as not having impact on promotions, financial rewards or punishing sanctions. The Department also presents a comparison between the current and the previous years of the evaluation of civil servants<sup>47</sup>. The main role of this Department in the context of the system of performance evaluation is to reflect statistical tendencies and changes of evaluations in the Lithuanian civil service.

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46 The data was gathered from the official website of the Civil Service Department [www.vtd.lt](http://www.vtd.lt) (2013-01-10).

47 e.g. the report of the year 2011 presents that evaluation commission approved 83.3% of all the outstanding performers for getting promotions or higher qualification classes in comparison to 81% in 2010 and 67.2% in 2009 (Civil Service Department, 2013).

## 4. RESULTS

In this part of the thesis, results covering the empirical part of the dissertation are presented. Empirical findings from the case study of the OPML are introduced by dividing them into four blocks:

- 5.1. Formal system of performance evaluation and its implementation in the OPML
- 5.2. General tendencies of the personality traits of the advisers of the OPML
- 5.3. Informal system of performance evaluation, its manifestation and relation to the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML
- 5.4. Personality types of advisers and their perception towards motivators lying within both systems of performance evaluation in the OPML

### 4.1. Formal system of performance evaluation and its implementation in the OPML

This part of the results deals with empirical data from the official reports of the yearly performance evaluation<sup>48</sup> and the findings from the focus group with the advisers of the OPML<sup>49</sup>.

During the process of report analysis, official performance reports of 52 advisers out of 69 were analysed. The empirical data of the “results part” revealed that the majority of advisers (49) exceeded at least some of their goals while only 9 of them were given incentives. The details of this part of evaluation are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Empirical data of the result evaluation of the advisers of the OPML, 2011

| Level of evaluation  | Number of advisers who received this evaluation | Number of rewarded advisers  |
|--|---|--|
| Exceeded all the goals according to the plan (grade 5)                             | 5   | 4 (promotion & higher salary)                                      |
| Exceeded some goals and completed the rest of them according to the plan (grade 4) | 44  | 3 (promotion & higher salary);<br>2 (certificates of appreciation) |
| Completed all the goals (grade 3)  | 3   | 0  |

Similarly, the analysis of the “competency part” showed that all 52 advisers were evaluated as having high or the highest level of competencies, namely, grades 4 or 5. According to the reports of performance evaluation, there were no advisers having middle or lower level of the required competencies.

<sup>48</sup> From the year 2011.

<sup>49</sup> Conducted on 5 April 2011.

Table 5. Empirical data of the competency evaluation of the advisers of the OPML, 2011

| Level of evaluation                         | Number of advisers who received this evaluation | Number of motivated advisers                                       |
|---|---|--|
| The highest level of competencies (grade 5) | 8   | 4 (promotion & higher salary)                                      |
| High level of competencies (grade 4)        | 44  | 3 (promotion & higher salary);<br>2 (certificates of appreciation) |
| Middle level of competencies (grade 3)      | 0   | 0  |

In the analysis of the reports of official performance evaluation, one adviser was found not included in the candidate list for getting a higher salary and position even though he or she had an evaluation fitting into the frames of such a motivator. However, the situation concerning the certificates of appreciation was more complicated, as only 2 of 44 employees given grade 4 were included in the candidate list for getting the certificates of appreciation by the Chancellor of the OPML. These data and the fact that all the competencies of 52 advisers were evaluated almost equally encouraged several informal conversations with some of the heads of units and OPML advisers. Consequently, it was decided that researchers<sup>50</sup> should collaborate with the OPML in order to improve the existing system of performance evaluation by developing a separate competency model for OPML advisers<sup>51</sup> that is presented in Table 6.

Table 6. OPML Advisor Competency Model

| Name of the competency       | Variation of the scale <sup>52</sup> | The level of competence the adviser should have |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Analytical thinking          | 1-6                                  | 3   |
| Quality of service           | 1-6                                  | 3   |
| Loyalty for the organization | 1-6                                  | 2   |
| Achievement orientation      | 1-6                                  | 3   |
| Teamwork and cooperation     | 1-6                                  | 3   |
| Professional excellence      | 1-4                                  | 2   |
| Information seeking          | 1-5                                  | 3   |
| Initiative                   | 1-6                                  | 2   |
| Flexibility                  | 1-6                                  | 2   |
| Conceptual thinking          | 1-6                                  | 3   |
| Organizational awareness     | 1-6                                  | 3   |
| Information seeking          | 1-5                                  | 3   |

<sup>50</sup> Prof. Dr. Tadas Sudnickas and me.

<sup>51</sup> For more information see section 2.

<sup>52</sup> Higher figures indicate higher competency levels.

At the end of 2011, following the procedure of behavioural observation throughout the year, the competencies of OPML advisers were evaluated using the new competency model. Advisers filled in self-evaluation forms, meanwhile their superiors separately filled the same forms with information about the subordinates. Forms of the competency evaluation of advisers were collected from 39 advisers and 12 superiors. The results of the superiors' evaluation of the competencies of advisers are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Superiors' evaluation of the competencies of advisers

| <b>Level of evaluation<br/>(varied from 1 to 6)</b>      | <b>Number of advisers<br/>who received this<br/>evaluation</b> | <b>Number of motivated<br/>advisers</b> |
|--|--|---|
| Very high level of competencies<br>(grade 6)             | 3  | 1 (promotion & higher salary)           |
| High level of competencies<br>(grade 5)                  | 16   | 4 (promotion & higher salary)           |
| Average level of competencies<br>(grade 4)               | 9  | 0                                       |
| Lower than average level of<br>competencies<br>(grade 3) | 8  | 2 (promotion & higher salary)           |
| Low level of competencies<br>(grade 2)                   | 2  | 0                                       |

It should be noted that in comparison to the competency model of Lithuanian civil servants the new competency model for advisers has produced different results. Out of 3 advisers who received the highest evaluation following the new competency model only 1 was selected for performance reward following the old system of performance evaluation. Furthermore, 2 advisers received incentives for their excellent performance measured on the basis of the official system, although following the new competency model their competencies were defined as lower than average.

In addition, it has to be mentioned that there was a strong tendency for the advisers to give themselves higher scores than given by the superiors. No tendencies regarding differences between the appraisal of advisers and their superiors in the reports of the official performance evaluation were noticed.

The overall results of the first block were discussed with the members of the OPML. The possible existence of the informal system of performance evaluation and the idea that the official system represented the formal facade only was several times mentioned by the employees. The results of this stage of the empirical research raised a question whether the official system of performance evaluation is the only way of performance evaluation in the OPML and, if not, what the other practices are.

## 4.2. General tendencies of the personality traits of the advisers of the OPML

The general tendencies of the evaluations of the personality traits of OPML advisers are presented in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Tendencies in the personality traits of OPML advisers

The strongest tendencies were noticed in Honesty-Humility (ranged from 45% to 95%, with a standard deviation of 9.77 and median 64.4%) and Conscientiousness (ranged from 45% to 88%, with a standard deviation of 10.58 and median 58.93%), while Agreeableness (ranged from 20% to 74%, with a standard deviation of 8.84 and median 48.06%) and Emotionality (ranged from 18% to 72%, with a standard deviation of 10.66 and median 53%) had a lower level of expression. It has to be stressed that the stronger the trait the higher the possibility of behaviour indicating a certain personality trait.

## 4.3. Informal system of performance evaluation, its practice and relation to the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML

In this section, empirical findings of participant observation and informal interviews are presented.

Observation in the OPML was based on questions prepared in advance and divided into five sections. The results of this part of the study are presented on the basis of each of the sub-sections:

5.3.1. Image of the OPML

5.3.2. The OPML as a politically-driven organization

5.3.3. Organizational culture in the OPML

5.3.4. Formal system of performance evaluation from the perspective of the employees of the OPML

5.3.5. Informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML



#### 4.3.1. Image of the OPML

The OPML building with a big parking place and the Vincas Kudirka square in front of the main entrance is located in the centre of Vilnius, one of the most prestigious places in Lithuania. Surrounded by many cafes, restaurants and shops it is just a few hundred metres from the Vilnius Old Town, the Cathedral and the Bernardine Gardens. As many other state institutions, including the Parliament, the Government is situated in the Gediminas avenue and known by the address “Gedimino 11” (similarly to 10 Downing Street in the UK). The building is a piece of luxurious soviet style architecture. Security procedures, a special permission and an ID card are a must for those who want to enter this building. It creates an image of power, importance and influence of the state.

The picture from the inside of the OPML is slightly different. The soviet style architecture can, to a certain extent, be considered as historical heritage; however, the same building looks rather different from the inside. As an illustration, I was working in one of the first floor offices where the temperature was not more than 17 degrees Celsius in the middle of December. *“Oh yes, these first floor offices are cold”*, was the most common comment upon my complaints about the low temperature in my temporary office in the OPML. Electric heaters, plaids and hot tea were often used to create a more comfortable atmosphere for working. After visiting dozens of office in this building, I got a clear picture that leaky windows, standard office furniture and soviet style cupboards were the main elements in the environment of more than 200 employees in the OPML. A dark marble lobby, endless corridors, a modest buffet, a spacious uncomfortable canteen, toilets and lifts were the places where all those employees could meet each other, usually accidentally and informally. The majority of these spaces looked just like 30 years ago, with an exception of the last two which seemed renovated not long ago.

Such an ambivalent impression of the physical environment of the OPML was felt really strong. Just somewhat later I got to know that some details of it well fit to the broader austerity policy picture of an old government, including, as mentioned by a number of employees, a limited number of formal and informal motivators, e.g. better salaries, career positions, bonuses, official presents, prospects of professional trainings or certificates of appreciation.

Another example of ambivalence came to the range of observation while interviewing the employees of this institution about how they imagined the OPML and the people working there. Some of them could be definitely characterized as having a strong internal feeling of self-esteem and importance. Those employees considered the OPML as a highest rank institution with employees of the highest competence: *“We are examples for other civil servants, other structures of the public sector, thus, we have to be leaders. People with average professionalism and other abilities should not work here. <...>. We have to work as clocks, just perfectly precise <...>”*. Such examples not only demonstrated their self-image, which was probably related to their high self-evaluation results, but also had an influence on their expectations regarding their overall performance evaluation.

The duality regarding the image of the OPML once again emerged when from informal questions the interview proceeded to the topic of what, from the point of view of the employees, was the opinion of the society about the OPML and its employees. Contrary to their self-image, the society, in their opinion, had a rather different attitude towards the

OPML. At least a few advisers stressed that there was a general negative public opinion about civil servants (including those working in the OPML). They also highlighted that the society had an image of them as “spongers”<sup>53</sup> and “those who actually do nothing”.

Thus, the image of the OPML and its employees was found to be rather different considering the internal (organizational) and external (view of the society) point of view. Similarly, the image of the building was also two-fold considering the inside (employees) and the outside (the rest of the society).

#### 4.3.2. The OPML as a politically-driven organization

Considering the OPML from the managerial point of view, its system of performance evaluation and the influence of politics have to be taken into account. In fact, the role of politics in this institution, in the eyes of its employees, was overwhelming. Its impact was clear: beginning from the mission of the OPML (“To be an expert advisory institution that helps the Prime Minister to ensure effective and timely implementation of the work priorities and programmes defined by the Government as well as to participate in the public administration reform implemented by the Government”) and ending with the comments of employees whose place in the organization depended on new leaders.

Following the idea of the influence of politics on the OPML, changing Prime Minister and other political appointees was just the top of the iceberg. At the moment of writing this text, the whole OPML was facing reorganizations caused by political changes in the Government. “*It is very difficult to work in this structure as everything is changing so much*”, said one of the senior employees while talking about the competences required from the OPML employees.

Politically influenced reforms were constantly in progress in this institution: senior employees even commented that from every new chancellor they expect new reforms and reorganizations. As a result, some of those employees even admitted not wanting to put much effort into some projects initiated by the outgoing Government as they already knew that everything would be changed or even cancelled by new leaders. Senior heads of units, the highest level civil servants, indicated that in the OPML, as a prestigious and professional institution, these reforms should not be as much affected by politics as it was.

Other expectations of the employees working in the OPML were also related to changes in the Government. According to the OPML staff, the first noticeable change during the period of this transition was neither related to organizational values and competencies nor the political appointees and structural reforms (these transformations were anticipated). The first change they felt was a change in the general rhetoric which influenced their expectations regarding future working tasks and conditions. The new Prime Minister, in his welcome speech, emphasized loyalty to the organization, competence and results. Unlike the previous leader and his political appointees, who were described as “*efficient, well performing and innovative*” but an “*arrogant and insensitive power*”, the new Prime Minister did not forget to mention the importance of the well-being of the employees of the OPML and their families. Even though there was a clear difference in style and aim of the farewell and welcome speeches, the key words can be compared. At least some of

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53 In Lithuanian *veltėdžiai*.

the employees of the OPML indicated that from the new Prime Minister they expected a raise in salaries and a higher possibility of other forms of performance motivators related to higher expenditures of this institution (during his election campaign, the new Prime Minister, the leader of social democrats, emphasized the welfare state and the end of constant cuttings). Some heads of units also expressed hopes that possible changes in the financial situation of this organization could positively affect the system of performance evaluation, meaning higher possibility of promotions, trainings, internships, etc.

Likewise, there was another part of employees and unit leaders who did not expect any noticeable changes from the new Government, especially having direct consequences for the system of performance evaluation and performance motivators. Those employees usually stated that nothing in general was changing in this institution. They often mentioned the absence of monetary motivators (such as “<...> *even though you work perfectly you cannot get a better salary because there is no money*”) and inability of the superiors to show attention and positive appraisal in other ways (e.g. “*If you successfully complete a task, you usually get no feedback from the superior*”). Such delimitations of performance evaluation and the system itself resulted in overwhelming disappointment of the employees. One of the conversations with an adviser well illustrated and summarized the internal feelings some of the employees had: “*Frankly, nobody evaluates anything here, neither the organization, nor the heads of unit or me.*”

From the broader perspective, considering the impact of political change on employees' expectations and the system of performance evaluation, it should be admitted that in some cases the word “shift” rather than “change” would be more precise, especially when talking about political appointees in the OPML. A part of the people coming to the OPML was the same that left it some years before. It means that the same people with the same organizational vision and standards of working were coming. It was well illustrated by the news presented by the new Prime Minister during his welcome speech: the Prime Minister stated that this institution was to be reorganized into the Office of the Government, as four years before. The same logic of a political “shift” could be applied to those employees who were leaving that day—probably some of them would come back to this institution after the forthcoming elections in 2016. One of the senior employees commented: “*old-new faces are coming in*”. Those who experienced such changes described such a situation as “*not the first and not the last time*”.

Elections and a consequent reorganization of the institution usually bring certain changes in the civil service personnel. During this process, the replacement of employees not fitting into the new standards takes place. This tendency, according to some advisers, also served as overall organizational renewal. “*It is a good time to get rid of those who work badly*”, said a few working senior civil servants and emphasized that the Law on Civil Service, with the exception of the reorganization of an organization, limits to a great extent the possibilities to downgrade and, especially, dismiss civil servants in Lithuania. However, promotions of some employees to very high positions typically raised dissatisfaction and a sense of unfairness for others. Such examples were several times mentioned by the employees of this institution.

Career changes in the OPML determined by a political reorganization in certain cases had a profound influence on its system of performance evaluation. For example, the heads of units demoted to advisers in the course of the reform retained the same category on

which their salary depended (according to the Law on Civil Service, it is almost impossible to compulsory lower categories in legitimate ways with an exception of long-term and numerous complaints about the poor quality of the work results of an employee). Thus, such employees still received a higher salary for the same kind of job and the same level of responsibility as other advisers. According to the comments of OPML employees, in such cases the official system of performance evaluation was not a criterion for the decisions to be made; therefore, *“emotional and psychological flexibility”* and *“the ability to adjust to different situations, leaders and governments”* were mentioned as the most important traits of an employee of this institution.

The more people were interviewed the bigger impact of politics on the system of performance evaluation was noticed. The employees of the OPML emphasized that the periods of political transition were always accompanied by certain intervals of time during which they could not concentrate on their working tasks because the absence of particular requirements and vision for the future. In their view, performance evaluation should be carried out not taking such periods into account. However, the actual situation was that during the period of observation every civil servant had to plan his or her forthcoming results for the year 2013 without even having the programme of the new Government which usually is the main reference document in order to develop an employees' individual plans.

Similarly, as revealed by the employees of the OPML, *“because of political reasons, there was a decision not to evaluate even very well-performing advisers' results as ‘very good’”* and, thus, not to promote and financially reward them. According to some employees, there always was a possibility to interpret a promotion of an adviser before the change of the Government as his or her political loyalty for the former ruling power.

To sum up, on one hand, in the organizational atmosphere of the OPML one could feel insecurity regarding an uncertain situation caused by the political change in the Government: *“No matter what they were, it is still a pity when they leave. It is not clear what advisers [political], what people will there be and what changes can occur”*, talked a group of women during the event of the farewell of the Prime Minister. On the other hand, at least some of the employees had positive expectations about a better functioning of the system of performance evaluation, financial conditions and performance rewards in the OPML. At the very end of the observation it was found out that in spite of the claims and disappointment about the *“impossible promotion and better salaries”* certain financing was allocated and every head of unit had a possibility to choose some of the best-performing employees that deserved to be promoted.

#### **4.3.3. Organizational culture in the OPML**

Elements and events represented in informal communication or hidden between the lines of the formal procedures and influencing, to a different extent, the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation are attributed to the subject of the organizational culture of the OPML.

To begin with, the abovementioned political influence and reforms in the OPML were closely related to the organizational culture. To be precise, politics was a part of the organizational culture there. A private conversation during lunch time in the canteen of

the OPML expressing expectations that new chancellor would be emphatic, sensitive and taking into account the problems of the employees of this organization could be taken as an illustration of the mentioned relation: “A: *What do you think about the new Chancellor and the others? What is your impression about him?* B: *I think the factor of humanity is the leading one.* A.: *That means it is OK.*” Further on, this conversation focused on how to do the best and “*create a positive image of the work*” in the eyes of the new leader. On one hand, in this example, the new Chancellor represented the political arena and how its new members influenced the rest of employees and their willingness to demonstrate their performance results. On the other hand, a spontaneous reaction of employees expressed in the informal atmosphere characterized the elements of the organizational atmosphere influenced by the new political appointee.

Another element of the organizational culture worth mentioning is team work and collaboration of the employees of the OPML. First of all, this phenomenon was chosen because it was named as one of the most important competencies assessed on the basis of the system of performance evaluation. Second, it was closely related to some aspects of the informal system of performance evaluation, such as personal relations and friendship with a superior. During the farewell speech of the Prime Minister, respect (everybody came a little before the time and were standing calmly for a while, some of them dressed up), a certain type of sadness (some of the employees after ironical jokes were sadly concluding “*well, let’s say goodbye*” or “*it was an interesting time*”) and even tears in the eyes of a few employees were noticed. Before the speech in the grand second floor lobby, one could see a lot of employees standing feeling uncomfortable in a big space and looking for a group of people that could be identified as “own”. At the beginning of the Prime Minister’s speech, employees were listening in silence with respect; however, when he finished they suddenly relaxed and started to communicate more vividly, even with outbursts of laughter. The peak of positive emotions was reached when they started to proudly pose for pictures with the Prime Minister. This view partly contradicts the abovementioned idea about efficient but arrogant political-level employees, although this comment was not particularly directed at the Prime Minister. The possibility to observe these people on that occasion allowed grasping an additional aspect of political change and its influence on the OPML as a whole team of professionals. Every four years (the period between the elections), organizational culture that supported team work and collaboration as well as every single employee who had to demonstrate this competence experienced a challenge.

Team spirit could be felt during the farewell of the Prime Minister; however, it could be difficult to feel it while walking in the corridors of the OPML. The doors of some of the offices were constantly closed and some regularly opened. Usually, the people whose office doors were open were more willing to communicate and share their experiences than those who preferred closed doors. Some of such tendencies depended on different units. Also, people from the open-door offices willingly agreed to be voluntary participants of informal interviews, while others had to be asked more officially.

During one of such conversations “behind closed doors” it was noticed that there were employees afraid or just unwilling to talk about the system of performance evaluation, its formal and especially informal aspects. They were kindly listening to my questions but were apathetic about answering them or emphasized being too busy for such conversations at that period of year (not even that day).

Different hints of insecurity were felt even while talking to people willingly answering questions or drinking a cup of tea. Thanks to those conversations, answers significant to the research were received; some of the interviewees gave not only factual replies but also comments on additional issues, including the organizational climate. For example, when asked why the majority of the forms of self-evaluation include the evaluation “good” avoiding lower grades, one of the employees answered: *“There are very snoopy people in this institution who can find all the information <...>. They can use the sensitive information <...> when the right situation comes.”* When asked whether the advisers thought that their reports of performance evaluation could be seen by their colleagues or even other researchers, they responded that this possibility existed. *“If you want, you can always get to know. People talk”*, silently said one of the senior advisers.

Similarly to differences between the people who preferred closed or open doors or willing and unwilling to speak, there were also different types of the comments of advisers regarding their colleagues: *“It depends on a person, some are really nice, but in this institution there also are people very difficult to work with. <...>. A part of the people here are really helpful and benevolent, but some are sceptical and peculiar personalities.”* In addition, the majority of the interviewees made a clear distinction between younger and older colleagues. As they explained, *“It is possible to identify this difference from the clothes, opinion and attitude. <...>. You see those old style clothes and can expect conservative opinions about everything. <...>. They are not professional enough and do not have experience but think they know and can everything.”* This distinction between the two groups was often accompanied by a negative attitude towards each other. There were such descriptions as *“they just want to succeed in their career and do nothing about anything else”* or *“they are not proactive at all”*. However, not necessarily in the context of age differences the interviewees talked about people who were actually not doing anything in this organization and just pretending to be working. They were called the *“parasites”*. Such divisions into different groups had an impact on the employees’ opinion about the distribution of formal and especially informal motivators in this organization, which will be explained in the following sub-section of the thesis.

#### **4.3.4. Formal system of performance evaluation from the perspective of the employees of the OPML**

First of all, it would be rational to explain the details of how the formal system was introduced to the employees of the OPML, in particular, how long it was practised and what elements were emphasized. The major object associated with the system of performance evaluation was “the report of official performance evaluation”. Other elements such as a conversation of annual performance review, a diary of behavioural representation of competencies and others went as a matter of course supplementing *“the main form of evaluation”*. The latest version of this form was presented to the civil servants of the OPML and the rest of the Lithuanian bureaucrats two years ago. According to some employees of the OPML, the competency part was developed hurriedly by the members of this institution. In addition, it was criticized for certain limitations such as unclear ranking criteria of separate competences and inadequate selection of competences.



In fact, the way of competency-based thinking in the field of public management was very new in the Lithuanian civil service. Those employees of the OPML who were specializing or interested in human resource management and had at least the basic knowledge about competency-based management mentioned that this system resembled an experimental one; however, on a huge sample of people. Consequently, some OPML employees, while applying the criteria of performance evaluation, were constantly complaining: *"I do not understand how to evaluate. I believe that maybe psychologists can do it, but not we."*

Similarly, there was a group of people who had a general negative attitude towards the latest version of the system of performance evaluation and its functioning during the period of the observation. They questioned it: *"Why do I need these competencies in general? <...> this evaluation and such a system—why? I don't understand why? <...>. I do not trust these managerial models that are so popular everywhere these days. <...>. There is theory and there is practice, and they are completely different matters"* or even *"I think that there is a correlation between young age, a lack of experience and a belief in such managerial systems based on 'little numbers'<sup>54</sup>. The young think that it is so simple to put everything in little numbers, and senior people understand the complexity of processes and the real situation that cannot be reflected in such simple ways. <...>. I don't like leaders who take into account such things."*

The negative attitude towards managerial systems in general was closely related to the negative comments about this particular system, its functionality and separate examples of its limitations: *"These systems with little numbers just do not work. There are a lot of things that do not depend on the adviser and I do not think that such a system of evaluation is fair. You cannot evaluate efforts on the basis of these numbers. It is just impossible to measure the things they want to measure. <...>. This system just does not function, it does not mean anything. <...> the competency evaluation part is a mere nonsense."* The lack of confidence in the system resulted in unwillingness to be engaged in the process of evaluation and even rejection of it: *"I do it just formally and do not think about the essence of this process. <...>. This is just a formality; the real decisions are made before this evaluation. <...> we write everything just for writing and that is all <...>. I even do not remember what criteria we have to use for the self-evaluation. <...>. It is just about the need to add something to the document form of performance evaluation that would create an impression of more work done."* There were also a few employees who indicated very clearly that the decisions regarding career and motivational incentives made in their organization were covered by the final results of the system of performance evaluation applying them as post facto justification rather than the main tool for rewarding those who performed the best.

The lack of money was another common reason for dissatisfaction with the system of performance evaluation: *"There is no money and thus the system of performance evaluation does not function. <...>. The authorities themselves destroy this system [it was said by one of the heads of units who regretted not having the possibility to raise the salary of those employees who performed the best] <...>. You get the order from above that there is no money and you have to be kind and evaluate yourself accordingly."* Such orders were given to the heads of units and they communicated them to the advisers. Therefore, the position of the heads of units as regards the system of performance evaluation was the key

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54 In Lithuanian *skaičiukai*.

issue. Advisers were influenced by the opinion and actions of their superiors. During the majority of conversations, advisers mentioned the significance of superiors in this system: *“Everything depends on the objectivity of the superior and this system of performance evaluation does not add any of that objectivity. <...>. Everything depends on how clever and smart the superior is. <...>. It is important that the superior notices what you are doing. <...>. The leader has to be responsible and control his or her emotions. There are not many leaders like that in this institution.”*

Examples about the lack of money, incompetence of the heads of units as well as the particularity of the organizational climate (described in the previous parts) were the roots of a unified self-evaluation of advisers' competencies: *“None of the superiors wants bad emotions in explaining why he or she wrote 3 instead of 4. <...>. People are afraid to evaluate themselves lower than good because they do not want the others to think that they are incompetent. <...>. This evaluation goes to the history record and nobody wants to be seen as stupid. <...>. I say everything as it is, directly: every person wants to evaluate him or herself as good as possible. In this case, 4 is the maximum, that's why everybody writes 4.”*

The opinions about the formal system of performance evaluation were mismatching to the information found in the intranet of the OPML. There were lots of articles and research papers about competency and results-based management explaining how to use it and how to benefit from it, meaning that the employees of this institution were informed about the purposes and benefits of the elements formulated in the system of performance evaluation. Besides, one could get an impression that the reason for the malfunction of this system was the organization itself rather than the weakness of the system as a managerial tool. Moreover, despite the high level of criticism and the fact that everyone (from the lowest to the highest positions) in this organization expressed their wish to have a more objective system of performance evaluation, none of them, including the heads of units and members of the Personnel Unit, suggested a clear vision of how to make it work. Such examples as *“I do not agree that we should force everyone to adjust to a certain competency model”* or *“I would suggest that these criteria could be only the minimal level of requirements for the selection procedure but not applied for the performance evaluation of already working employees”* were exceptional cases of an initiative; however, still with a tendency to express a negative attitude towards the current system. The rest of the suggestions contained the idea to take into account only the years of previous experience in this institution instead of emphasizing competencies and results achieved per year.

Likewise, while analysing the answers of the OPML staff when asked what criteria, in their opinion, should be the most important in selecting the most deserved civil servants who could be awarded by additional motivators, it can be noticed that even the same people who were criticizing the existing system of performance evaluation indicated the elements that already were a part of the system: *“Those who work more, sit in the office until late at night and do more than others. <...>. Those who show initiative and have ideas <...>. Those who work and do more than it is written in their job description <...>. Those who are able to go beyond the routine and show initiative <...>.”*

To conclude, the main examples illustrating the attitudes towards the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML contained more criticism than praise. Nevertheless, there were some positive comments, especially about the “result” part of the system, which should be highlighted: *“Anyway, this evaluation form is not so bad, at least something is going on. <...>. Anyway, it is one step forward. <...>. I really like and apply this system of*



performance evaluation; although it is not as objective as it could be, it helps us to improve the process of performance evaluation. <...>. This system is wonderful as it really helps to plan everything. <...>. This system is supposed to show that it is impossible to be good for everyone, it forces to rank people and I think this is positive". At the very end of a conversation, one of the advisers said: "If we used this system fairly, it would be much more beneficial."

#### 4.3.5. Informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML

During the observation, issues related to the informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML were often hidden under the broader topics of "political influence" and "organizational culture" or between the lines of the "formal system and its manifestation". It should be noted that the employees were rarely willing to share their views about the informal system of performance evaluation directly. Therefore, a lot of information related to the informal system was received in the context of other, already presented, topics. After numerous informal interviews in the OPML it is possible to summarize that there were two types of opinions about the system of performance evaluation: one group of employees thought that the informal system did not exist and the other group mentioned its existence and could characterize its elements.

Employees of the first group usually highlighted results and competences of employees as the most important characteristic for performance evaluation. According to them, these elements were the key issues while discussing the distribution of various forms of performance motivators such as better salaries, bonuses, career possibilities, exclusive trainings, conferences, internships, etc.

Other employees, a considerably larger group, mentioned the existence of the informal system, its main factors and relations with the formal system. The employees who stated that the most important aspect of evaluation was the topic they were working on and the quality of the work are also attributed to this group. The distribution of topics in the OPML was informal rather than formal. The informal system was disclosed during longer and more personal conversations with the heads of units and advisers. Such expressions as "I trust my intuition. <...>. I just feel how I should evaluate people. <...>. I know whom I can trust and these persons can expect to be rewarded" were often mentioned by the heads of units in response to a question regarding the criteria applied for performance evaluation. Whereas "murmur in the corridors" or "dissatisfaction in the corridors" were mentioned in the answers of their subordinates who were asked about the employees' reaction to the superiors' decisions.

With the aim to develop a structure in the representation of the elements of the informal system (the ones that were directly mentioned by the employees), the results are grouped into different categories on the basis of the factors that influence the process of evaluation:

- a) Personal relations<sup>55</sup>. This category deals with personal relations, including relations in the political arena. There were a lot of comments such as "Personal relations are the most important in this job. <...>. If you want to get good results you must have personal relations. <...>. Especially personal relations are very important here". The employees of the OPML usually mentioned the importance of personal relations in two senses: relations that help to reach a higher quality of task fulfilment within

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55 In Lithuanian *ryšiai*.

a shorter period of time (*"I don't care how he or she reached the result and what relations were used. As far as he or she managed to do the job good, I do not see anything bad about having personal relations"*) and relations that influenced the decisions regarding rewards in cases of particular employees even in the absence of their exceptional competencies and results reached. In some cases, certain personal relations (e.g. having friends among the heads of other public sector institutions) affected the informal status of an employee in the organization as well as tasks assigned and responsibilities delegated to him or her.

- b) Friendship. The basis of this category is the influence of friendship between the advisers and the heads of units on the system of performance evaluation. Contrary to personal relations, friendship in this context is treated as a close relationship between a subordinate and a superior only; it could be also described as sympathy between these two groups of people: *"Performance here is evaluated on the basis of friendship. Friends get better grades than others. They want to promote and help their friends. <...>. Those who have coffee breaks together with the superiors, of course, are evaluated better. <...>. Sympathy-antipathy and friendship plays the key role in getting the final result of evaluation. If you want you can adjust all the official forms according to that. <...>. It is difficult to be objective in the process of performance evaluation when you have to evaluate a friend's wife. <...>. There is always a piece of subjectivity, <...> a glass of brandy with a colleague also has an impact on the evaluation."*
- c) Social issues. As it was mentioned before, the system of performance evaluation was related to the possibility of getting more money. Thus, in certain cases it was used to help employees lacking some kind of support. Several particular examples were mentioned: i) pregnancy. Maternity leave in Lithuania usually lasts two years with the possibility to prolong it to three years. The amount of social allowances a mother (or a father) gets depends on the salary before leaving. The higher the salary, the higher the maternity pay. In addition, under the Lithuanian law, a pregnant woman cannot be downgraded; moreover, the process of performance evaluation for pregnant or breast-feeding women can be omitted, if they wish. In this way *"an innovative possibility to avoid stress for pregnant and breast-feeding women"* was created, as one of the authors of this idea explained. Thus, a pregnant woman could be evaluated as "very good" in order to raise her salary or not evaluated at all in order to avoid stress; ii) poor personal financial situation or financial difficulties in a family. A number of examples were mentioned: an unemployed spouse of a colleague, a serious long-term illness of an employee's family member, a lack of financial foundation in life, etc. Such factors were indicated as leading to the evaluation of performance as "very good". The comments of the employees regarding social issues were very different: from *"I do agree that we have to help those who suffer."* or *"It is not easy for him or her at this period of life and if everything the organization can do is a good performance evaluation, we should do it."* to *"I don't agree with such a system because in this case only the ones who shout loudly about their problems are the winners."* or *"It is very subjective as it depends on a superior and the problems he or she treats as important."* It should be noted that this kind of social issues (financial difficulties in a family) raised more dissatisfaction about the unfairness of the system than the cases of pregnancy; iii) social equality between

the colleagues of a unit. According to some employees, there were cases when the superiors' willingness to equal the salaries of every subordinate (or at least the majority of them) led to the fact that even not the best performers were evaluated as very good if their salary was lower in comparison to the rest of the unit.

- d) Seniority. The influence of age and experience in the organization as the key element for the system of performance evaluation was also mentioned. It has to be admitted that the majority of the people who talked about this issue were senior civil servants. They stated that long-term working experience in the office by itself indicates high competence and a high level of results; therefore, there was no need to do any other performance evaluation. Such statements were followed by an idea that the OPML was an exceptional institution where it was impossible to perform "very good" without long-term experience.
- e) Behaviour. During the informal interviews, certain behaviour leading to better results of the final performance evaluation was highlighted: *"Those who shout loudly about how much they work get more than those who sit silently and do their job. <...>. It is very important that everybody, especially the superior, notices how much you work in this organization. <...>. Those who try to be positive, keep smiling and speak the way everybody is satisfied with no matter what happens have more possibilities <....>. Being flexible and having the ability to bow to the superior sometimes helps."*

#### **4.4. Personality types of advisers and their perception towards motivators/demotivators lying within both systems of performance evaluation in the OPML**

Empirical data from the interviews with the advisers of the OPML is presented in this section.<sup>56</sup> For ethical reasons the interviewees were encoded, e.g. O1 (O meaning the name of the personality type "ORGANIZED" and 1 being the number of the interviewee in the group). Direct quotations within the text are marked by quotation marks and italics, insubstantial information is removed and marked as an ellipsis and personal comments of the author are put in square brackets.

All the results of semi-structural interviews cover four categories of data about the systems of performance evaluation as well as the impact of their motivators/demotivators on certain personality types of the interviewees.<sup>57</sup>

##### **4.4.1. Evaluation of the existing formal system of performance evaluation and its motivators/demotivators for the interviewees of the ORGANIZED personality type**

O1

O1 mentioned the existence of the informal system and explicitly described the imperfections of the formal system: *"It is not objective"; "It is subjective, especially the*

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<sup>56</sup> It should be noted that some additional aspects of the informal system of performance evaluation were also revealed during these interviews and were incorporated in the descriptions of the informal system in the previous section.

<sup>57</sup> For more information see section 2.

part about our qualification and competences”; “It is like a psychological assessment”; “It would be good if it was possible to evaluate reasonably by applying this system”; “The part of competences within this system aims to measure what is immeasurable, for example, leadership or initiative”; “The lack of information has an impact on the system of performance evaluation.”

O1 mentioned being demotivated by lower evaluation by the superior than expected and explained that the disappointment was caused by the evaluation results rather than the system itself. When asked about the motivators within the formal system of performance evaluation, O1 indicated: “*The system of performance evaluation and its structure fits well for me; however, in reality it is not working. Therefore, for the moment it rather causes additional paper filling<sup>58</sup> than gives clear directions and criteria for evaluation. This system, as it is now, does not motivate me.*” O1 also added that the main reason for the malfunction of the formal system was that “*it measured performance results as interpreted by the superior*”. According to this respondent, the superior’s evaluation was informal and not based on the measurement of results and competencies. The personal opinion of O1 about his or her own performance was often significantly different from the superior’s.

O2

O2 expressed a positive opinion about the official system of performance evaluation. This interviewee identified that “*the formal system, in particular the part of employee self-evaluation, helps to protect subordinates from the superiors’ evaluations, which are not always objective and rational.*” According to the interpretations of this respondent, “*if performance evaluation does not lead to the downgrade, it also means good evaluation.*” Nonetheless, O2 admitted that there was no relation between the official system of performance evaluation and performance incentives in the OPML. O2 summarized that “*there are no possibilities for any incentives [monetary performance motivators] <...>. Therefore, the formal system does not work.*” O2 also indicated that the official system had to be improved by incorporating qualitative criteria in it.

In spite of the absence of monetary incentives, O2 mentioned that these motivators were not very important for him or her personally: “*Work and its results motivate me the most <...>. The system of performance evaluation does not have any impact on my motivation*”, “*A result, when I successfully reach it <...>, when I see happy people <...>, it motivates me.*”

O3

O3 emphasised the benefits of the formal system of performance evaluation: “*My attitude towards this system is positive. It helps me to plan my yearly activities, goals <...>. It becomes clearer how to set the priorities. <...>. It helps the superior to explain what criteria for performance evaluation are applied*”, said this interviewee. O3 also emphasized the motivational strength of the formal system of performance evaluation which lies in its potential to structure work and to anticipate results.

In spite of the initial positive comments about the official system of performance evaluation, at the same time O3 stated: “*the system of performance evaluation does not*

58 In Lithuanian *popierizmas*.

work the way it should". According to O3, the "results part" of this system was much stronger than the "competency part", although both of them had their own shortcomings. This respondent remarked that the main problem of the "results part" was its inflexibility and inability to adapt to the changing strategic plans of the organization. To put it more clearly, the interviewee explicitly described the latest situation when the new Government was in the middle of the process of developing its programme (it gives the guidelines for the strategic goals of the OPML and its units) while the advisers of the OPML had to plan their main goals and tasks without having this document: *"We do not have our organizational strategic goal but we have to indicate our own goals"*. The major challenge in the "competency part" was self-evaluation: *"To adequately evaluate myself is the most difficult task <...>. Even though I think that I did everything very good, I still do not want to praise myself. <...> Maybe it is because of the Lithuanian modesty"*.

In the eyes of O3, the shortcomings of the official system of performance evaluation were not overwhelming. O3 also added: *"this system, anyway, is much better than the previous one."* This respondent treated the formal system of performance evaluation as *"<...> a way of justifying decisions of promotion already made"* but, in his or her point of view, those decisions were made following the criteria for the evaluation of the results and competences of an employee.

While discussing motivators in the OPML, this interviewee stated that there were no other kinds of incentives except a promotion (thus, a better salary as well). This motivator was mentioned as important, though not the main driving force for O3. It should be noted that such an opinion of O3 was based on his or her personal experience of being awarded a certificate of appreciation: *"It [the certificate of appreciation] was given to me like 'from under the table'<sup>59</sup>. <...> It caused talks in the corridors"*. Therefore, O3 could not treat it as a motivator: *"I felt guilty rather than motivated."*

#### O4

O4 positively evaluated the system as a managerial tool: *"In general, the system as a tool is not bad. <...>. The fact that your work is evaluated on the basis of certain criteria is positive"*. This respondent also mentioned that the system of performance evaluation was *"good for self-motivation. <...>. You know better what to do in the future."* The opinion of O4 remained the same even when talking about the cases when a superior evaluated a subordinate lower than he or she thought it should be: *"Then it is a little bit unpleasant <...>. But it is a way to development in a broader sense."* In addition, O4 stressed this system being *"good for the superior in order to follow the progress of a subordinate's work. <...> everybody needs tasks and criteria."*

However, O4 had a different opinion about the existing practice of the official system of performance evaluation in the OPML: *"I don't want to say heresies, but it is really very subjective. <...>. Everything looks nice but in reality it is completely different. <...>. I don't believe that it is a real tool for performance evaluation in our organization and subsequent incentives. <...>. It is an unreliable method to evaluate the performance of a subordinate in our organization"*. The respondent also stressed that the system of performance evaluation was *"very limited by the lack of the competence of superiors. <...>. A lack of the understanding of context and a lack of authority in the eyes of the subordinates."* As an illustration, O4

<sup>59</sup> In Lithuanian *ištrauktas iš po stalo*.

mentioned a situation when an adviser was not given grade 3 (meaning moderate) because the superior wanted to avoid negative emotions as well as explanations how to improve the performance of the subordinate.

#### **4.4.2. Evaluation of the existing informal system of performance evaluation and its motivators/demotivators for the interviewees of the ORGANIZED personality type**

O1

O1 was disappointed about the existence of the informal system of performance evaluation. The following examples illustrate his or her opinion about the informal system, some elements of it and the role of a superior within the process of evaluation: *“There are people who are under-evaluated following this system <...>, and there are others who are ‘the favourites’<sup>60</sup>. <...>. Often, nobody asks what you’ve done and, as a result, under-evaluates you as non-fitting into the framework of certain competences. <...>. It is difficult to reach the superior and get the information needed for better performance. The superior does not share the information <...>. Only the people who are ‘close’ to the superior get the information. <...>. Everything depends on the superior, how he or she treats all informal elements and you personally. If an employee is communicative and popular,<sup>61</sup> he or she is evaluated better. <...>. It is very important to talk loudly that you are working a lot. It is like an unwritten law in this organization. <...>. The heads of units are weak leaders in this organization <...>; therefore, the formal system does not work.”*

During the conversation, O1 several times mentioned the importance of money and promotion as the key motivators: *“Evaluation that leads to promotion and a better salary motivates me.” “If it is limited to praise, I do not see any value of it <...>. It does not motivate me”,* explained O1. While talking about other types of performance motivators, O1 stated: *“It is important that the work I do is meaningful and everybody understands why I do it”*; O1 also emphasized *“good atmosphere in the unit”*.

O2

O2 mentioned a few general examples of the importance of personal relations in the public sector, though he or she did not directly relate them to the system of performance evaluation. In addition, all this interviewee’s answers about the informal elements of the system of performance evaluation were abstract, without any particular examples of the obvious existence of such a phenomenon. The illustrations of O2 answers described only the general type of inaccuracies as well as the recommendations for the improvement of the formal system rather than the elements of the informal system: *“The objectivity and competence of leaders should be reflected in the system of performance evaluation rather than his or her mood, sympathy or antipathy. <...> personal relations are too important here. <...> those who are more conscious, who do not know how to approach the leaders or how to speak with them, do not receive certificates of appreciation or nominal presents. <...>. The*

60 In Lithuanian *išrinktieji*.

61 In Lithuanian *prijomnas*.

question is whether you were awarded because of your nice smile for the leaders or because of your results <...>. It is not good, but social capital exists. However, it exists everywhere.” At the same time in other responses O2 denied the importance of political relations: “Political relations do not have any impact on the results of performance evaluation.”

This respondent expressed his or her internal motivation that was not related to any of the systems: “I am the most important critic and evaluator of myself. <...>. I am the person who works for the idea<sup>62</sup>.”

### O3

O3 mentioned that before the decision regarding promotion there was always a common understanding with the superior; however, he or she did not treat it as an element of the informal system of performance evaluation. “The formal system does not work as performance evaluation. <...>. What works is the superior and his or her decisions <...> that are based on the results and work load of a subordinate”, stated this respondent and added: “It is important that the biofields between the head of unit and the adviser are matching <...>”.

This respondent also gave an illustration of a situation when an employee was promoted in relation to the reorganization in the OPML. He or she described several situations when, after the reorganization, the workload of employees had grown. Therefore, promotion was a natural reaction to a larger amount of tasks and longer working hours.

According to O3, the final decision regarding the distribution of motivators in the OPML was aligned with the elements of the formal system of performance evaluation, namely, results and competences. Besides, this interviewee stated that neither social factors (such as bad financial situation) nor age and experience plays a role in the system of performance evaluation. The only component that could be attributed to the informal system, from the O3 point of view, was “<...> the need to practice self-presentment during the meetings, especially when the leaders of the organization<sup>63</sup> participate”.

During the interview, this respondent also shared information about the distribution of incentives in the public sector (possibly, including the OPML). As an illustration, O3 revealed that there were decisions regarding promotion or bonuses either for every member of the organization or nobody at all, following the principle of equality<sup>64</sup>. However, the respondent did not relate this phenomenon to any of the systems of performance evaluation.

### O4

O4 identified the existence of the informal system of performance evaluation as well as some elements of it. Several times the respondent mentioned the complexity of the OPML case because of “the influence of various political winds”. This interviewee also emphasized the changes in “everything: goals, work priorities and the possibilities of incentives” as a

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62 In Lithuanian *idėjinis žmogus*.

63 In Lithuanian *vadovybė*.

64 In Lithuanian *lygiavos principas*.



result of political influence. In addition, O4 stressed the impact of “*the latent matters, personal relations and pleadings*” that form the informal system of performance evaluation. O4 added: “*People who are chosen to be motivated are selected according to the principal of sympathy and antipathy.*” O4 also mentioned the “*institutional memory*” which was related to the “*superior’s memory*” and, as O4 explained, could be described as the ability of a superior to remember a subordinate’s mistakes or negative emotions for a long period of time. This memory had an impact on yearly performance evaluation even though a certain incident was two or more years old; “*<...> you cannot hide from the factor of humanity*”, the respondent explained.

During the interview, O4 also presented a few examples of factors influencing the informal system of performance evaluation: “*I know cases when a person not generating better results in comparison to others was still rewarded because of those latent reasons. <...> in this organization, it is very important how you position yourself, what are your oratorical skills, how you can use the hands of others and the work of others to show the results.*”

While discussing performance motivators, especially the informal ones, this respondent stated: “*in this institution, they depend on the head of unit. <...> the Personnel Unit is not so important here. <...>. It depends on the initiative of the head of unit, his or her ability to stand for his or her people.*” O4 mentioned a few informal motivators in the OPML: “*<...> trainings and possibilities to attend events. <...> they motivate me.*” However, for this interviewee, participation in work groups was “*hard work <...> rather than a motivator to perform better*”. In addition, O4 also mentioned that formal motivators (salary and career position) were of average importance.

Table 8. Summary of the perception of the respondents of the ORGANIZED personality type towards the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as well as formal and informal performance motivators

|    | Existence of the informal system | Acceptance of the formal system | Importance of monetary rewards | Informal performance motivators  |
|----|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| O1 | Yes                              | Yes                             | High                           | Good atmosphere in the team, result and its impact to the overall result of the OPML |
| O2 | No                               | Yes                             | Low                            | Result and its direct consequences for people  |
| O3 | No                               | Yes                             | Moderate                       | Superiors’ evaluation, evaluation of other leaders                                   |
| O4 | Yes                              | Yes                             | Moderate                       | Conferences, trainings, participation in events                                      |



#### 4.4.3. The existing formal system of performance evaluation and its motivators/demotivators for the interviewees of the FLEXIBLE personality type

F1

F1 mentioned that the official system of performance evaluation “<...> in general is an interesting idea”. However, the main form of performance evaluation (a written document) that requires filling in the results and competency evaluation in detail was not acceptable for this respondent: “*This system irritates me. I do everything as fast as I can and just want to finish it. <...> I do what it is needed in order to fulfil the task but not what the bureaucracy wants.*” F1 described the official system of performance evaluation as one of the elements of such bureaucracy. Moreover, F1 stressed that in the current system of performance evaluation there was “no benchmark, no qualitative elements such as an initiative <...>, only quantities and numbers”. According to this respondent, “*The Personnel Unit decides on the salary and categories of an employee*”. Later, F1 also mentioned the importance of the Finance Unit and the head of one’s own unit to the final result of performance evaluation and subsequent motivators. The way a superior interpreted the work load of his or her subordinates, according to this interviewee, played a significant role in the whole system of performance evaluation.

While answering questions about the relation between the official system of performance evaluation and various work motivators, F1 said: “*I don’t think it works. <...> those categories [of the official system of performance evaluation] would work well if everybody took it seriously. <...>. It needs more commitment of the employees.*” In addition, it should be noted that formal motivators were not among the most important for F1, e.g. flexible working conditions and a possibility to combine professional activities outside this organization were mentioned as a much more important subject.

In spite of the negative attitude towards the practice of the official system of performance evaluation in the OPML, this interviewee stressed: “*I hope that results rather than friendship with the superior and his or her mood on the day of performance evaluation are the main criteria for the decisions made <...>. It [the official system of performance evaluation] is needed in order to minimize subjectivity. <...> At least I hope that they [the superiors] measure results rather than loyalty <...>, if that is not the case, everybody would try to please the leaders. <...>. There are people who are sitting here for too long<sup>65</sup> and think differently, but their opinion about such issues is based on gossip rather than the real situation.*”

F2

F2 had a negative opinion about the official system of performance evaluation: “*I am sceptical about this kind of documents*”, F2 said while pointing at the report of official performance evaluation. According to this respondent, the introduction of this system in the OPML did not raise the level of effectiveness and professionalism in this institution: “*Professionals have something that is not expressed in numbers. <...> we need specialists rather than managers <...>, it is difficult to put all these aspects [of qualitative work results]*

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65 In Lithuanian *užsisėdėję*.

into these papers [reports of official performance evaluation]“. This respondent described the high quality of work results as “<...> the feeling of how to do things that arrives from professionalism and experience.”

It has also to be noted that during the interview, F2 ironically commented on the general ideas of result-oriented management, which was one of the basis for the official system of performance evaluation: “<...> you have to be like a hound which succeeds and finds its prey”. In addition, the answers of this interviewee revealed that he or she did not relate any of the systems of performance evaluation to the motivators (neither formal nor informal): “I cannot get a promotion or a better salary or even participate in trainings because of my situation [F2 occupied a position of a high category and got a relatively good salary] and the financial situation in the organization.” However, at the same time, while talking about his or her personal social and economic situation, F2 added: “salary is important for me <...>”.

### F3

The opinion of F3 about the official system of performance evaluation was more positive than negative. First of all, the respondent stated: “It is difficult to say something about this system because the head of unit applies the principle of equality. <...> in our unit, the ranking is based on merits.” Secondly, this respondent gave an extensive description of the informal system of performance evaluation and emphasized his or her disappointment about the absence of the formal one. Thirdly, F3 stated: “competitiveness forces me to work better <...>; in such a case I am forced not to sleep and to move forward <...> as well as spare no efforts and develop myself.”

During the interview, this respondent strongly emphasized the positive effect of ranking but not the formal system of performance evaluation and the way it intended to measure results and competencies.

### F4

F4 had a distinctively negative opinion about the official system of performance evaluation: “it is a complete nonsense. It looks absolutely impossible to use. <...>. A monument should be built for such a “masterpiece” [ironically]. Of course, not the Prime Minister will have to fill in such a nonsense [briedas]. <...>. This system would be good for a factory <...> where you have to count mechanic details made per hour but not for this institution. It is impossible to measure our work. It is impossible to rank us. <...>. It is impossible to exceed the results if they were well planned <...> and this is how it should be. If you exceed it, it means the planning part was not good.”

This interviewee mentioned that the official system of performance evaluation “<...> was adapted from the UK model <...>; they think that if it works there, it will also work in Lithuania <...>, but this is a mere theory.”

F4 summarized that he or she did not understand how the official system of performance evaluation should work: “I do not understand the difference between good and very good”. F4 also said: “the best way would be if the system was based on the evaluation of experience <...>, whereas the current system does not take into account experience at all. The same principle should be applied for the delivery of all motivators”. In addition, this respondent

stated that monetary performance evaluation was the most important motivator: *"I don't care about the category or position, the most important thing is money."*

#### **4.4.4. Informal system of performance evaluation and its motivators/demotivators for the interviewees of the FLEXIBLE personality type**

F1

F1 did not indicate the existence of the informal system of performance evaluation. This respondent attributed some elements of it (when asked about political relations, friendship with the superior, etc.) to the *"level of gossip"*. Although this respondent mentioned the importance of the *"network of people"* and *"relations between an adviser and the head of unit"*, these examples were an exception rather than a rule in terms of the overall system of performance evaluation. Moreover, F1 did not attribute *"the absence of relation between the official system of performance evaluation and motivators"* (informal, such as internships and other possibilities for development) to the informal system of performance evaluation.

F2

F2 did not mention the informal system of performance evaluation. However, this interviewee expressed some critical comments about the organization in general (*"the leaders here sometimes deter from any wish to broaden the scope of one's knowledge"*; *"For the last five or six years it [the OPML] has been trying to economize and to cut down on as much as possible"* [including all the motivators]) and emphasized political influence on this organization (*"This institution is like a conveyer of different decisions. There are a lot of different interests that have to be combined. <...> it happens that people say one thing and do another"*).

F2 also mentioned that *"communication and good relationships between team members"* and the *"possibility to reach good results"* were among the main informal motivators.

F3

F3 clearly identified the informal system of performance evaluation and its characteristics. Unlike the other respondents, F3 related it to the whole organizational culture: *"There is quite a big part of people [within the OPML] who represent the position 'we want it to be as it was' <...> meaning the less change the better [the official system of performance evaluation is treated as a novelty]. There also are such people among the heads of units. They do not apply the system of performance evaluation <...>, they evaluate subordinates from the perspective they imagine the organization should be <...>; they apply it according to what seems more acceptable and convenient for them"*. According to this interviewee, it was the main reason why this type of superiors reacted very formally to all innovations, including the official system of performance evaluation: *"they think only about writing and finishing it <...>; they do not go deeper into the essence. They do not want to make it better."* In addition, F3 also mentioned an *"unwritten standard [in the OPML] to complain to everybody how much one works"*, which was a part of the organizational culture and affected the whole management system. This respondent also mentioned another

problem in the system of performance evaluation: *"The merits of one employee often are attributed to another one. <...> this phenomenon exists on all levels."*

While characterizing some of the elements of the informal system, F3 emphasized: *"Without any doubts political and personal relations are very important here. <...> for the evaluation of results, performance and the career in general <...>; for those having certain relations it is easier to get the motivators [internships, promotion, etc.] in this organization."* However, at the same time F3 stated: *"The relations are a desirable but not a necessary element in order to get the motivators. <...>. One may be promoted for an exceptional amount of work."* F3 provided an example of a hardworking colleague who reached a very high position and was motivated in many different ways in this institution. Moreover, the respondent also explained that in the majority of cases in the OPML, the relation between subordinates and superiors was based on workplace collaboration and interpersonal communication rather than political attitudes.

Talking about his or her motivation/demotivation and various performance incentives/disincentives, F3 indicated a lot of elements related to the head of unit, his or her conservativeness and the *"old fashioned way of leading a team"*. F3 summarized: *"it is good if at least the head of unit does not disturb my work."*

On the other hand, this interviewee stressed a lot of other elements maintaining his or her motivation to work in this institution: *"Here is the centre of power; this is the place where it is possible to make changes. <...>. I want to be here, where it is possible to do something. <...>. I get exceptional information and knowledge here. <...> I can say that I work for the Prime Minister. I am motivated when I am sent to the Parliament to represent the OPML. You go, you represent the OPML. That responsibility drives me. <...> Participation in the discussions and forums also motivates me."* It should be said that monetary rewards were not mentioned among the main motivators of F3.

#### F4

F4 indicated and explicitly described the informal system of performance evaluation: *"<...> evaluation is not objective. I obviously see that the input of everybody is equal but categories differ. <...>. Everybody works equally but those who get certificates of appreciation <...>, everybody understands who they are [ironically]."* This respondent also mentioned the importance of personal relations and friendship with the head of unit: *"I think that those who are evaluated as 'very good' and get the motivators are friends of the head of unit. <...>. The relation with leaders is very important here. <...> The ones 'close to' the head of unit get better evaluations. <...>; those who can approach the directors get more possibilities" [for motivators]; <...> the relationship between a subordinate and a superior are the most important. There are clear favourites here."* F4 described favourites as *"those who would like to be close to the strong ones and who know how to please the leaders."*

Among other significant elements affecting the informal performance evaluation, F4 mentioned the need to represent oneself as a hard-worker (*"how much I worked <...>. I do not have time <...>. Those who constantly repeat that and those who are very pleasant with the leaders are evaluated better. <...> It is like a good tone if you sit at work longer, for example, until 7 p.m."*) and the ability verbally express the efforts of working (*"those who shout more loudly about how they work are also better evaluated"*). In addition, it should

be said that F4 mentioned the importance of social elements (e.g. financial problems in the family, etc.) for the system of performance evaluation, though he or she interpreted it positively: *“if a person is in trouble, why not help him”*.

When asked about performance incentives, this interviewee could not indicate any examples of incentives received during the recent years: *“<...> it is the best if they [the organization and the head of unit] do not disturb”*. The main motivators for F4, except a stable salary, were *“a stable and calm place”* [meaning low possibilities of being fired, etc.]. The motivation to work for the OPML was explained as follows: *“Everybody depends on your abilities to motivate yourself <...>; the most important is the internal belief in yourself.”*

Table 9. Summary of the perception of the respondents of the FLEXIBLE personality type towards the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as well as formal and informal performance motivators

|           | <b>Existence of the informal system</b> | <b>Acceptance of the formal system</b> | <b>Importance of monetary rewards</b> | <b>Informal performance motivators</b>                                |
|-----------|---|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| <b>F1</b> | No                                      | No                                     | Moderate                              | Flexible working conditions   |
| <b>F2</b> | No                                      | No                                     | Low                                   | Result, good atmosphere in the team, open communication               |
| <b>F3</b> | Yes                                     | Partially yes                          | Low                                   | Result, public opinion, prestige, responsibility, internal motivation |
| <b>F4</b> | Yes                                     | No                                     | High                                  | Stability of work position and conditions                             |

## 5. ANALYSIS

### 5.1. Individual level of result analysis

The individual (micro) level of result analysis focuses on the personality types of advisers and their perception towards motivators lying within the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML. In this regard, the performance assessment criteria of both systems of evaluation as well as the systems themselves function as work motivators/demotivators for the employees. Two different types of OPML advisers' personalities having different sets of personality traits—ORGANIZED and FLEXIBLE—were developed applying the psychometric inventory of personality assessment HEXACO PI-R. Respondents belonging to any of these two personality types were interviewed and their responses summarized in the *Results* section. The aim of the present section is twofold: first, to analyse the general tendencies of personality traits among the advisers of the OPML and, second, to discuss the results of the semi-structural interviews concerning advisers' perception about the motivational elements (evaluation criteria) of the systems of performance evaluation in this organization.

From the motivational point of view, individuals having high scores of certain personality dimensions will be best motivated if the organizational environment, including the system of performance evaluation, reflects their personality traits. In this context, the behaviour driven by personality traits or motivational power of dispositions, as stated by Allport (1961), plays the major role. The motivational strength of personality traits is aroused if the organizational environment is similar to values, attitudes and ways of thinking of employees (e.g. Tett & Guterman, 2000, Tett & Burnett, 2003). In this light, compatibility between the individual and organizational levels functions as a work performance motivator. On the contrary, demotivational reactions are aroused when the organizational practices of human resource management are not in line with the employees' expectations driven by their personality traits. Furthermore, it has an even stronger negative effect if the employees have limited possibilities to convert those incompatible practices into the ones that correspond to their personality traits. Therefore, demotivation comes as an answer to the wrong organizational choice of stimuli that conflict with certain personality traits of employees.

Work performance motivation/demotivation resulting from the employee-organization interaction could also be explained by the broader perspective of person-environment fit which focuses on the satisfaction of various psychological needs of employees, including the need of achievement, power, autonomy, recognition and affiliation (McClelland, 1987; Murray, 1938). Murray's theory of needs emphasizes different types of psychological demands as well as the importance of the match and mismatch between individual needs and organizational requirements. Consequently, psychological needs of employees drive their work motivation, which is either stimulated or lowered by the environment of the organization. Hence, it is necessary to assess the personality traits of employees as well as their reaction to organizational environment in order to detect the motivational link between the organizational practices of human resource management and the personalities of employees.

The analysis of the distribution of personality traits among the OPML advisers reveals higher scores of Honesty-Humility and Conscientiousness comparing to other personality-related dimensions.<sup>66</sup> This means that the advisers tend to have higher average score of Sincerity, Fairness, Greed Avoidance and Modesty scales that belong to the Honesty-Humility dimension as well as higher ratings of Diligence, Perfectionism and Prudence that compose the dimension of Conscientiousness. Advisers received slightly lower scores of Openness to Experience and Extraversion comparing to Honesty-Humility and Conscientiousness. Accordingly, they have a slightly lower average score of Aesthetic Appreciation, Inquisitiveness, Creativity and Unconventionality that comprise Openness to Experience and slightly lower average scores of Social Self-Esteem, Social Boldness, Sociability and Liveliness—the components of Extraversion. The lowest scores among all personality-related dimensions were estimated in Agreeableness and Emotionality and their components.

Honesty-Humility reflecting the values-based preferences played the key role in the empirical research and could be described as having a significant impact on the advisers' attitudes towards both formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. These advisers have a tendency to "<...> avoid manipulating others for personal gain, feel little temptation to break rules <...> [they] are uninterested in lavish wealth and luxuries, and feel no special entitlement to elevated social status <...>"<sup>67</sup>. In other words, Honesty-Humility involves similar personality characteristics as the employees of Weber's bureaucracy should have. The characteristics of modern bureaucracy described by Weber (1978) emphasize societal versus individual benefit, meaning that civil servants have to have such traits as leaning to fairness, sincerity, greed-avoidance and modesty rather than focus on personal wealth and power. Stability in values and respect of authority are among the main principles in Weber's bureaucracy composing the environment in which the employees scoring high in Honesty-Humility can find a familiar organizational culture. Similarly, the Law on Civil Service of Lithuania (2002) mentions several elements having parallels with Honesty-Humility, e.g. it states that "<...> equality, loyalty, political neutrality, transparency and responsibility" are among the main principles of civil servants ethics (Article 3). In addition, studies of Vries et al. (2009), Vries and Kampen (2010), Lee et al. (2012) stress the negative correlation between Honesty-Humility and rates on egoism, and Machiavellianism, which are incompatible with the values of civil service. Therefore, Honesty-Humility represents a meaningful share of civil servants' personality traits required for qualitative and effective service in public sector institutions.

There may be a temptation to explain high scores of Honesty-Humility by the fact that all the respondents filled in the self-evaluation forms of HEXACO PI-R themselves, what means that this score is a result of social desirability, especially taking into account the positive image of this institution among the advisers. The following quote from participant observation perfectly illustrates the advisers' opinion about the OPML and its members:

66 In has to be stressed that the analysis of results concerning the personality traits of advisers in this section is not based on standardized norms of the inventory and should be interpreted cautiously. As there are no Lithuanian norms of HEXACO PI-R, the evaluations of each of personality-related dimension are interpreted as an absolute amount number.

67 The description of each of the dimensions is presented in the official website of HEXACO PI-R; [www.hexaco.org](http://www.hexaco.org).



*“We are examples for other civil servants, other structures of the public sector, thus, we have to be leaders. People with average professionalism and other abilities should not work here. <...>. We have to work as clocks, just perfectly precise <...>.”*

This means that some advisers could have tended to report an answer to the questions of HEXACO-PI-R in a way that deemed to be more socially acceptable than their “true” answer. However, the distribution of Honesty-Humility dimension among the advisers is too wide to be explained by social desirability, i.e. ranging from 44.99% to 95.19%. Besides, “the middle number” or the median of Honesty-Humility among OPML advisers is 62.2% and in the rest of the dimensions it is 60.785% (Extraversion), 63.515% (Conscientiousness), 58.93% (Openness to Experience) and 53.05% (Emotionality) with an exception of Agreeableness (48.065%). It shows that the grades of Honesty-Humility are similar to the evaluation in other personality-related dimensions measured by HEXACO PI-R rather than an exceptional extreme and an indicator of socially desirable choices in the answers to the questions of the questionnaire. In the same vein, the authors of HEXACO PI-R, Lee and Ashton, claim that numerous studies do not confirm the overestimation of Honesty-Humility among various samples throughout the world. They argue that “<...> when we look at people’s scores on self-report scales measuring H [Honesty-Humility] factor. Just as we find for the other five factors, a few people have very high scores, a few people have low scores, and most people are in between <...>” (2012, p. 77). Hence, neither statistical analysis of the data nor the authors of this instrument support the suspicions that the Honesty-Humility dimension is intentionally higher.

The score of OPML advisers in Conscientiousness was the second highest among HEXACO PI-R dimensions. Similarly to the case of Honesty-Humility, Weber’s principles of modern bureaucracy encompass some elements of Conscientiousness; in particular, the principles of official jurisdiction areas, professionalism, hierarchically ordered structure as well as written and formal rules. Therefore, the composition of employees scoring high in Conscientiousness and Honesty-Humility comprehensively reflects the Weber’s vision of a civil servant.

Different studies reveal that Conscientiousness is strongly related to performance and training effectiveness among both private and public sector employees (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Vries, Vries, & Born, 2011b; Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999). Unlike the other six elements of HEXACO PI-R, Conscientiousness focuses on the nature of administrative work. Individuals having high evaluations in this dimension have a strong tendency to “<...> organize their time and their physical surroundings, work in a disciplined way toward their goals, strive for accuracy and perfection in their tasks, and deliberate carefully when making decisions.”<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, the importance of Conscientiousness for OPML advisers was noticed during the process of competency model development carried out at the initial stage of this empirical research. Discipline, organization and goal-oriented efforts were mentioned by all the advisers in the focus group as the most important traits of a well performing adviser in the OPML. The specificity of OPML bureaucratic tasks, e.g. coordination of administrative activities, and a high level of control and accountability require behaviour

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68 The descriptions of each of the dimensions is presented in the official website of HEXACO PI-R; [www.hexaco.org](http://www.hexaco.org).



dependant on the traits of Consciousness. Similarly, other elements influencing organizational climate as well as culture, e.g. security system, dress code, electronic entrance cards, working hours control, formal and very official attitude, fit better to the employees having higher grades of Consciousness than those having opposite personality traits. The average evaluation of Consciousness in the OPML is 63.77% signifying the alignment between the performance functions of advisers and the reality of the personality traits of employees. At last, the requirement for a high level of Consciousness in the OPML can be also noticed in the internal image of this institution formed by its members; a quote stressing the importance of the Honesty-Humility dimension for this institution incorporates some traits of Consciousness as well: “<...>We have to work as clocks, just perfectly precise <...>”. Thus, in the OPML, being organized, diligent, perfectionist and prudent is a must, signifying that those having more “flexible” traits of personality are the minority in this organization.

Personality-related dimensions of Openness to Experience and Extraversion were also expressed relatively strongly, though not as much as Honesty-Humility and Consciousness. The means of Openness to Experience and Extraversion were 61.2% and 60.49% respectively. Consequently, these results provide information about the internal life in the OPML. For instance, extroverted employees influence the organizational culture by their style of communication as well as other forms of live interaction. A successful empirical study of this thesis is also an example of the general tendency of OPML employees’ willingness to talk and share their thoughts about performance evaluation in their organization. Likewise, individuals scoring higher in the dimension of Openness to Experience tend to be less likely to see threats and danger in the society and are more open to new initiatives and practices (Lee et al., 2010; Perry & Sibley, 2013). Incorporating dimensions of Openness to Experience and Extraversion into the personality profile of the average OPML adviser, the list of advisers’ personality-related characteristics are supplemented by the personality traits of Aesthetic Appreciation, Inquisitiveness, Creativity and Unconventionality (the subscales of Openness to Experience) as well as Social Self-Esteem, Social Boldness, Sociability and Liveliness (the components of Extraversion). To be more precise, the advisers of OPML “<...> become absorbed in the beauty of art and nature, are inquisitive about various domains of knowledge, use their imagination freely in everyday life, and take an interest in unusual ideas or people<sup>69</sup> <...>” and “<...> feel positively about themselves, feel confident when leading or addressing groups of people, enjoy social gatherings and interactions, and experience positive feelings of enthusiasm and energy<sup>70</sup> <...>”. So, OPML advisers’ preference for behaviour described by the dimensions of Openness to Experience and Extraversion is significantly strong, indicating that these persons positively react to new projects, innovative practices of work performance evaluation and untraditional motivators. Their self confidence, internal energy and social dominance make them active members of the OPML being able to express their opinion and take the dominating roles in different fields of organizational activities, including the new practices of human resource management.

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69 The descriptions of each of the dimensions is presented in the official website of HEXACO PI-R; [www.hexaco.org](http://www.hexaco.org).

70 *Ibid.*

Comparing the results of Openness to Experience and Consciousness, it has to be underlined that on one hand OPML advisers are organized, strict and prefer administrative tasks; however, on the other hand, they are innovative, creative and idea-driven employees. Subsequently, high evaluations in both of these personality-related dimensions explain some of the differences in advisers' understanding about the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML. The general tendency of advisers' incompatible opinions concerning the advantages and shortcomings of the formal system is related to their personality traits. Specifically, the strong side of Openness to Experience focuses on the satisfaction of the internal needs for creativity and unconventionality which are restricted by the formal system, while the strong side of Consciousness is striving for prudence, diligence and perfectionism systematically reflected in the same system of performance evaluation.

The majority of OPML advisers scored the lowest grades in the dimensions of Emotionality and Agreeableness in comparison to the other four. It shows that their evaluations of Fearfulness, Anxiety, Dependence and Sentimentality (the subscales of Emotionality) as well as Forgivingness, Gentleness, Flexibility and Patience (the components of Agreeableness) are comparatively low. The mean scores of Emotionality and Agreeableness were 52.07% and 48.89% respectively. Both evaluations are very close to 50% what means that none of the dispositions of these two dimensions are stronger than the other and the interpretations concerning Emotionality and Agreeableness should be made carefully.

The second part of the individual level result analysis shifts from the general discussion of the personality traits of OPML advisers to the specific interpretations of the motivational aspects of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. Two types of personality developed in this thesis, ORGANIZED and FLEXIBLE, have differences in terms of three personality-related dimensions: Consciousness, Agreeableness and Honesty-Humility. These particular dimensions were chosen considering their descriptions and the results of previous studies indicating the correlation between personality traits and employees' preferences for certain behaviour, e.g. lower rates on Honesty-Humility and higher rates on Machiavellianism (Lee et al., 2012)<sup>71</sup>.

Following the principles of the personality trait theory, each of these personality types should differently assess the criteria of informal and formal performance evaluation which, being important elements of organizational environment in the OPML and depending on personality, may function as motivators or demotivators. This has been confirmed by the empirical study in the OPML: advisers having different personality types reacted to and accepted the formal system of performance evaluation differently. The results showed that the respondents of the ORGANIZED type of personality described the formal system as an acceptable form of performance control in their organization. These advisers showed their support and demonstrated positive attitude towards the formal system as a managerial tool of performance measurement in the organization. Furthermore, they did not express any dissatisfaction with the fact that their work performance and competencies were standardized, measured, ranked and described on the basis of the criteria of the formal system of performance evaluation. They stated: *"It would be good if it was possible to*

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71 For more information see section 2.

*evaluate reasonably by applying this system; <...> the formal system, in particular, the part of employee self-evaluation, helps to protect subordinates from the superiors' evaluations that are not always rational; I have a positive attitude towards this system <...>; In general, the system as a tool is not bad <...>. The fact that your work is evaluated by certain criteria is positive."* However, all these advisers stressed the malfunctioning of the formal system and openly expressed their disappointment that the formal system did not function as stipulated by the Law on Civil Service. For example, while talking about the formal system of performance evaluation, O1, O2, O3 and O4 (all advisers of the ORGANIZED personality type) mentioned: *"It is not objective; <...> in reality it is not working; the system of performance evaluation does not work the way it should; everything looks nice but in reality it is completely different."*

Taking into account that the ORGANIZED type of personality has higher evaluations on Consciousness, Honesty-Humility and lower on Agreeableness, the results reflect the content of personality trait descriptions in these three dimensions. The formal system, its structure and the managerial logics well fit for the ORGANIZED type of OPML advisers who are achievement-oriented and have an internal sense of fairness and honesty. In particular, for ORGANIZED advisers the measurement of performance results creates an image of organizational culture based on clear standards, fair rules and transparent system of performance management. These respondents mentioned positive motivational outcomes: *"<...> it [the formal system] is good for self motivation"*. ORGANIZED advisers demonstrate the need for the formal system of performance evaluation as it is described by the law. Their motivation is aroused by clear, transparent, organized and result-based criteria reflecting their high rates on Honesty-Humility and Consciousness. Agreeableness is not the strength of ORGANIZED employees; therefore, the motivation of these advisers is not aroused by compromise and cooperation, forgiveness and leniency in judging others.

ORGANIZED advisers require honest, concrete, straight and comprehensive organizational communication. Their dissatisfaction with the formal system was influenced by the lack of transparency in the OPML regarding the challenges of the implementation of the formal system. The studies of Kikoski (1999) and Tziner & Latham (1989) also confirmed the crucial importance of the communication system for a successfully functioning system of performance evaluation. The lack of clear and equal standards for every employee, limited constant face-to-face communication and the absence of the general vision about performance appraisal in the organization lead to the ORGANIZED advisers' distrust in the formal system.

On the contrary, the respondents of the FLEXIBLE type of personality expressed a significantly different position about the formal system and the way it works. These advisers (F1, F2 and F4) were unsatisfied, irritated and demotivated by the formal system of performance evaluation in their organization. Personality traits of Consciousness, Agreeableness and Honesty-Humility of FLEXIBLE advisers are different than those of the ORGANIZED ones, meaning that these respondents also express different reactions to the same type of motivators (criteria of the system of performance evaluation). The formal system of performance evaluation raised resistance and dissatisfaction rather than responsibility and commitment of FLEXIBLE advisers. During the interviews, these respondents stated: *"The system irritates me. I do everything as fast as I can and just want to finish <...>; I am sceptical about this kind of documents <...>. It is a complete nonsense."*

*It looks absolutely impossible to use.”* In addition, these advisers often emphasized the limits of measurement and quantity-based strategies of performance evaluation: “<...> no qualitative elements such as initiative <...>, only the quantity and numbers”; “professionals have something that is not expressed in numbers”; “this system is good for a factory <...> where you have to count mechanic details made per hour but not for this institution.”

Having lower grades on Honesty-Humility and Consciousness, and higher on Agreeableness, FLEXIBLE advisers openly expressed their need not to be evaluated following the system based on numbers. The main motivators of the formal system of performance evaluation: result and competency assessment regulated by the Law on Civil Service negatively affected not so organized, less guided by the formal rules and more interested in relationship and collaboration FLEXIBLE advisers. The responses of F1, F2 and F4 to the formal system were as if they have been forced to be different than they were and pretend that it was possible to measure their performance even though they did not believe it is so. Oh & Lewis (2009) revealed that the implementation of a performance evaluation system in an organization negatively influences the motivation of intrinsically motivated employees. Thus people whose performance is driven by internal motivators, e.g. responsibility for the state and society, are demotivated by the performance evaluation system that focuses on the measurement of their goals and tasks' completion as well as the level of competencies. There is no information that FLEXIBLE advisers in the OPML are more intrinsically motivated than the ORGANIZED ones; on the contrary, ORGANIZED civil servants have higher scores on Honesty-Humility which is related to internal motivation rather than external. Therefore, the differences between these two groups can be explained by the differences in their personality characteristics rather than the source of motivation.

F3 was the only respondent whose answers could not necessarily be attributed to the rest of FLEXIBLE advisers' opinion regarding the formal system. This adviser was so overwhelmed by the unfair evaluations of his or her supervisor (“<...>in our unit, the ranking is not based on merits”) that he or she could not give any comments about the formal system and its basic elements of performance assessment. When the questions about the formal system were rephrased into how he or she reacts to the fact of his or her behaviour being measured, F3 stated that this fact would not disappoint him or her. However, as the interview switched to the general issues and was detached from the topic of the formal performance evaluation, generalizations and conclusions about this respondent cannot be made. The case of F3 is an example of how the rater's and the ratee's personality characteristics and the compatibility between them influence the ratee's general opinion about the formal system. Wexley & Youtz (1985) emphasized that a rater's beliefs about the process and principles of performance evaluation have a crucial impact on the final result of assessment. Thus, if the supervisor has an attitude that the principle of equality is the most important in the formal system, as it was told by F3, the idea of result-based evaluation is distorted.

In contrast to the formal system, empirical findings did not show any obvious link between a personality type and the perception of the informal system. There were two groups of advisers: those who indicated the existence of the informal system and those who did not, and there was no relation between the personality type of an employee and his or her understanding about the existence of the informal system, as two ORGANIZED

(O1 and O4) and two FLEXIBLE (F3 and F4) advisers were among these respondents. However, the advisers who did not mention the existence of the informal system did not necessarily think that the formal system worked as regulated by the Law on Civil Service. Moreover, they mentioned some of the elements that could be attributed to the informal system, e.g. the importance of personal relations in the OPML or the ability to please others: *“the question is whether you were awarded because of your nice smile for the leaders or because of your results <...>”; “it is important that the biofields between the head of unit and the adviser are matching <...>”; “people say one thing and do another”*. The biggest difference between these two groups of advisers was noticed in their personal perceptions and interpretations of certain elements as the components of the informal system of performance evaluation. The first group agreed with the idea that the informal “new criteria” of performance assessment were not mistakenly understood standards of the formal system or accidental errors of the heads of units but a part of the separate and independent informal system of evaluation. The second group interpreted the observed informal criteria of performance assessment as more or less accidental errors of the formal system but not as components of a separate and independent informal system of performance evaluation.

Four advisers belonging to the latter group mentioned the existence of the informal system, described it explicitly, gave many examples of it and were persuaded about this fact. The disappointment was noticed while talking with each of these employees: *“there are people who are underevaluated on the basis of this system, and there are others who are ‘the favourites’ <...>. Everything depends on the superior, on how he or she treats all the informal elements and you, personally <...>”; “<...> influence of various political winds”; “<...> latent matters, personal relations and pleadings. <...> they apply it according to what seems acceptable and convenient for them <...>. Everybody works equally, but those who get certificates of appreciation <...>, everybody understands who they are”*.

Personality type does not determine the understanding about the informal system and performance motivators lying within it. Though theoretically FLEXIBLE employees should accept the informal system better than the ORGANIZED ones, in the case of the OPML, all advisers who indicated the existence of the informal system described it negatively. Neither the level of Honesty-Humility nor the grades on Consciousness and Agreeableness had an impact on advisers’ perception about the informal system of performance evaluation.

O1, O4, F3 and F4 (who mentioned the existence of the informal system) indicated that the evaluation criteria applied in the informal system were not under control of advisers. The employees described their supervisors by dividing the OPML into two groups: “they” (supervisors) and “we” (the rest). In their view, the gap between supervisors and subordinates in the OPML caused by performance evaluation is related to the sense of unfairness raised by the unacceptable informal system of performance appraisal. These results are in parallel with the findings of Mayer and Davis (1999) who revealed that *“<...> the implementation of a more acceptable performance appraisal system increased trust for top management”* (p. 123).

All the respondents criticized the criteria of informal performance evaluation (personal criteria, friendship with the supervisor, social issues (such as pregnancy, etc.), seniority and

certain type of behaviour) as unreliable, lacking in transparency and objectivity. Unfair results of performance evaluation loosens employees' commitment to the performance evaluation system and leads to personal demotivation (Dewettinck & Dijk, 2013). In this light, the criteria of informal performance evaluation functions as a demotivator for these advisers regardless of their personality type.

Consequently, those advisers who referred to the existence of the informal system as an important part of human resource management in the OPML accepted this fact as a strong demotivator, whereas those who identified the elements of the informal system but not the system itself were demotivated by the noticed informal criteria of performance appraisal but to a much lesser extent.

In conclusion, the empirical results as well as the analysis of the criteria of the formal and informal performance evaluation influencing the motivation of advisers disclose that the formal system functions as a motivator for ORGANIZED and as a demotivator for FLEXIBLE civil servants, meanwhile the informal system serves as a strong demotivator for those advisers who realize its existence.

## **5.2. Management level of result analysis**

The management (meso) level of result analysis is based on OPML experience in applying the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. Both systems of performance evaluation will be discussed as managerial tools constructed in order to control employees' work behaviour leading to estimated performance results which later determine civil servants' career positions and performance rewards. Scientific framework for the interpretation of these two systems lies in the management level of result analysis.

As formal and informal systems of performance evaluation are completely different practices existing side by side in the OPML, the result analysis is divided into two parts. The first part will be focused on the investigation of formal performance appraisal procedures, their documentation, success of implementation as well as the specificity of interpretation by the members of the OPML. Bearing in mind that performance appraisal is controlled by the Law on Civil Service (2002) and accompanying legislation, the OPML shares a number of similarities with all other public sector institutions in Lithuania. Therefore, the basic standards of human resource management in those organizations are the same, meaning that some results of the formal system can be generalized to the country level. The whole part of the analysis of the formal system will answer to the first research question and will become a foundation for the rest of the discussions regarding the management level of organizational control.

On the other hand, empirical results of the thesis indicate that the informal system of performance evaluation exists as a separate mechanism of organizational control in the OPML and can be interpreted considering the organization's specific view on work performance, its evaluation, management as well as on the consequences coming after the decisions of the performance appraisal commission. The informal system is revealed via the observation of the internal organizational life of the OPML driven by its employees and regulated by the legal and informal norms. The OPML is treated as a separate organizational body having its own image, culture and history. Though the practice of the informal system of performance evaluation is highly dependent on the organizations'

unique attributes (e.g. teams of the heads of units and advisers), the Law on Civil Service and the formal system play a significant role and shape common understanding about performance evaluation, its purposes and procedures in the organization. Consequently, in this part of result analysis, the informal system of performance evaluation and its elements as well as their origins and practices in relation to the formal system will be discussed. While answering to the second and third research questions, the managerial characteristics of performance evaluation systems will be highlighted as the core of this discussion as well as the starting point for the legislative and personal levels of the analysis of organizational control.

### **5.2.1. The OPML experience in the implementation of the formal system of performance evaluation**

A comprehensive interpretation of OPML experience in the implementation of the formal system is not possible without an integrated discussion about the general characteristics of this system. To be more precise, the analysis of the results of the empirical study in the OPML depends on the understanding of performance evaluation reports as well as on the standards and procedures of appraisal processes. The initial analysis reveals several positive aspects of the system, while further investigations, especially considering the OPML experience, disclose a controversial and even paradoxical face of the formal system.

To begin with, the formal system of performance evaluation for Lithuanian public sector organizations is developed following several standards of the theory and practice of human resource management. Explicitly, result and competency evaluation composing the major parts of the formal system are the examples of “management by objectives” (Drucker, 2007) and competency-based management (e.g. Armstrong, 2001). To put it more clearly, the planning of performance results to be reached during the year, which was implemented on the basis of the formal evaluation system, is recommended by the majority of management academics and experts (e.g. Armstrong, 2000, 2001; Beardwell, 2003; Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Boxall & Purcell, 2011; Woods & West, 2010; Colquitt, LePine & Wesson, 2012).

Similarly, in human resource management, annual assessment of the competencies of employees is treated as one of the sources of organizational effectiveness and a progressive feature of performance appraisal systems (e.g. Horton, 2003; Bohlander & Snell, 2007). Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 1860 of 29 December 2010 “On the Amendment of the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’” (No. 1514) provides for the set of competencies for civil servants, namely: “leadership, human resource management, programmes and projects management, finance management, analysis and reasoning, communications and public relations, strategic management, ability to perform functions indicated in job description performing the supervisory functions over the natural and legal persons”. It presents an innovative managerial practice of combined superior-subordinate appraisal, meaning that the competencies of all the subordinates are evaluated twice: by the supervisor and by



the employee himself or herself. Moreover, the formal system, as it is described under the Law on Civil Service and accompanying legislation, well corresponds to the model of organizational control (Flamholtz et al., 1985) and reflects all of its main stages, i.e. performance planning, measurement, feedback and final evaluation resulting in either performance rewards or the decisions of its improvement. Graphic illustration of the formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service is demonstrated in Figure 5.




Figure 5. The formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service

These elements of the formal system create its image as a scientifically-based, innovative and effective tool for performance evaluation. In addition, despite the legal regulation, the formal system incorporates not only administrative or judgemental but also developmental aspects of performance appraisal and corresponds to the recommendations of an effective evaluation system (Bohlander & Snell, 2007; Bratton & Gold, 2007). For instance, in the Law on Civil Service (Article 22) “qualification improvement” is mentioned among the sanctions for unsatisfactory performers. It indicates about the possible manifestations of competency-based development in public sector organizations and sends the message that low-performing employees can expect to be trained in order to better accomplish the specific work tasks rather than punished or even dismissed.

Nevertheless, when the scope of analysis shifts to a deeper level and the particular example of the OPML is studied, essential differences between the formal system and the theoretical principles of performance management emerge. One of the main ideas of management by objectives is to draw the link between the goals of an organization and its employees. Therefore, an employee understands his or her input into the overall performance results of a unit, department or even organization and is more responsible for his or her own quality of work. In addition, the distribution of rewards is often linked with the performance results of employees.

The formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian public sector focuses on planning and appraisal of every single civil servant’s work outcomes without the



incorporation of strategic management and organizational perspectives. As a consequence, employees do not see the full picture of organizational performance and their role in it. Some of them argued: “*Why do I need these competencies in general? <...> this evaluation and such a system—why? I don’t understand why? <...>. I do not trust these managerial models that are so popular everywhere these days. <...>*”; “*I think that there is a correlation between young age, a lack of experience and a belief in such managerial systems based on ‘little numbers’.*”<sup>72</sup>

The word “little numbers” (Lith. *skaičiukai*) was many times mentioned by the advisers and their supervisors while describing the formal system of performance evaluation. Its derogatory connotation in the context of performance evaluation conveys the notion that intellectual work performance is not possible to measure. The opinion of one of the advisors comprehensively depicts this situation: “*It is just impossible to measure the things they want to measure*”. Therefore, the negative practice of the formal system of the OPML stimulates sceptical judgments about scientific methods and theories and broadens the gap between the academic world and the real life practice of public sector organizations. “*There is theory and there is practice, and they are completely different matters,*” emphasized one senior advisor.

Following the idea of strategic alignment between individual and organizational goals in the OPML, it has to be admitted that, in spite of thorough legislative regulation of the formal system, at least a part of the responsibility for the meaningful performance objectives lies on the superiors’ shoulders, their ability to think strategically and present and communicate the managerial purposes of performance appraisal in the organization. “*Everything depends on the superior,*” said one of senior advisers. However, the supervisors are not responsible for the non-functioning system of the distribution of financial rewards which was constantly mentioned among the biggest obstructions for the formal system of performance evaluation. An extract from participant observation illustrates the dissatisfaction of OPML members related to monetary incentives in the organization: “*There is no money and thus the system of performance evaluation does not function. <...>. The authorities themselves destroy this system* [it was said by one of the heads of units who regretted not having the possibility to raise the salary of those employees who performed the best] *<...>. You get the order from above that there is no money and you have to be kind and evaluate yourself accordingly.*”

Thus the direct link between the results of performance evaluation and rewards in the formal system serves as a disadvantage rather than an advantage in Lithuanian public sector organizations. Document analysis of the reports of performance evaluation indicates that in the OPML the formal system of performance evaluation is not operating properly. There is a very low level of the distribution of performance evaluation grades among the advisers in both competency and results parts of the report. Furthermore, neither performance ranking nor forced distribution principles, which are usually a part of the majority of managerial performance evaluation systems (e.g. see Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Armstrong, 2000, 2001), do not exist in the OPML. As a result, advisers do not understand the rationale behind the performance evaluation decisions and express

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72 In Lithuanian *skaičiukai*.

their dissatisfaction about the unfairness of the formal system: “*This is just a formality; the real decisions are made before this evaluation*”.

The implementation of a managerial system of performance evaluation in the public sector means that the mechanism of market control (in Ouchi (1979) terms) or output control (in Snell's (1992) terms) have to be an acceptable form of managing people, and the superior should have the understanding about the means–ends relation in every subordinate's job (see Ouchi & Maguire, 1975). What is more, if the work results of a civil servant are evaluated on the basis of the methods of market control, the principles of cost effectiveness have to be followed and financial rewards distributed accordingly. Bureaucratic or behaviour control concentrating on the surveillance of civil servants is no longer the only mechanism of regulation in the public sector and a combination of different forms of control might be the way of making the formal system of performance evaluation work better. As Tannenbaum (1962) said, “increased control exercised by all levels of the organizational hierarchy is associated with increased organizational effectiveness” (p. 236). The formal system was introduced in the OPML without important changes in supervisors' understanding about the mechanisms of human resource management control and the differences between them. Moreover, financial incentives depend on a wider range of criteria and reasons than declared by the formal system (e.g. the general financial situation in the country). These causes had negative outcomes in terms of the image of the formal system and its effectiveness.

Similar tendencies of the malfunction of managerial models and techniques emerge while analysing the part of competency assessment in the formal system. In 2011, an investigation under the umbrella of this thesis *Analysis of the Application of Competency Models: the case of the OPML* was carried out. The study revealed “<...> many shortcomings in its [competency-based performance evaluation] theoretical and functional backgrounds” (p. 531). The part of the competency evaluation in the formal system was criticized for basically two reasons: 1) the same competency model was applied for all the positions of civil servants<sup>73</sup>; 2) there were no explanations and descriptions for different competency levels. Consequently, the head of unit is supposed to apply the existing formal standards of employee assessment according to his or her own understanding about human resource management. The majority of the heads of units in the OPML had no experience in competency-based evaluation and the subordinates did not get professional communication about the formal system, its purposes, methods of assessment and other procedures. Thus, during the informal conversations in the OPML, there were number of responses about this problem: “*Why do I need these competencies?*” or “*Maybe psychologists can do it [the self-evaluation] but not me*”.

The principles of management applied in the formal system of performance evaluation are effective practices playing the essential role in the success of the system's application. Nevertheless, in the case of the Lithuanian public administration the Law on Civil Service grasps just separate details of single managerial practices while the distribution of monetary rewards, performance ranking and the role and responsibility of supervisors remain unclear.

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73 With a few competencies added for the managerial level civil servants.

### 5.2.2. Informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML

The informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML is a mechanism of organizational control closely related to the internal life of the OPML, its values, image, history and organizational culture. Informal norms, unwritten criteria of desirable behaviour and the general sense of supervisors' intuition about performance evaluation and reward distribution for their subordinates compose the main elements of the informal system, having not much in common with the formal performance appraisal described by the Law on Civil Service. In other words, the informal system, existing side by side with the formal one, covers the missing parts of the performance evaluation puzzle in the OPML and is the crucial piece in the whole mechanism of human resource management control in this institution.

The informal system in the OPML is revealed via the five different categories of factors influencing the process of appraisal: personal relations, friendship, social issues, seniority and behaviour. Each of these factors functions as the main or additional criteria for evaluation—it depends on a supervisor. In addition, indefiniteness, flexibility and secrecy are the essential attributes of the informal system. As there are no written documentation and clear communication about the criteria and procedures of the informal system, the main understanding about its application comes from the internal comprehension of the managing people or the “intuition” of superiors. For example, such statements as “*I trust my intuition. <...>. I just feel how I should evaluate people. <...>. I know whom I can trust and these persons can expect to be rewarded*” were often mentioned by the heads of units as the answers to my question regarding the criteria they applied for performance evaluation. Not all criteria in the informal system have the same value in the final result of performance appraisal. Usually it is sufficient to be positively evaluated by one or two of the criteria in order to be rewarded, for instance, to be a senior working employee and have a difficult financial situation in the family. Besides, the same criteria may have different value depending on the time, situation and people involved in the process of appraisal. The evaluation and the importance of each of the criteria are related to the supervisor's personal convictions and identification with the evaluatee. This is what Selznick (1948) described as “non-rational behaviour” in bureaucratic organizations; behaviour that is difficult to control by using the tools and techniques of human resource management. When the behaviour of employees is not directed to reach the goals of an organization as the main priority of performance, the space for the interpretations of performance appraisal decisions based on informal criteria opens. The case of the OPML demonstrates that the rational principles of the formal system of performance evaluation are not able to replace the informal system.

The secrecy of the informal system is rooted in the organizational culture of the OPML and has an impact on beliefs about the limited transparency and use of performance evaluation in this institution in general: “*murmur in the corridors*” or “*dissatisfaction in the corridors*” were mentioned in the answers of subordinates who were asked about the employees' reaction to the superiors' decisions. Even though the main focus of analysis in human resource management is on an organization rather than an individual, when dealing with the informal system, cultural rituals and culture of clan, the line between these two objects of analysis becomes very thin. In the informal system, “*the factor of*

*humanity*” is expressed much stronger than in the formal one, resulting in a higher level of interconnections between an individual employee, his or her personality, values, attitudes, behaviour and the organization. Ironically, the number of evaluation criteria uncontrolled by the employees is bigger in the informal system, e.g. the age or the aspects of performance appraisal not related to the quality of work, like the form of nepotism when friendship with the supervisor is treated as the most important criteria for reward distribution. These criteria signify the role of organizational level control in informal performance appraisal.

Political pressure on personnel decisions in the OPML should also be mentioned among the difficulties in the management of irrational elements of a bureaucratic organization rooted in the informal system. Having in mind that the OPML is a highly politically influenced organization where the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the directors of the departments as well as other political appointees are delegated by the members of the winning political party or coalition, their role in the system of human resource management, including informal performance evaluation, has to be understood as very important. To be more precise, all of these employees become not only the users of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation but also the architects of some of the informal standards and norms as well. These officials, having their individual experience and image about managing human resources, carrying out performance appraisal, understanding and interpreting criteria and the main purposes of performance evaluation system, form the core of the OPML and have the crucial impact on its organizational culture, values and informal norms. An extract from participant observation illustrates the influence of a new Chancellor to the organizational culture of the OPML: “A: *What do you think about the new Chancellor and the others? What is your impression about him?* B: *I think the factor of humanity is the leading one. A: That means it is OK.*” (further on, this conversation focused on how to do the best and “*create a positive image of the work*” in the eyes of the new leader). In this context, the most important factor is the impact of the leader’s personality on the organization rather than politics and political decisions behind him. However, it has to be noticed that political decisions often are the preconditions for the manifestation of the informal system in the OPML. New employees appointed by the politicians reorganize units, departments or even the whole institution, while the reports of formal performance evaluation serve as the documentation explaining their decisions regarding the changes in employees’ positions. Thus often the formal performance evaluation criteria are adjusted to decisions already taken using the informal system. Some of the senior OPML members also participate in this reorganization, depending on their personal relations with the new leaders, professionalism and individual personalities.

During the period of the change of the politically appointed staff in the OPML, the formal system is also functioning. It can be noticed that there are some cases when the formal and informal system of performance appraisal are used at the same time. For instance, if the performance of an employee is evaluated as unsatisfactory/outstanding under both of the systems, there are higher possibilities of particular sanctions or performance rewards in his or her respect, meaning that an adviser who exceeds performance results and is a friend of the head of unit has greater chances of promotion or monetary incentives and vice versa. In some cases, the formal system is used as the only mean to assess an employee, while in other cases only the informal system serves as a mean to evaluate the personnel. Consequently, all three variations of performance evaluation—the formal system, the

informal system and a combination of both systems—exist in the OPML. A quote from participant observation illustrates the first and the second cases: *“It is a good time to get rid of those who work badly”* (it was said by a few working senior civil servants who also emphasized that the Law on Civil Service, with the exception of the reorganization of an organization, limits to a great extent the possibilities to downgrade and, especially, dismiss civil servants in Lithuania. However, promotions of some employees to very high positions typically raised dissatisfaction and a sense of unfairness for others).

Political impact on the OPML is closely related to the transmission of certain attitudes, values, beliefs, loyalty and indoctrination. Participant observation showed the rhetoric of the Prime Minister who, in his welcome speech, emphasized loyalty to the organization, competence and results and, unlike the previous leader and his political staff who were described as *“effective, well performing and innovative”* but *“arrogant and insensitive power”*, did not forget to mention the importance of the well-being of the employees of the OPML and their families. The key words of the Prime Minister’s speech demonstrate the values of the Lithuanian civil service. The leaders of institutions applying different mechanisms of organizational control are able to manage their organizations in order to implement the vision of civil service and the missions of institutions. Ouchi (1979) introduced “clan control” as the third type of control mechanisms, particularly appropriate for the OPML experience of politically influenced organizational control. Clan control is described as the most suitable when the continuity of traditions, rituals and ideas is the highest priority. Neither bureaucratic nor market mechanisms of regulation guarantee the stability and continuity of values, mentality and commitment of employees in public sector institutions.

From the organizational perspective, political influence and the level of social accountability are among the key components determining the differences between human resource management in public and private sector organizations (Bach & Kessler, 2008; Ingraham, 2007; Immordino, 2009). These differences are not reflected in the formal system of performance evaluation. The mechanism of clan control is not included in the formal performance appraisal, so in the OPML the informal system fills this gap. The informal system in the OPML indicates the resistance of the directors of departments and the heads of units to practice the formal system, the lack of political will to promote the ideas of new public management and the importance of the “factor of humanity” in this organization.

The formal system did not emerge on tabula rasa, as it was developed in order to convey the good experience from the science and the practice of human resource management as well as to avoid and replace unsystematic, biased and nepotistic practice in civil service. Currently, there exists a combination of all three mechanisms of organizational control in the OPML, the first two (market and bureaucratic control) mostly expressed within the formal system, while clan control predominantly embodies the elements of the informal system.

To sum up, the formal system of performance appraisal symbolizes the attempts to create performance-focused organizational culture in Lithuanian public sector institutions, to motivate employees on the basis of the principles of management by objectives and develop their individual strengths by implementing the competency-based approach. The mix of the forms of organizational control, formal and informal performance evaluation systems and their co-existence in the OPML indicate the demand for an in-depth analysis of

the impact of politically influenced decisions on public sector institutions, understanding of their organizational culture and the place of clan control elements there.

### **5.3. Final discussion of the result analysis as an equivalent of macro level interpretation**

The result analysis is divided into micro, mezzo and macro levels in line to psychological, administrative and sociological theoretical perspectives composing the theoretical backbone of this thesis. While psychological and administrative theoretical perspectives were reflected in the empirical research in the OPML, the perspective of the sociology of law served as a theoretical construct with the aim to deepen the understanding about the informal system of performance evaluation as well as its role in the organization and society.

The multidisciplinary nature of this thesis and the incorporation of not only psychological and administrative levels but also theoretical aspects of the sociology of law generated a different, new and broader scope of insights about the theory and practice of organizational control in public sector institutions and the systems of performance evaluation as the main tools of its implementation. Therefore, the main role of macro level interpretations in this section is to demonstrate the coherent link between micro-meso-macro levels of the analysis of organizational control as well as to emphasize the role of the sociology of law perspective in understanding the problem of this research.

The macro level analysis of the systems of performance evaluation in the OPML focuses on the Law on Civil Service (2002), particularly the articles related to performance appraisal and remuneration (Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27), their implementation and the way they are understood by the civil servants working in this institution. The formal system of performance evaluation is interpreted as a type of the Weber's "iron cage" in the OPML, where both the heads of units and the advisers have limited possibilities to choose their "best way" for the evaluation of performance. Consequently, the outcomes of this situation crystallized into the gap problem, becoming the core of this study.

The discipline of the sociology of law covers the missing part of result analysis, as it links together the main elements of this thesis. First, it provides the guidelines for the analysis of the law, describing the essence of the formal system of performance evaluation and serving as the legal context of this study. Second, it contributes to the deeper understanding of the Law in relation to its image and impact on the organizational culture, the society and OPML employees. Finally, although the sociology of law plays a major role in explaining the macro level of this thesis, it also provides a few insights regarding the micro level by acknowledging the necessity to comprehend the rationale behind the behaviour of people. Holistic interpretation incorporating the understanding of economic, political and social sources of control in OPML management as well as perception about the psychological types of employees' personalities into the implementation of the Law on Civil Service (2002) provides the frame of knowledge necessary for the in-depth analysis of the results of this research.

Empirical investigations revealed that in the OPML the formal system of performance evaluation is overshadowed by the informal one. The underlying reasons for this phenomenon can be found in all three levels of the analysis. From the macro

level perspective, the gap problem lies in the discrepancy between the standards of performance rewards and economic situation in the institution. Positive managerial practice of performance appraisal based on promotions and financial rewards for the best performers has been proved to be unsuccessful in the OPML, especially in the time of austerity. The distance between the rules and standards regulated by law and the real situation in the budget of the OPML was among the key factors forcing its members to find different ways of performance evaluation. This situation illustrates the thoughts of Ellickson (1994) emphasizing the importance of informal norms when the rule of law fails to be properly implemented. The civil servants of the OPML<sup>74</sup>, particularly the heads of units, are challenged by the absence of the rules and standards for the evaluation of the performance of their subordinates when incentives are not possible even for the best performers.

On one hand, OPML employees have to accept and obey the Law on Civil Service (2002), meaning that the heads of units are expected to evaluate employee performance considering their real achievements and competencies.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, they know that the real evaluation of performance would contradict to the financial reality of the organization as almost all rewards are linked to the financial costs of the organization under the Law on Civil Service (2002). In such a case, employees are trapped into a sort of a cognitive dissonance arising from the mismatch between the Law and the financial situation in the organization.

Difficult financial situation in the organization (regularly communicated by the supervisors) limits the possibility of monetary rewards for the employees; however, usually, there still is a quota<sup>76</sup> (e.g. one person per unit) for monetary performance incentives that should be distributed according to the principles presented in the Law on Civil Service (2002). Thus, the necessity of fair distribution of performance rewards emerges in the OPML even if the economic incentives for its employees are extremely limited. The principle of forced distribution<sup>77</sup> of all the employees' performance is not described in the Law on Civil Service (2002). Though, it is often an integral part of performance evaluation systems and the essence of performance ranking (e.g. see Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Armstrong, 2000, 2001). The example of the OPML indicates that forced distribution is a missing part of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian public sector, although some of its separate elements exist. To be more precise, instead of the typically used normal distribution curve in this organization there is a tendency to divide all the employees in two groups only: those who perform the best (these are recommended to be promoted or/and receive a higher salary) and the rest of the civil servants (average performers) who, in reality, are not ranked at all<sup>78</sup>.

Hence, this study shows that the formal system of performance evaluation is not used as a managerial tool for performance appraisal, employees' development and career planning. Formal performance evaluation symbolizes documentation justifying

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74 It can be interpreted as a mini society.

75 The advisers also have to fill in their self-evaluation forms.

76 At the end of 2010, 2011 and 2012 there were certain quotas for monetary incentives in the OPML.

77 The pre-determined percentage of employees for each of the evaluation category, e.g. 10% low performers, 70% average performers and 20 % high performers, is required.

78 For more information see sub-section 4.1.



the decisions regarding performance rewards rather than a technique for performance appraisal. Above all, it can be stated that the attempts to implement the best business management practice of performance evaluation in public sector organizations and regulate it by the Law on Civil Service (2002) resulted in a fictitious adjustment to the requirements but not an actual change in performance management and evaluation in the OPML. Pound (1910) described similar situations using an expression “law in books and law in action” illustrating the essence of the gap problem highly relevant in the field of the sociology of law.

The abovementioned findings concerning the malfunction of the formal system of performance evaluation do not provide comprehensive answers about the reasons for the emergence of the informal system in the OPML. A difficult financial situation in this organization explains why the formal system is not properly applied, but it remains unclear what is the basis of the origins of the informal norms, the criteria of evaluation and the whole system of appraisal. The analysis of the organizational culture of the OPML and the political influence in this institution reveals different aspects of the informal system of performance evaluation. Furthermore, the investigation of organizational culture and its relation to the Law on Civil Service in public administration helps to explain the link between formal and informal organizational control and their manifestations in the institutions. By defining organizational culture through its norms, values, beliefs and expressive symbols (see Peterson, 1979) a researcher observing the social environment of an institution is able to capture these components of the organizational life. Interactions between members, the distribution of power and the perception of authority in the OPML are reflected by the elements of organizational culture. Accordingly, in this institution, the whole informal system of performance evaluation is a product of its culture.

The organizational culture of the OPML is significantly affected by politics. In this organization, civil servants serve for the Prime Minister, the top level employees are appointed by the winners of Parliament elections and the whole institution as well as its everyday work experience is highly politically influenced<sup>79</sup>. One of the functions of the formal system of performance evaluation is to enhance the transparency of performance appraisal, including the protection of civil servants from politically influenced decisions in performance management. As Deflem (2008) argues “<...> with the democratization of the political systems, the polarization of law is no longer a constant factor, but, on the contrary, law becomes a guarantee against the abuse of political power” (p. 162). Thus, in this regard, the Law on Civil Service (2002) should serve as an ethical norm to promote and motivate only high performing, competent and experienced employees. Nevertheless, the legal requirement in Lithuania to detach the performance appraisal of civil servants from politics is not necessarily implemented in practice to a full extent, especially in such a politically influenced organization as the OPML.

On the other hand, it is highly likely that procedures of performance evaluation, promotion and remuneration in the public sector strictly regulated by law are nowadays significantly more transparent in comparison to the practice that existed before the adoption of the Law on Civil Service (2002). Moreover, the example of the OPML shows that both systems of performance evaluation (formal and informal) as well as their mix

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79 For more information see sub-section 4.3.2.



or hybrid system are used in the everyday practice of the OPML, thus the formal system is not eliminated by the informal one. Besides, the main criteria of the formal system (results and competencies) were often mentioned as being important principles in the process of performance appraisal in the OPML. Therefore, a positive impact of law on the transparency and objectivity of performance evaluation could be an option for future comparative analyses.

The transparency and objectivity of performance evaluation are particularly highlighted by the very principle of performance appraisal form, which is a part of the Law on Civil Service (2002) and defines precise standards as well as procedures of appraisal. The current form of formal performance evaluation as an attempt to implement and fix scientific managerial practice by the comparatively stable Law on Civil Service (2002) and accompanying legislation<sup>80</sup> leaving limited flexibility and possibilities to improve it for the users of this system is rather disputable. For the most part, the legal regulation of performance appraisal has at least two sides: positive, as it protects or at least enhances the possibility of the protection of civil servants from biased and politically influenced decisions; and negative, as it reduces the flexibility and adequate reactions of the users of the formal system as well as limits the improvement of the system itself.

The relation between the Law on Civil Service (2002) and the organizational culture in the OPML also reveals the connections between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in this institution. The way OPML employees react to the formal rules of performance appraisal and the subsequent decisions of personnel management allow foreseeing the response of the members of the organization: acceptance of the formal system, distortion of some of its elements or development of an alternative informal system. The existence of the informal system of performance evaluation in the OPML signifies about the level of dissatisfied civil servants, particularly the heads of units. It is important to notice that this dissatisfaction is not always directed towards the criteria or the procedures of the system; often civil servants are dissatisfied with the whole system as a form of management aiming to change well-established traditions in the organization. The situation in the OPML resembles the “law’s dependence on culture” analysed by Cotterrell (2006). The author argued about the existence of six different relations between

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80 Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 1106 of 17 October 2007 “On the Amendment of the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’”; Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 1860 of 29 December 2010 “On the Amendment of the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’”; Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 570 of 18 May 2011 “On the Amendment of the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’”; Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 1514 of 12 December 2012 “On the Amendment of the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 909 of 17 June 2002 ‘On the Classification of Civil Servants and the Rules of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants and the Criteria of the Evaluation of the Activity of Civil Servants’”.

law and culture, one of them being practical “law’s dependence on culture” an example of which is the relation between the formal system of performance evaluation and organizational culture in the OPML. The law does not exist in a vacuum and, in case of a strong organizational culture, the enforcement of law regulating or even seeking to change certain elements of culture has limited possibilities to implement the estimated changes in the everyday management of institution. The understanding about performance evaluation criteria, remuneration and career development among civil servants in the OPML influences their relation with the comparatively new formal rules and standards.

The roots of the clash between the formal system of performance evaluation and the OPML organizational culture could be better understood by analysing the common conflict between legal and social norms. In this context, norms are interpreted as multidimensional constructs (see Svensson, 2013) having their imperative nature described by the law and supplemented by psychological subjectivity coming from differences in cultural and personal understanding about the social environment. As a consequence, norms can provide the background for the investigation of the formal and informal performance evaluation systems.

The empirical part of this thesis revealed that the organizational norms for performance appraisal in the OPML are a collection of formal and informal criteria of performance evaluation. The differences between the formal and informal criteria determine difficulties in controlling proper implementation of the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML. This experience confirms the thoughts of Hydén (2011) on the positive correlation between the higher distance of the actual norms in society and the legal rules, and the higher costs of controlling the enforcement of these legal rules. Even though the control of the implementation of the formal system in the OPML is regulated by law and the heads of units as well as the whole Personnel Unit are responsible for the formal procedures and documents, there still is not enough effort allowing the formal rules and standards of performance appraisal to become an overall practice in this institution without a shadow of the criteria of the informal system.

In the context of this thesis, the multi-levelness of norms explains the origins of the gap problem in the performance evaluation systems of the OPML and integrates different disciplines (management and public administration, the sociology of law and psychology) into one coherent frame of study. Therefore, the concept of norms links the different levels of this research: the Law on Civil Service (2002) representing the macro level of norms, organizational standards of performance evaluation in the OPML creating the meso level and individual values as well as beliefs of civil servants standing for the micro level of norms.<sup>81</sup>

The micro level of norms in the OPML includes the psychological characteristics of civil servants as well as their individual perceptions about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation and is directly connected to the overall unified perspective of this three-level research. The psychological traits of human personality influence the understanding and interpretation of the law, the formal system and organizational rules in general. The macroscopic umbrella of the sociology of law emphasizes the society and groups of people in relation to the implementation of law; however, it does not analyse

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81 This categorization of norms is adopted from Hydén, 2011.

individuals and their personalities as a source of information explaining the underlying reasons for certain actions. As a result, this study widens the scope of the sociology of law perspective by adding dimensions related to OPML members' personalities and their understanding about the implementation of law to the investigations of the mini society of this public sector organization.

Informal norms existing in the organizational culture of the OPML such as support for the members of an institution having difficulties in their private life or respect for senior civil servants as well as gentleness towards one's friends and people having power in the institution are transmitted to the organizational system of human resource management. Consequently, despite the fact that the main reason for the malfunction of the formal system of performance evaluation formulated by the members of the OPML was the absence of monetary motivators, in reality the aforementioned informal norms were considerably more important causes of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the lack of professional understanding about the use and benefits of performance evaluation and ranking strengthened the unwillingness of the supervisors (the heads of units) to evaluate their subordinates following the principles of managerial practice. In this way, the heads of units avoided emotionally unpleasant situations which could emerge if the grades in the form of performance appraisal did not correspond to the subordinates' expectations and views about themselves as well as assured comfortable "everybody is equal" climate in the units. Regardless of the demand to justify the merits of the best performers (those who are promoted and/or receive monetary incentives), the performance of the majority of advisers is not ranked and they are constantly referred to as "good performers" in the formal documents of performance appraisal.

This investigation showed that the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation (the legal and social norms) and their criteria of appraisal have motivational/demotivational effects on OPML advisers, influencing the process of evaluation, the systems themselves and the perception about the Law on Civil Service (2002). Particularly, the formal system arouses positive reactions of the civil servants of the ORGANIZED type of personality and negative reactions of the FLEXIBLE ones, while the informal system stimulates only negative responses from OPML employees of both types of personality. These findings show direct relations between all three key sources of analysis of this thesis: the Law on Civil Service (the formal system of performance evaluation), the OPML (the organization) and civil servants (a group of individuals). A graphical illustration of the interconnected components is presented in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Three sources of control

The elements of the triangle represent multilevel sources of control: social, organizational and individual. Moreover, each of the components influences and is influenced by the other two and none of them can be replaced or removed. The circle feedback is moving from the Law on Civil Service to the organization and its members and vice versa. There might be different individual reactions of employees to the same stimuli (situations, i.e. the formal and informal performance evaluation systems) depending on their personality-related characteristics. The group of individuals composes the organization and has an effect on its culture, and the organization has an impact on the individuals and the implementation of the Law on Civil Service in the OPML. The informal system is the result of the specific interactions between all three elements of the triangle. Therefore, every component of this triangle was discussed in a holistic manner in order to comprehensively understand the problem of performance evaluation and integrate the informal system into the overall picture of organizational control in the OPML.

## CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The conclusions of this thesis are based on the answers to seven sub-research questions, all of them composing the overarching research question expressed as: “To what extent the informal system of performance evaluation exists beside the formal system of performance evaluation and how do they operate as work motivators/demotivators for civil servants of different psychological types?”. Twofold contributions—theoretical and empirical—were achieved linking together three theoretical perspectives of the sociology of law, management and psychology. The pre-study has shown significant problems in performance evaluation regulated by the Law on Civil Service (2002) in the OPML; therefore, the in-depth research was conducted with the aim to create a functional platform of multidisciplinary approaches for theoretical investigations of performance evaluation in the civil service as well as to contribute to the development of a better understanding of the link between the law, the systems of performance evaluation and individual traits of human personality in public sector institutions. Such interdisciplinary multilevel approach encouraged new insights about challenges in human resource management and, particularly, performance management of public sector organizations.

### *1. The formal system of performance evaluation and its role in the civil service of Lithuania*

Human resource management perspective defines the system of performance evaluation and its role in management (e.g. Beer et al., 1984; Armstrong, 2000, 2001; Beardwell, 2003; Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Boxall & Purcell, 2011; Woods & West, 2010). The formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service shares the elements of the Drucker's (2007) model of “management by objectives”.

The formal system of performance evaluation in the civil service of Lithuania was revealed through the analysis of the Law on Civil Service (2002) and the formal reports of performance appraisal of OPML advisers. The evaluations of the achieved results and competencies of civil servants are the core parts of the formal system. The best performers (receiving the highest evaluations) are rewarded with work motivators, including a higher salary, a better career position, bonuses and certificates of appreciation. Although the main aim of the formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service is to provide a transparent framework for performance management, the example of the OPML indicated that the system has significant flaws limiting its effectiveness. As a result of the shortcomings of the formal system (e.g. the competency ranking is not clear enough, as there are no behavioural explanations for the differences in the evaluations measured from 1 to 5; the absence of performance ranking; the absence of formal guidance for performance evaluation in case of financial difficulties in the organization), performance evaluation often serves as formal documentation justifying the decisions already made before the evaluation rather than the form of performance management.

### *2. The informal system of performance evaluation and its role in the OPML*

This study has revealed the existence of the informal system of performance evaluation, its criteria and the ways of functioning in the OPML. The informal system is closely related to the socio-legal norms and organizational culture of this institution. Developed as a

result of a clash between the social norms of the members of the organization and the formal standards of performance appraisal, regulated by the Law on Civil Service (2002), the informal system is a form of organizational control in the OPML. The essential parts of human resource management, including performance appraisal, career planning and rewards distribution, are strongly influenced by the informal system.

The perspective of the sociology of law explains the gap between formal (legal norms) and informal (social norms) systems of social control functioning within the society as well as organizations (e.g. Banakar, 2011; Ehrlich, Pound, & Ziegert, 1936; Nelken, 1981; Pound, 1910; Ellickson, 1994; Hydén & Svensson, 2008).

In this light, the analysis of the internal and external OPML image, organizational culture as well as the influence of politics on the formal system of performance evaluation was carried out in order to disclose the informal system. Decades of organizational history, a high number of long-term employees and, at the same time, the lack of strategic management, constantly changing top civil servants (due to political fluctuations), financial crises and the politics of economic austerity significantly enhanced role of the informal system in the OPML. Furthermore, the legal context or, in other words, the formal system and its implementation also played a role in the organization's performance management and affected the general understanding of civil servants about performance appraisal. Consequently, five criteria of informal performance evaluation—personal relations, friendship, social issues, seniority and behaviour—were interpreted in a broader perspective of economic, political, social and legal situation in the organization and the Lithuanian public sector in general.

### *3. The relation between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML*

The concept of organization control interprets the relation between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation and their role in different organizations (Selznick, 1948; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992).

This study has disclosed a strong mutual relation between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML. The origins of this relation are encoded within the socio-legal norms, which are also the beginning of the informal system. Both of the systems of performance evaluation exist in the OPML simultaneously and both types of norms (social and legal) compose the core of its organizational culture. Therefore, different formal and informal evaluation criteria are applied in the performance appraisal depending on the situation and supervisor's preferences. The study has shown that during the time of political and structural change in the organization, the informal system is more intensely applied, while the use of the formal system depends on the heads of units, their beliefs and attitudes about the performance appraisal part of the Law on Civil Service (2002) as well as their personal values and experience. In addition, the OPML experience also revealed the existence of the hybrid system of performance appraisal when a mixture of formal and informal criteria is applied during the same process of evaluation.

### *4. Personality traits of advisers working in the OPML*

The personality trait theory and the Five Factor Theory were applied as the theoretical basis for the analysis of OPML advisers' personality traits (Allport, 1937; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Ashton & Lee, 2004).

The tendencies of personality-related characteristics of OPML advisers were revealed measuring their traits of Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality (E), Extraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Consciousness (C) and Openness to Experience (O). Personality traits assessment was carried out using the psychometric instrument of HEXACO PI-R, which was translated and adapted to Lithuanian as an integral part of this thesis. Two opposite types of personality, ORGANIZED (higher evaluations in H and C, and lower in A) and FLEXIBLE (lower evaluations in H and C, and higher in A) were developed from the sample of OPML advisers, the majority of them being ORGANIZED. These results indicate the tendency of OPML advisers being sincere, fair, greed avoidant, modest (the subscales of H), organized, diligent, perfectionists, prudent (the subscales of C), unforgiving, ungentle, inflexible and inpatient (the subscales of A).

#### *5. Performance motivators for employees of different psychological types*

The theory of personality traits argues that personality characteristics can predict motivational preferences of an individual (e.g. Allport, 1961; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Tett & Burnett, 2003). The traits of human personality indicate various psychological needs of employees, including the need of achievement, power, autonomy, recognition and affiliation (McClelland, 1987; Murray, 1938), which, if satisfied, will serve as performance motivators. As a result, the differences of personality traits among employees specify their different preferences for performance motivators. In the context of this research, semi-structural interviews with both types of OPML advisers were run and questions about the informal performance motivators (e.g. trainings, conferences, specific work tasks, certificates of appreciation, etc.) as well as the importance of monetary rewards were given in order to find out whether there are any differences of work motivators between the ORGANIZED and the FLEXIBLE types.

This qualitative study has revealed a variety of different work motivators (e.g. flexible working conditions, stability of work position and conditions; good atmosphere in the team, open communication, superiors' evaluation, evaluation of other leaders; opportunity to achieve visible results and see a positive impact on the society, responsibility for performance results; positive public opinion about the organization, institution's prestige; conferences, trainings, participation in various work groups) which are difficult to categorize into two groups depending on the personality types of OPML advisers. Moreover, the advisers' type of personality was not a predictor of the importance of monetary rewards for their motivation.

#### *6. Perception about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation by OPML advisers of different psychological types*

The present study has revealed the differences in OPML advisers' perception about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation, though the majority of these differences were not related to advisers' traits of personality. First, half of the interviewed advisers (4 out of 8 civil servants) indicated the existence of the informal system. Moreover, two of those advisers were of the ORGANIZED type of personality and two were FLEXIBLE meaning that the differences in personality traits were not the critical factors explaining these results. Those civil servants who indicated the informal system thoroughly described the informal criteria of performance assessment and understood

them as a part of the separate and independent informal system of evaluation, while the rest of the advisers understood the observed informal criteria of performance evaluation as more or less accidental errors of the formal system. Second, all of the employees, regardless of their personality type, who discussed about the informal system and its evaluation criteria perceived them negatively. Third, ORGANIZED advisers interpreted the managerial principles of the formal system of performance evaluation favourably, whereas FLEXIBLE advisers were more critical about them.

#### *7. Consequences of OPML advisers' perception towards the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation on their work motivation*

The personality types of OPML advisers and their perception towards the systems of performance evaluation revealed the tendencies of work motivators/demotivators, especially those located within the criteria of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. The advisers of the ORGANIZED type of personality are motivated by the standardized, measured and results-based criteria of the formal system. Furthermore, formal and direct communication about their competencies and performance results as well as the overall transparency of the system, emphasized by the formal system, are particularly important for ORGANIZED advisers. In spite of the fact that in reality the formal system is not always so, the managerial logics of this system positively influence the motivation of ORGANIZED civil servants. On the contrary, the main criteria and principles of the formal system rather negatively affect FLEXIBLE advisers who are less guided by the formal rules and more interested in relationship and collaboration. These advisers expressed dissatisfaction about strict, measures-based standards of the formal performance evaluation forcing them to fit their competencies and performance achievements into numbers, without much flexibility and creativity.

Unlike the formal system of performance evaluation, the informal criteria did not arouse any motivational responses in OPML advisers and served as a demotivator for all of the individuals regardless their type of personality.

### **TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS**

The recommendations on the improvement of performance evaluation in the civil service in Lithuania are derived from the three-level analysis (macro, meso and micro) of organizational control presented in this dissertation.

First, further academic studies on performance evaluation, in particular, investigations of the possible ways to unfold and deal with the informal systems of performance appraisal would be beneficial for the improvement of the performance evaluation system defined in the Law on Civil Service (2002) and other related legislation.

Second, better internal communication is needed to increase the awareness of OPML heads of units and top level managers about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as well as general transparency in this organization. For example, targeted discussion on performance evaluation process, its criteria and application before performance appraisal could serve for this purpose and improve human resource management in the OPML.



Third, psychometric assessment (using HEXACO PI-R or other similar tool) of civil servants revealing their traits of personality would allow predicting individual reactions to the systems of performance evaluation, finding out individual preferences for work motivators/demotivators as well as preparing and adapting better career and individual development plans for each civil servant. In addition, it would improve teamwork, cooperation and communication within the organization by adapting appropriate communication and conflict management strategies according to the traits of personality of the employees.

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## APPENDIX 1. Questions for participant observation

### Elements of behaviour

- What kind of advisers' behaviour is appreciated in the OPML? What competencies, including personality traits, are needed for this behaviour?
- How do the immediate superiors of the advisers indicate that this behaviour is appreciated?

### Elements of the formal system of performance evaluation

- To what extent the formal system of performance evaluation, namely the part of competency evaluation, represents advisers' competencies appreciated in the OPML?
- How accurate, according to the advisers and their supervisors, the formal system of performance evaluation is?
- What might be the reasons that only "good" and "very good" performing advisers work in the OPML?<sup>82</sup>
- What kind of behaviour and other factors lead to the highest formal performance evaluation of the advisers in the OPML? What else do the results of the formal performance evaluation influence? What is the role of informal information within this process?
- What is the opinion of the advisers and their supervisors about the formal performance evaluation (structure, procedure, etc.)? What pros and cons of the formal performance evaluation system do they notice?
- Is the official performance evaluation applied for all the advisers of the OPML? If no, what is the advisers' opinion about it?<sup>83</sup>

### Elements of performance motivators

- What informal motivators of the advisers' performance are applied in the OPML?<sup>84</sup>
- Do all the advisers in the OPML perceive these informal motivators as motivators?
- How are these informal motivators distributed?
- What is the attitude towards the existence of informal motivators among the advisers in the OPML? Do they feel that the distribution of informal motivators is fair? How should these motivators be distributed?

### Elements of the informal status in organization

- What are the main factors influencing the informal status of advisers in the OPML?
- How could the informal status of advisers be noticed in the OPML?
- What are the benefits of the informal status?
- How does this status manifest inside the OPML?

### Elements of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation

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82 There are no middle level and poor performers according to the results of the first stage of the research.

83 Under the law, there might be exceptions for the excellent performers, pregnant women, etc.

84 It is already known that there are internships, conferences and special trainings.

- How is the formal and informal information, used for performance evaluation, gathered?
- Do the advisers and their supervisors think that the informal system of performance evaluation exists? If yes:
- What is their attitude towards it?
- How could the advisors describe the informal system?
- What are the main elements of the informal system?
- Which one of the two systems is more important to them?
- Are there any elements of behaviour overlapping in the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML?

Elements regarding the current situation in the OPML and the status of this institution

- How are the formal and informal systems understood by the advisers and their supervisors as the employees of the highest level civil service institution?
- Are the reports of the formal performance evaluation kept in secret from e.g. researchers, other colleagues, etc.?
- Is there any fear regarding the public opinion in terms of performance evaluation (among the members of the OPML)?

## APPENDIX 2. Questions for the semi-structural interview

- How do you think the formal system of performance evaluation works?
- How does the fact that your results and competencies (main elements of the formal system) have to be measured affect your motivation?<sup>85</sup>
- How could you explain that the vast majority of the formal evaluation of performance is 4<sup>86</sup>? Why do you think there is no such evaluations as 3, 2, etc.? How do these facts affect your motivation?
- How does the idea of being ranked affect your motivation? How do you think this system should/could work (this question is for those who are not satisfied)?
- How could you describe the main external motivators of your work? What are they?
- How are you motivated in this organization? What is the reality?
- What do you think about the motivators you have been offered? What do you think they should and could be (the best scenario)?
- How do you think the informal motivators could be distributed (conferences, trainings, educational trips, etc.)?
- How are the elements enlisted below represented in the system of performance evaluation?
  - a) Your creativity
  - b) Political relations
  - c) Relationship with senior employees in the office
  - d) Friendship with your manager
  - e) Your social braveness, i.e. being not afraid to ask, to complain and to demand to be evaluated better and motivated stronger
  - f) Your social situation (family situation, financial situation, etc.)
  - g) Your age and working experience in the organization
- What is your opinion about the existence of these elements within the system of performance evaluation?
- What other elements important for the informal system of performance evaluation could you mention?
- How do you think your personality characteristics might be related to the results of performance evaluation (formal and informal)?
- How do you think the personality characteristics of your supervisor might be related with the results of performance evaluation (formal and informal)?

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85 The issue is whether it is motivator for certain personalities or not.

86 Meaning that employee overreached at least some of her/his goals and have strong competencies in all the fields.

### APPENDIX 3. Descriptions of HEXACO PI-R scales

Source: [www.hexaco.org](http://www.hexaco.org)

#### Domain-Level Scales

*Honesty-Humility:* Persons with very high scores on the Honesty-Humility scale avoid manipulating others for personal gain, feel little temptation to break rules, are uninterested in lavish wealth and luxuries, and feel no special entitlement to elevated social status. Conversely, persons with very low scores on this scale will flatter others to get what they want, are inclined to break rules for personal profit, are motivated by material gain, and feel a strong sense of self-importance.

*Emotionality:* Persons with very high scores on the Emotionality scale experience fear of physical dangers, experience anxiety in response to life's stresses, feel a need for emotional support from others, and feel empathy and sentimental attachments with others. Conversely, persons with very low scores on this scale are not deterred by the prospect of physical harm, feel little worry even in stressful situations, have little need to share their concerns with others, and feel emotionally detached from others.

*Extraversion:* Persons with very high scores on the Extraversion scale feel positively about themselves, feel confident when leading or addressing groups of people, enjoy social gatherings and interactions, and experience positive feelings of enthusiasm and energy. Conversely, persons with very low scores on this scale consider themselves unpopular, feel awkward when they are the center of social attention, are indifferent to social activities, and feel less lively and optimistic than others do.

*Agreeableness (versus Anger):* Persons with very high scores on the Agreeableness scale forgive the wrongs that they suffered, are lenient in judging others, are willing to compromise and cooperate with others, and can easily control their temper. Conversely, persons with very low scores on this scale hold grudges against those who have harmed them, are rather critical of others' shortcomings, are stubborn in defending their point of view, and feel anger readily in response to mistreatment.

*Conscientiousness:* Persons with very high scores on the Conscientiousness scale organize their time and their physical surroundings, work in a disciplined way toward their goals, strive for accuracy and perfection in their tasks, and deliberate carefully when making decisions. Conversely, persons with very low scores on this scale tend to be unconcerned with orderly surroundings or schedules, avoid difficult tasks or challenging goals, are satisfied with work that contains some errors, and make decisions on impulse or with little reflection.

*Openness to Experience:* Persons with very high scores on the Openness to Experience scale become absorbed in the beauty of art and nature, are inquisitive about various domains of knowledge, use their imagination freely in everyday life, and take an interest in unusual ideas or people. Conversely, persons with very low scores on this scale are rather unimpressed by most works of art, feel little intellectual curiosity, avoid creative pursuits, and feel little attraction toward ideas that may seem radical or unconventional.

## Facet-Level Scales

### *Honesty-Humility Domain*

The *Sincerity* scale assesses a tendency to be genuine in interpersonal relations. Low scorers will flatter others or pretend to like them in order to obtain favors, whereas high scorers are unwilling to manipulate others.

The *Fairness* scale assesses a tendency to avoid fraud and corruption. Low scorers are willing to gain by cheating or stealing, whereas high scorers are unwilling to take advantage of other individuals or of society at large.

The *Greed Avoidance* scale assesses a tendency to be uninterested in possessing lavish wealth, luxury goods, and signs of high social status. Low scorers want to enjoy and to display wealth and privilege, whereas high scorers are not especially motivated by monetary or social-status considerations.

The *Modesty* scale assesses a tendency to be modest and unassuming. Low scorers consider themselves as superior and as entitled to privileges that others do not have, whereas high scorers view themselves as ordinary people without any claim to special treatment

### *Emotionality Domain*

The *Fearfulness* scale assesses a tendency to experience fear. Low scorers feel little fear of injury and are relatively tough, brave, and insensitive to physical pain, whereas high scorers are strongly inclined to avoid physical harm.

The *Anxiety* scale assesses a tendency to worry in a variety of contexts. Low scorers feel little stress in response to difficulties, whereas high scorers tend to become preoccupied even by relatively minor problems.

The *Dependence* scale assesses one's need for emotional support from others. Low scorers feel self-assured and able to deal with problems without any help or advice, whereas high scorers want to share their difficulties with those who will provide encouragement and comfort.

The *Sentimentality* scale assesses a tendency to feel strong emotional bonds with others. Low scorers feel little emotion when saying good-bye or in reaction to the concerns of others, whereas high scorers feel strong emotional attachments and an empathic sensitivity to the feelings of others.

### *Extraversion Domain*

The *Social Self-Esteem* scale assesses a tendency to have positive self-regard, particularly in social contexts. High scorers are generally satisfied with themselves and consider themselves to have likable qualities, whereas low scorers tend to have a sense of personal worthlessness and to see themselves as unpopular.

The *Social Boldness* scale assesses one's comfort or confidence within a variety of social situations. Low scorers feel shy or awkward in positions of leadership or when speaking in public, whereas high scorers are willing to approach strangers and are willing to speak up within group settings.

The *Sociability* scale assesses a tendency to enjoy conversation, social interaction, and parties. Low scorers generally prefer solitary activities and do not seek out conversation, whereas high scorers enjoy talking, visiting, and celebrating with others.

The *Liveliness* scale assesses one's typical enthusiasm and energy. Low scorers tend not to feel especially cheerful or dynamic, whereas high scorers usually experience a sense of optimism and high spirits.

#### *Agreeableness Domain*

The *Forgivingness* scale assesses one's willingness to feel trust and liking toward those who may have caused one harm. Low scorers tend "hold a grudge" against those who have offended them, whereas high scorers are usually ready to trust others again and to re-establish friendly relations after having been treated badly.

The *Gentleness* scale assesses a tendency to be mild and lenient in dealings with other people. Low scorers tend to be critical in their evaluations of others, whereas high scorers are reluctant to judge others harshly.

The *Flexibility* scale assesses one's willingness to compromise and cooperate with others. Low scorers are seen as stubborn and are willing to argue, whereas high scorers avoid arguments and accommodate others' suggestions, even when these may be unreasonable.

The *Patience* scale assesses a tendency to remain calm rather than to become angry. Low scorers tend to lose their tempers quickly, whereas high scorers have a high threshold for feeling or expressing anger.

#### *Conscientiousness Domain*

The *Organization* scale assesses a tendency to seek order, particularly in one's physical surroundings. Low scorers tend to be sloppy and haphazard, whereas high scorers keep things tidy and prefer a structured approach to tasks.

The *Diligence* scale assesses a tendency to work hard. Low scorers have little self-discipline and are not strongly motivated to achieve, whereas high scorers have a strong "work ethic" and are willing to exert themselves.

The *Perfectionism* scale assesses a tendency to be thorough and concerned with details. Low scorers tolerate some errors in their work and tend to neglect details, whereas high scorers check carefully for mistakes and potential improvements.

The *Prudence* scale assesses a tendency to deliberate carefully and to inhibit impulses. Low scorers act on impulse and tend not to consider consequences, whereas high scorers consider their options carefully and tend to be cautious and self-controlled.

#### *Openness to Experience Domain*

The *Aesthetic Appreciation* scale assesses one's enjoyment of beauty in art and in nature. Low scorers tend not to become absorbed in works of art or in natural wonders, whereas high scorers have a strong appreciation of various art forms and of natural wonders.

The *Inquisitiveness* scale assesses a tendency to seek information about, and experience with, the natural and human world. Low scorers have little curiosity about the natural or social sciences, whereas high scorers read widely and are interested in travel.



The *Creativity* scale assesses one's preference for innovation and experiment. Low scorers have little inclination for original thought, whereas high scorers actively seek new solutions to problems and express themselves in art.

The *Unconventionality* scale assesses a tendency to accept the unusual. Low scorers avoid eccentric or nonconforming persons, whereas high scorers are receptive to ideas that might seem strange or radical.

#### APPENDIX 4. Cronbach's alpha coefficients of HEXACO PI-R

| <b>Honesty-Humility</b>  | <b>Emotionality</b>     | <b>Extraversion</b>         | <b>Agreeableness</b>   | <b>Conscientiousness</b> | <b>Openness to Experience</b>   |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>0.839</b>             | <b>0.881</b>            | <b>0.920</b>                | <b>0.837</b>           | <b>0.849</b>             | <b>0.864</b>                    |
| Sincerity<br>0.666       | Fearfulness<br>0.757    | Social Self-Esteem<br>0.744 | Forgivingness<br>0.760 | Organization<br>0.706    | Aesthetic Appreciation<br>0.840 |
| Fairness<br>0.754        | Anxiety<br>0.749        | Social Boldness<br>0.859    | Gentleness<br>0.680    | Diligence<br>0.770       | Inquisitiveness<br>0.618        |
| Greed Avoidance<br>0.834 | Dependence<br>0.811     | Sociability<br>0.741        | Flexibility<br>0.651   | Perfectionism<br>0.795   | Creativity<br>0.776             |
| Modesty<br>0.641         | Sentimentality<br>0.665 | Liveliness<br>0.845         | Patience<br>0.662      | Prudence<br>0.638        | Unconventionality<br>0.572      |

## APPENDIX 5. Confirmatory factor analysis of HEXACO PI-R

| Total Variance Explained |                     |               |                   |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Com-<br>ponent           | Initial Eigenvalues |               |                   | Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings |               |                   | Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings |               |                   |
|                          | Total               | % of Variance | Cumu-<br>lative % | Total                               | % of Variance | Cumu-<br>lative % | Total                             | % of Variance | Cumu-<br>lative % |
| 1                        | 6,640               | 27,665        | 27,665            | 6,640                               | 27,665        | 27,665            | 3,752                             | 15,634        | 15,634            |
| 2                        | 3,315               | 13,812        | 41,477            | 3,315                               | 13,812        | 41,477            | 2,946                             | 12,275        | 27,909            |
| 3                        | 2,456               | 10,231        | 51,709            | 2,456                               | 10,231        | 51,709            | 2,634                             | 10,976        | 38,886            |
| 4                        | 1,731               | 7,211         | 58,920            | 1,731                               | 7,211         | 58,920            | 2,621                             | 10,920        | 49,806            |
| 5                        | 1,462               | 6,090         | 65,010            | 1,462                               | 6,090         | 65,010            | 2,509                             | 10,455        | 60,261            |
| 6                        | 1,318               | 5,492         | 70,502            | 1,318                               | 5,492         | 70,502            | 2,458                             | 10,241        | 70,502            |
| 7                        | 1,276               | 5,319         | 75,821            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 8                        | 1,068               | 4,452         | 80,272            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 9                        | ,748                | 3,117         | 83,389            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 10                       | ,597                | 2,488         | 85,877            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 11                       | ,538                | 2,242         | 88,120            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 12                       | ,431                | 1,796         | 89,915            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 13                       | ,410                | 1,710         | 91,625            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 14                       | ,377                | 1,573         | 93,198            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 15                       | ,348                | 1,450         | 94,648            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 16                       | ,300                | 1,252         | 95,900            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 17                       | ,232                | ,968          | 96,868            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 18                       | ,170                | ,709          | 97,577            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 19                       | ,147                | ,611          | 98,188            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 20                       | ,127                | ,529          | 98,717            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 21                       | ,109                | ,455          | 99,171            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 22                       | ,082                | ,340          | 99,512            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 23                       | ,066                | ,276          | 99,788            |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |
| 24                       | ,051                | ,212          | 100,000           |                                     |               |                   |                                   |               |                   |

| Rotated Component Matrix <sup>a</sup>               |           |       |       |       |       |       |
|---|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Name of sub-factor                                  | Component |       |       |       |       |       |
|   | 1         | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     | 6     |
| Social Self-Esteem                                  | ,446      | ,273  | ,053  | -,350 | ,502  | ,081  |
| Social Boldness                                     | ,667      | ,393  | -,004 | -,182 | ,309  | -,323 |
| Sociability   | ,304      | ,610  | -,016 | ,090  | ,376  | -,372 |
| Liveliness  | ,789      | ,201  | ,071  | -,074 | ,312  | -,222 |
| Diligence   | ,634      | -,250 | ,411  | -,107 | ,424  | -,055 |
| Perfectionism                                       | -,085     | -,242 | ,542  | ,048  | ,568  | ,179  |
| Prudence  | ,145      | ,161  | ,169  | -,066 | ,674  | ,141  |
| Organization  | ,001      | -,052 | ,136  | ,004  | ,600  | -,290 |
| Aesthetic Appreciation                              | ,256      | ,046  | ,779  | ,078  | ,119  | -,077 |
| Inquisitiveness                                     | ,431      | ,112  | ,379  | -,505 | -,107 | ,014  |
| Creativity  | ,494      | ,231  | ,411  | -,296 | ,044  | -,552 |
| Unconventionality                                   | ,235      | ,189  | ,315  | -,166 | -,317 | -,636 |
| Forgivingness                                       | ,719      | ,388  | -,004 | -,149 | -,308 | -,064 |
| Gentleness  | ,127      | ,756  | ,183  | ,025  | -,015 | -,001 |
| Flexibility   | -,368     | ,606  | ,040  | -,140 | ,023  | ,096  |
| Patience  | ,317      | ,809  | ,010  | -,104 | -,013 | -,040 |
| Modesty   | -,210     | -,005 | ,223  | -,035 | ,051  | ,831  |
| Sincerity   | -,140     | ,181  | ,743  | -,055 | ,126  | ,154  |
| Fairness  | ,122      | ,091  | ,588  | ,004  | ,476  | ,058  |
| Greed Avoidance                                     | ,073      | ,100  | ,162  | ,272  | -,202 | ,698  |
| Sentimentality                                      | ,016      | -,076 | ,257  | ,799  | ,122  | ,258  |
| Fearfulness   | -,667     | ,166  | -,018 | ,538  | -,006 | ,071  |
| Anxiety   | -,137     | -,388 | -,046 | ,708  | -,100 | ,042  |
| Dependence  | -,310     | ,269  | -,139 | ,706  | -,268 | ,109  |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.    |           |       |       |       |       |       |
| Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. |           |       |       |       |       |       |
| a. Rotation converged in 16 iterations.             |           |       |       |       |       |       |

MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY  
*In cooperation with Lund University*

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**ANALYSIS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS  
OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION:  
THE CASE OF THE OFFICE  
OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF LITHUANIA**

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## ANALYSIS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: THE CASE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF LITHUANIA

### Summary

**Research problem.** Human resource management and its initiatives are a part of public sector everyday activities. The paradigm of new public management advocates the implementation of the principles of private sector management into the public sector by emphasizing results-based government, performance measurement and performance evaluation. Currently, under the flag of results-based government, performance evaluation is conducted in the majority of the so-called “performance measurement regimes”: the UK, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the US (Pollitt, 2008). Quantitative expression of performance measures and results creates the possibility to control the productivity of employee performance and motivate those who exceed the expectations. Lithuania has also chosen this direction (Nakrošis, 2008). The Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) provided instructions and criteria of performance evaluation and rewards.

The object of work motivators or, in other words, work incentives is within the field of human resource management. Extrinsic work motivators are the basis of the employee rewards system, which is connected with the system of performance evaluation<sup>87</sup>. Furthermore, appropriately chosen work incentives enhance the level of employee motivation and lead to improved results of individual performance and positively correspond to overall organizational productivity. Finally, the growing body of research emphasizes the relation between increased motivation of employees and higher rates of job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviour<sup>88</sup>, commitment and loyalty (Herzberg, 1966; Mobley, 1977; Smither, 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; Wang, Howell, Hinrichs & Prieto, 2011; Kovach, 1995). As a result of that, decreased level of absenteeism and employee turnover is also noticed.

Although these tendencies are applied to both private and public sector organizations, there is a solid amount of studies revealing a motivational difference between the employees in these two sectors. The main distinction lies in the forces driving employees for work performance. Intrinsically motivated<sup>89</sup> employees working for the wellbeing of the community and society are less motivated by the extrinsically driven organizational reward systems than those who work in private companies (Perry & Porter, 1982; Perry, 1996, 1997; Perry & Wise, 1990; Brewer, Selden, Facer & Rex, 2002; Wright, 2001;

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87 The system focuses on performance assessment of an individual employee and usually is related to the distribution of performance rewards and/or suggestions for professional development considering the results of appraisal.

88 Voluntary attempts of an employee to enhance the effectiveness of an organization without expectations to receive performance reward under the organizational system of performance motivation.

89 An intrinsically motivated employee performs his/her work driven by the internal satisfaction of doing the tasks, while an externally motivated person focuses on the rewards related to the outcomes of performance.

Vandenabeele, Depré, Hondegheem & Yan, 2004). In addition, the specific nature of public sector employee motivation is defined by organizational mission not only as a central element in the system of organizational strategic management but also in the process of individual motivation of all the levels of employees (Kaplan & Norton, 1996a; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999).

The fact that employees in public and private sectors can be differently motivated does not mean that there is a practice of distinct systems of performance evaluation. The processes of performance measurement and evaluation are similarly applied in both public and private sector organizations. The key feature of the systems of performance evaluation is grounded by the ideas of goal-setting theory aiming to define specific, measureable, attainable, relevant and timely goals for employees (SMART criteria). Since the main reasons for the application of SMART-based performance evaluation systems are work planning and accountability, their motivational strength is rarely discussed in the academic community. Those, however, who analysed this topic, focused only on the private sector and noticed a positive impact of performance evaluation system only on extrinsically motivated employees while in the case of the intrinsically motivated ones the impact was found to be negative (Roopnarain & Lau, 2012; Oh & Lewis, 2009).

The motivational success of the system of performance evaluation also depends on psychological characteristics of the evaluated employees. According to the trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000), an individual is intrinsically motivated if the performance of a particular task satisfies the need of his/her individual personality traits. Therefore, it can be inferred that a performance evaluation system and the way it functions in an organization will differently motivate/demotivate employees depending on their personality characteristics. On the basis of this principle, psychometric instruments are developed and successfully applied in the processes of human resource management: employee selection, development, career planning, etc. (e.g. Cattell & Mead 2008; Ashton, 2013). The psychological personality type is a result of the categorization of personality traits. According to it, a certain structure of workplace procedures can be adapted in order to reach a mutual benefit: organization productivity and employee motivation. Though personality assessment is a significant part of the field of human resource management, there still is a lack of research into the possible relations between personality characteristics and the systems of performance evaluation.

The lack of studies on various aspects of performance evaluation in the public sector is especially noticed while concentrating on the Lithuanian experience. The initiative of Ramūnas Vanagas and Aurimas Tumėnas (2008) to analyse the system of performance evaluation as a part of the Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) could be an exception rather than common practice. Possible mismatches between the formal regulations and daily practice were noticed by these authors. This phenomenon is highly researched in the discipline of the sociology of law and known as the “the gap problem”<sup>90</sup>. Nevertheless, Tumėnas and Vanagas did not focus on these issues and their study was not empirically based.

Similarly, during the last decade, performance measurement in public service met challenges in all countries of “performance measurement regimes”. Even the supporters of the new public management confirm the growing tendency of significant gaps between the

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90 However, the sociology of law does not deal with performance evaluation.



results generated by performance measurement systems and the real situation, especially this is noticed on the macro organizational level (Norman, 2002; Metawie & Gilman, 2005; Bevan & Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; Radin, 2006; Thomas, 2006; Hood, Dixon & Wilson, 2009; Hoque & Adams, 2008; Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Goh, 2012).<sup>91</sup>

The “gap problem” was encountered while conducting the empirical part of this research in the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania (the OPML). A conceptual model explaining the relationship between the system of performance evaluation, the competencies of employees and work motivators/demotivators was developed at the beginning of this study. However, the initial results indicated that the informal system exists beside the formal one. This information was taken into consideration and the conceptual model was redesigned.

**Research purpose.** This research aims to contribute to the practice and theory of public management and administration by developing 1) a better understanding of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the public sector and work motivators/demotivators in both of the systems as well as the motivational/demotivational impact of these systems on civil servants of different personality types, 2) a conceptual interdisciplinary research platform presenting the intersections of public management (civil servants and the process of their performance evaluation), the sociology of law (formal and informal systems of performance evaluation) and personality psychology (different types of personality).

**The main research question.** To what extent the informal system of performance evaluation exists beside the formal system of performance evaluation and how do they operate as work motivators/demotivators for civil servants of different psychological types?

**Research questions.** The research questions are split into three subsequent parts:

Part I

Q1. What is the formal system of performance evaluation and its’ role in the civil service of Lithuania?

Q2. What is the informal system of performance evaluation and its’ role in the civil service of Lithuania?

Q3. How are the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation related together in the OPML?

Part II

Q4. What are the personality traits of advisers working in the OPML?

Q5. What motivates advisers of different psychological types in the OPML?

Part III

Q6. How do advisers of different psychological types perceive the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML?

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<sup>91</sup> Currently, the official title is the Office of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. However, at the time of the research it was the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania; therefore, this title is used to refer to the organization in this thesis.

Q7. What are the possible consequences of their perception towards these systems on their work performance motivation?

**Previous research.** There are two main research fields covering the core of this dissertation: performance evaluation and work motivation. The reviewed literature on performance evaluation focuses on the systems of personnel evaluation in the public sector and—what is important in the context of this thesis—includes not only the components of the formal system but also the manifestations of the elements attributed to the informal one. Similarly, the reviewed research on work motivation emphasizes the specific features of the public sector, although it also includes the analysis of the relationship between the perception of motivators/demotivators and the personality traits of an individual that is common to both the private and the public sector.

**Structure of doctoral dissertation.** The dissertation consists of five different sections: theory, formal context of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service, results and analysis as well as conclusions and suggestions.

**Theory.** In this section theoretical guidelines for the development of research model are presented. First of all, the concept of organizational control linking different levels of analysis was introduced in the context of this thesis. Secondly, three theoretical perspectives (the sociology of law, human resource management and personality psychology) were discussed in terms of their different locus of expertise:

- society, its culture and socio-legal norms (to answer research questions related to the formal and informal systems of control);
- administrative organization and management of its human resources (to analyse managerial aspects of performance evaluation system);
- individual human being and his or her personality (to understand individual differences between employees and thus the different impact of motivators/demotivators on individuals).

In this way, a more integrative view of employee–employer–organization relations in the field of human resource management was demonstrated and its relation to other disciplines of social sciences was highlighted. Motivational aspects encoded within the practices of human resource management, in particular, performance appraisal, its procedures as well as extrinsic and intrinsic rewards were mentioned in relation to the differences in the personalities of employees. Therefore, psychological and managerial research paradigms were applied for answering questions related to employee motivation/demotivation and their workplace behaviour in the organization.

A research model showing macro, meso and micro levels of the analysis of performance evaluation systems and their motivational impact on individual personalities of employees depicts the socio-cultural environment representing the sociological level of analysis and influencing the systems of performance evaluation as well as formal and informal systems of appraisal generating different performance motivators/demotivators depending on a type of employee personality it is practiced on. A graphic illustration of this research model is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Research model

**Methodology.** The methodology of the thesis is composed of two different parts. The first part deals with changes and development of my own understanding about the research object, its components and the thesis in general. It covers the pre-study or how research into the formal system of performance evaluation switched to the investigation of the informal system and how the research topic became as it is. Analysis of the official performance evaluation forms, focus group with the advisers and heads of units of the OPML as well as written and online questionnaires were used at this stage of the research (see Figure 2). All stages of the pre-study indicated the malfunction of the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML.




Figure 2. Stages of the pre-study

My decision to conduct an ethnographic study on the system of performance evaluation was highly influenced by the limited results of the pre-study as well as the particularity of the institution and the situation. Bearing in mind that document analysis (official reports of performance evaluation) identified only the malfunctioning of performance evaluation

forms but not information on the actually applied performance criteria and considering that the OPML is a highly politically influenced organization regularly having changes in some of the top level employees<sup>92</sup>, ethnographic observation and informal interviews were expected to be the most appropriate research tools and give answers to the research questions. Furthermore, the application of the ethnographic method in the context of performance evaluation created the possibility to see a broader picture of the evaluation system instead of focusing on details. In my case, the choice of an ethnographic research was an opportunity to go beyond the numbers of formal forms of performance evaluation and unlock the corridors of a relatively latent organizational life of the OPML civil servants. I understood that if both systems of performance evaluation were functioning at the same time in one organization, their characteristics would be noticeable in the organizational culture and would be grasped using such techniques of the ethnographic method as participant observation and informal interviews.

Participant observation was applied as a long-term, detailed and systematic tool of research enabling to be in the field of study and test the reality of the performance appraisal in the OPML by seeing, hearing and even touching the elements of the organizational culture of this institution. In order to convey my experience in a scientific manner, I followed strict rules of planning, recording and documenting the observations. My participant observation in the OPML was based on questions prepared in advance on the basis of the data and experience from the pre-study and the theoretical framework. During the two weeks, numerous informal interviews, lunches and meetings with the employees (usually, advisers and heads of units) of the OPML were organized and carefully registered in the research diary. In addition to participant observation two types of ethnographic interviews were conducted. The first one, unstructured interview, aimed at discovering the informal system of performance evaluation and the second one, semi-structured, was focused on the civil servants' (advisers') perceptions on work motivators/demotivators laying within the both systems of performance evaluation. Before the second type interviews opened questions covering two broad sections on the motivational capacities of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation for OPML employees were prepared. The questionnaire was based on the results of the participant observation, pre-study and the theoretical framework. Eight respondents were selected for the interviews focusing on work motivators (four respondents for each of the personality types). The decision on the number of interviewees was taken considering the data saturation criteria of qualitative research methodology (e.g. Berg, 2007; Merriam, 2009; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011) and the general sample of advisers of each of the personality types. One semi-structural interview lasting for approximately one hour was conducted with each of the respondents.

The ethnographic study was supported by the quantitative approach in this research. An ethnographic method implemented via participant observation and semi-structural interviews was applied for gathering data about the informal system of performance evaluation as well as civil servants' perceptions towards performance motivators. Respectively, respondents were selected considering the results of the personality test HEXACO PI-R, a psychometric tool for personality trait assessment, adapted to the

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92 For more information about the political situation and other conditions influencing performance evaluation see the following section.

Lithuanian language and applied in order to measure the personality traits of civil servants working in the OPML.

**Formal context of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service.** This section deals with the formal context of the system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service. Two different layers are selected as the milestones of getting a comprehensive view of the formal system of performance evaluation. First, the Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Lithuania, accompanying legislation and their appendices are analysed. In particular, this section is focused on the article regulating performance evaluation in civil service. Second, the roles and functions of the main institutional bodies, namely, the Government, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Service Department, related to the development and enforcement of the Law on Civil Service and the system of performance evaluation are investigated.

**Results.** Empirical findings from the case study of the OPML are introduced by dividing them into four blocks: the formal system of performance evaluation and its implementation in the OPML, general tendencies of personality traits of advisers of the OPML, the informal system of performance evaluation, its manifestation and relation to the formal system of performance evaluation in the OPML, personality types of advisers and their perception towards motivators/demotivators lying within both systems of performance evaluation in the OPML.

**Analysis.** The result analysis consists of three different parts.

1) The individual (micro) level of result analysis focuses on the personality types of advisers and their perception towards motivators/demotivators lying within the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML. In this regard, the performance assessment criteria of both systems of evaluation as well as the systems themselves function as work motivators/demotivators for the employees.

2) The management (meso) level of result analysis is based on OPML experience in applying the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. Both systems of performance evaluation are discussed as managerial tools constructed in order to control employees' work behaviour leading to estimated performance results which later determine civil servants' career positions and performance rewards. Scientific framework for the interpretation of these two systems lies in the management level of result analysis.

3) The final discussion of the result analysis is understood as an equivalent of macro level interpretation. The discipline of the sociology of law covers the third part of result analysis, as it links together the main elements of this thesis. First, it provides the guidelines for the analysis of the law, describing the essence of the formal system of performance evaluation and serving as the legal context of this study. Second, it contributes to the deeper understanding of the Law in relation to its image and impact on the organizational culture, the society and OPML employees. Finally, although the sociology of law plays a major role in explaining the macro level of this thesis, it also provides a few insights regarding the micro level by acknowledging the necessity to comprehend the rationale behind the behaviour of people. Holistic interpretation, incorporating the understanding of economic, political and social sources of control in OPML management as well as perception about the psychological types of employees' personalities into the implementation of the Law on

Civil Service (2002) provides the frame of knowledge, necessary for the in-depth analysis of the results of this research.

**Conclusions and suggestions.** The conclusions of this thesis are based on the answers to seven sub-research questions, all of them composing the overarching research question expressed as: “To what extent the informal system of performance evaluation exists beside the formal system of performance evaluation and how do they operate as work motivators/demotivators for civil servants of different psychological types?”. Twofold contributions—theoretical and empirical—were achieved linking together three theoretical perspectives of the sociology of law, management and psychology. The pre-study has shown significant problems in performance evaluation regulated by the Law on Civil Service (2002) in the OPML; therefore, the in-depth research was conducted with the aim to create a functional platform of multidisciplinary approaches for theoretical investigations of performance evaluation in the civil service as well as to contribute to the development of a better understanding of the link between the law, the systems of performance evaluation and individual traits of human personality in public sector institutions. Such interdisciplinary multilevel approach encouraged new insights about challenges in human resource management and, particularly, performance management of public sector organizations.

### *1. The formal system of performance evaluation and its role in the civil service of Lithuania*

Human resource management perspective defines the system of performance evaluation and its role in management (e.g. Beer et al., 1984; Armstrong, 2000, 2001; Beardwell, 2003; Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Boxall & Purcell, 2011; Woods & West, 2010). The formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service shares the elements of the Drucker's (2007) model of “management by objectives”.

The formal system of performance evaluation in the civil service of Lithuania was revealed through the analysis of the Law on Civil Service (2002) and the formal reports of performance appraisal of OPML advisers. The evaluations of the achieved results and competencies of civil servants are the core parts of the formal system. The best performers (receiving the highest evaluations) are rewarded with work motivators, including a higher salary, a better career position, bonuses and certificates of appreciation. Although the main aim of the formal system of performance evaluation in the Lithuanian civil service is to provide a transparent framework for performance management, the example of the OPML indicated that the system has significant flaws limiting its effectiveness. As a result of the shortcomings of the formal system (e.g. the competency ranking is not clear enough, as there are no behavioural explanations for the differences in the evaluations measured from 1 to 5; the absence of performance ranking; the absence of formal guidance for performance evaluation in case of financial difficulties in the organization), performance evaluation often serves as formal documentation justifying the decisions already made before the evaluation rather than the form of performance management.

### *2. The informal system of performance evaluation and its role in the OPML*

This study has revealed the existence of the informal system of performance evaluation, its criteria and the ways of functioning in the OPML. The informal system is closely related to the socio-legal norms and organizational culture of this institution. Developed as a

result of a clash between the social norms of the members of the organization and the formal standards of performance appraisal, regulated by the Law on Civil Service (2002), the informal system is a form of organizational control in the OPML. The essential parts of human resource management, including performance appraisal, career planning and rewards distribution, are strongly influenced by the informal system.

The perspective of the sociology of law explains the gap between formal (legal norms) and informal (social norms) systems of social control functioning within the society as well as organizations (e.g. Banakar, 2011; Ehrlich, Pound, & Ziegert, 1936; Nelken, 1981; Pound, 1910; Ellickson, 1994; Hydén & Svensson, 2008).

In this light, the analysis of the internal and external OPML image, organizational culture as well as the influence of politics on the formal system of performance evaluation was carried out in order to disclose the informal system. Decades of organizational history, a high number of long-term employees and, at the same time, the lack of strategic management, constantly changing top civil servants (due to political fluctuations), financial crises and the politics of economic austerity significantly enhanced role of the informal system in the OPML. Furthermore, the legal context or, in other words, the formal system and its implementation also played a role in the organization's performance management and affected the general understanding of civil servants about performance appraisal. Consequently, five criteria of informal performance evaluation—personal relations, friendship, social issues, seniority and behaviour—were interpreted in a broader perspective of economic, political, social and legal situation in the organization and the Lithuanian public sector in general.

### *3. The relation between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML*

The concept of organization control interprets the relation between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation and their role in different organizations (Selznick, 1948; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992).

This study has disclosed a strong mutual relation between the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the OPML. The origins of this relation are encoded within the socio-legal norms, which are also the beginning of the informal system. Both of the systems of performance evaluation exist in the OPML simultaneously and both types of norms (social and legal) compose the core of its organizational culture. Therefore, different formal and informal evaluation criteria are applied in the performance appraisal depending on the situation and supervisor's preferences. The study has shown that during the time of political and structural change in the organization, the informal system is more intensely applied, while the use of the formal system depends on the heads of units, their beliefs and attitudes about the performance appraisal part of the Law on Civil Service (2002) as well as their personal values and experience. In addition, the OPML experience also revealed the existence of the hybrid system of performance appraisal when a mixture of formal and informal criteria is applied during the same process of evaluation.

### *4. Personality traits of advisers working in the OPML*

The personality trait theory and the Five Factor Theory were applied as the theoretical basis for the analysis of OPML advisers' personality traits (Allport, 1937; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Ashton & Lee, 2004).

The tendencies of personality-related characteristics of OPML advisers were revealed measuring their traits of Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality (E), Extraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C) and Openness to Experience (O). Personality traits assessment was carried out using the psychometric instrument of HEXACO PI-R, which was translated and adapted to Lithuanian as an integral part of this thesis. Two opposite types of personality, ORGANIZED (higher evaluations in H and C, and lower in A) and FLEXIBLE (lower evaluations in H and C, and higher in A) were developed from the sample of OPML advisers, the majority of them being ORGANIZED. These results indicate the tendency of OPML advisers being sincere, fair, greed avoidant, modest (the subscales of H), organized, diligent, perfectionists, prudent (the subscales of C), unforgiving, ungentle, inflexible and impatient (the subscales of A).

#### *5. Performance motivators for employees of different psychological types*

The theory of personality traits argues that personality characteristics can predict motivational preferences of an individual (e.g. Allport, 1961; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Tett & Burnett, 2003). The traits of human personality indicate various psychological needs of employees, including the need of achievement, power, autonomy, recognition and affiliation (McClelland, 1987; Murray, 1938), which, if satisfied, will serve as performance motivators. As a result, the differences of personality traits among employees specify their different preferences for performance motivators. In the context of this research, semi-structural interviews with both types of OPML advisers were run and questions about the informal performance motivators (e.g. trainings, conferences, specific work tasks, certificates of appreciation, etc.) as well as the importance of monetary rewards were given in order to find out whether there are any differences of work motivators between the ORGANIZED and the FLEXIBLE types.

This qualitative study has revealed a variety of different work motivators (e.g. flexible working conditions, stability of work position and conditions; good atmosphere in the team, open communication, superiors' evaluation, evaluation of other leaders; opportunity to achieve visible results and see a positive impact on the society, responsibility for performance results; positive public opinion about the organization, institution's prestige; conferences, trainings, participation in various work groups) which are difficult to categorize into two groups depending on the personality types of OPML advisers. Moreover, the advisers' type of personality was not a predictor of the importance of monetary rewards for their motivation.

#### *6. Perception about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation by OPML advisers of different psychological types*

The present study has revealed the differences in OPML advisers' perception about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation, though the majority of these differences were not related to advisers' traits of personality. First, half of the interviewed advisers (4 out of 8 civil servants) indicated the existence of the informal system. Moreover, two of those advisers were of the ORGANIZED type of personality and two were FLEXIBLE meaning that the differences in personality traits were not the critical factors explaining these results. Those civil servants who indicated the informal system



thoroughly described the informal criteria of performance assessment and understood them as a part of the separate and independent informal system of evaluation, while the rest of the advisers understood the observed informal criteria of performance evaluation as more or less accidental errors of the formal system. Second, all of the employees, regardless of their personality type, who discussed about the informal system and its evaluation criteria perceived them negatively. Third, ORGANIZED advisers interpreted the managerial principles of the formal system of performance evaluation favourably, whereas FLEXIBLE advisers were more critical about them.

#### *7. Consequences of OPML advisers' perception towards the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation on their work motivation*

The personality types of OPML advisers and their perception towards the systems of performance evaluation revealed the tendencies of work motivators/demotivators, especially those located within the criteria of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation. The advisers of the ORGANIZED type of personality are motivated by the standardized, measured and results-based criteria of the formal system. Furthermore, formal and direct communication about their competencies and performance results as well as the overall transparency of the system, emphasized by the formal system, are particularly important for ORGANIZED advisers. In spite of the fact that in reality the formal system is not always so, the managerial logics of this system positively influence the motivation of ORGANIZED civil servants. On the contrary, the main criteria and principles of the formal system rather negatively affect FLEXIBLE advisers who are less guided by the formal rules and more interested in relationship and collaboration. These advisers expressed dissatisfaction about strict, measures-based standards of the formal performance evaluation forcing them to fit their competencies and performance achievements into numbers, without much flexibility and creativity.

Unlike the formal system of performance evaluation, the informal criteria did not arouse any motivational responses in OPML advisers and served as a demotivator for all of the individuals regardless their type of personality.

### **Tentative recommendations**

The recommendations on the improvement of performance evaluation in the civil service in Lithuania are derived from the three-level analysis (macro, meso and micro) of organizational control presented in this dissertation.

First, further academic studies on performance evaluation, in particular, investigations of the possible ways to unfold and deal with the informal systems of performance appraisal would be beneficial for the improvement of the performance evaluation system defined in the Law on Civil Service (2002) and other related legislation.

Second, better internal communication is needed to increase the awareness of OPML heads of units and top level managers about the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation as well as general transparency in this organization. For example, targeted discussion on performance evaluation process, its criteria and application before performance appraisal could serve for this purpose and improve human resource management in the OPML.

Third, psychometric assessment (using HEXACO PI-R or other similar tool) of civil servants revealing their traits of personality would allow predicting individual reactions to the systems of performance evaluation, finding out individual preferences for work motivators/demotivators as well as preparing and adapting better career and individual development plans for each civil servant. In addition, it would improve teamwork, cooperation and communication within the organization by adapting appropriate communication and conflict management strategies according to the traits of personality of the employees.

## LIST OF AUTHOR'S SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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4. Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė, A. Formal and Informal Systems of Performance Evaluation as Work Motivators for Different Types of Personality in Public Sector. Proceedings of the Conference „Doctoral Students Internships in the Science Centres Abroad 2012-2013”, 11 October, 2013, Vilnius, Lietuva (ISBN 978-9955-613-64-0).
5. Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė A., Skaržauskienė A. Leaders' Competencies and Their Assessment Tools. Proceedings of Business Psychology Conference “Problems of Business Psychology”, 16 April, 2010, Vilnius, Lietuva (ISBN 978-9955-880-63-9).

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

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### EDUCATION

2009-until now Mykolas Romeris University, PhD in Social Sciences  
Management and Administration  
2012 Lund University, Sweden, internship at the Sociology of Law Department  
2007-2009 Vilnius University, Master of Organizational Psychology  
2007-2008 Université Paul-Valéry Montpellier III, France, Organizational Psychology  
internship  
2006-2007 Université de Poitiers, France, Erasmus scholarship  
2003-2007 Vilnius University, Bachelor of Psychology

### WORK EXPERIENCE

2013 – until now Founder and director of CBM solutions

The main responsibilities: consultancy projects and competency model development for other organizations, leading the trainings

2010 – until now Mykolas Romeris University, Lecturer for the courses in English and Lithuanian: “Introduction to Psychology”, “Psychology of Management” and “Positive Psychology”

The main responsibilities: preparation of the programme and the material for the seminars and lectures; lecturing the course for Lithuanian and international students; consultations for students on bachelor and yearly papers.

2009–until now European Leadership Institute, R&D Manager

The main responsibilities: preparation of the programme of the trainings, organization of the training process, developing and adapting psychometric tools, leading the trainings.

2008–2010 Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences, Junior  
Lecturer for the course “Developmental and Pedagogical Psychology”

The main responsibilities: preparation of the programme and the material for the seminars and lectures, lecturing the course for the bachelor programme students.

2008 Oxford Psychologists Press, R&D assistant, EU internship

The main responsibilities: researches in personality assessment and psychometrics, assistant in projects of personnel selection and consultancy, analysis of the psychometric market.

## CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- 2013 Conference “Doctoral Students Internships in the Science Centres Abroad 2012-2013”  
Presentation’s title: “Formal and Informal Systems of Performance Evaluation as Work Motivators for Different Types of Personality in Public Sector”  
11 October, 2013, Vilnius, Lithuania
- 2013 Young Researchers Conference “Social Transformations in Contemporary Society 2013”  
Presentation’s title: “Formal and Informal Systems of Performance Evaluation as Work Motivators for Different Types of Personality in Public Sector”  
5-6 June, 2013, Vilnius Lithuania
- 2012 Young Researchers Conference “Expressions of Social Transformations”  
Presentation’s title: “The Relation between Advisers’ Competency Model and Performance Effectiveness in the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania”  
6 June, 2012, Vilnius, Lithuania
- 2012 Conference “Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days (ACDD)”  
Presentation’s title: “Does Competency Models Predict Performance Effectiveness on Individual and Organizational Levels?”  
9-11 May, 2012, Strasbourg, France
- 2012 Lithuanian Psychologists Congress “Science for Practice–Practice for Science”  
Presentation’s title: “Psychometric Characteristics of the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire HEXACO PI-R”  
13 May, 2012, Klaipėda, Lithuania
- 2011 International Doctoral Students Conference “Development of Social Innovations: Interdisciplinary Researches”  
Presentation’s title: “Analysis of Applying Competency Models: Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania Case”  
8 June, 2011, Vilnius, Lithuania
- 2010 International Business Psychology Conference  
Presentation’s title: “Leaders’ Competencies and Their Assessment Tools”  
16 April, 2010, Vilnius, Lithuania
- 2009 IV<sup>th</sup> Conference of Young Psychologists Researchers “Man in XXI century: what’s new?”  
Presentation’s title: “Personality Differences in Home-Working and Office-Working IT Related Professionals”  
8 May, 2009, Vilnius, Lithuania

## FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Fluent in English (oral and written), independent user of French (a certificate of DELF 2 examination), the basics of German

## SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS

Performance Management, Competency-based Management, Work Motivation, Psychometric Testing

MYKOLO ROMERIO UNIVERSITETAS  
*Bendradarbiaujant su Lundo universitetu*

Aistė Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė

FORMALIOS IR NEFORMALIOS VEIKLOS  
VERTINIMO SISTEMOS ANALIZĖ:  
LIETUVOS MINISTRO PIRMININKO  
TARNYBOS ATVEJIS

Daktaro disertacijos santrauka  
Socialiniai mokslai, vadyba (03 S)

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Disertacija rengta 2009–2014 metais Mykolo Romerio Universitete.

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## FORMALIOS IR NEFORMALIOS VEIKLOS VERTINIMO SISTEMOS ANALIZĖ: LIETUVOS MINISTRO PIRMININKO TARNYBOS ATVEJIS

Santrauka

**Tyrimo problema.** Žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymas ir jo praktikos yra viešojo sektoriaus kasdienės veiklos dalis. Naujosios viešosios vadybos paradigma yra paremta privataus sektoriaus vadybos principų įgyvendinimu viešajame sektoriuje, pabrėžiant į rezultatus orientuotą valdymą ir veiklos vertinimą. Šiuo metu į rezultatus orientuoto valdymo rėmuose veiklos vertinimas atliekamas daugelyje vadinamųjų „veiklos vertinimo režimų“: Jungtinėje Karalystėje, Kanadoje, Naujoje Zelandijoje, Australijoje ir JAV (Pollitt, 2008). Vertinimo rodiklių ir rezultatų kiekybinė išraiška leidžia kontroliuoti darbuotojų veiklos našumą ir papildomai motyvuoti tuos, kurie viršija lūkesčius. Šią kryptį pasirinko ir Lietuva (Nakrošis, 2008). Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės tarnybos įstatyme (2002) numatyta, kaip ir kokiais kriterijais vadovaujantis atliekamas veiklos vertinimas ir skiriamas atitinkamas atlygis.

Darbo motyvatorius arba, kitaip tariant, apdovanojimus už darbą analizuojantys tyrimai yra priskiriami žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymo sričiai. Išoriniai darbo motyvatoriai (pvz.: pinigai, aukštesnė karjeros pozicija) yra darbuotojų atlygio sistemos pagrindas, kuris susijęs su veiklos vertinimo sistema<sup>93</sup>. Be to, tinkamai parinkti apdovanojimai už darbą didina darbuotojų motyvaciją, gerina veiklos rezultatus ir teigiamai veikia bendrą darbo našumą organizacijoje. Galiausiai, vis daugiau mokslinių tyrimų pabrėžia egzistuojantį santykį tarp aukštesnės darbuotojų motyvacijos ir didesnio pasitenkinimo darbu, darbuotojų pilietiško elgesio organizacijoje<sup>94</sup>, atsidavimo ir lojalumo (Herzberg, 1966; Mobley, 1977; Smither, 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; Wang, Howell, Hinrichs & Prieto, 2011; Kovach, 1995). Visa tai mažina pravaikštų skaičių ir darbuotojų kaitą.

Nors šios tendencijos galioja ir privataus, ir viešojo sektoriaus organizacijoms, gausybė tyrimų rodo, kad šių sektorių darbuotojai turi skirtingą motyvaciją. Pagrindinis skirtumas yra stimulus, verčiantis darbuotojus dirbti. Vidinė motyvacija<sup>95</sup> pasižymintis viešojo sektoriaus darbuotojus, dirbančius dėl bendruomenės ir visuomenės gerovės, sunkiau motyvuoti materialiu atlygiu nei tuos, kurie dirba privačiose bendrovėse (Perry & Porter, 1982; Perry, 1996, 1997; Perry & Wise, 1990; Brewer, Selden, Facer & Rex, 2002; Wright, 2001; Vandenabeele, Depré, Hondeghem & Yan, 2004). Viešojo sektoriaus darbuotojų motyvacijos specifinę prigimtį taip pat lemia organizacijos misija, kuri yra ne tik organizacijos strateginio valdymo sistemos, bet ir visų lygių darbuotojų individualaus motyvavimo proceso pagrindinė dalis (Kaplan & Norton, 1996a; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999).

93 Veiklos vertinimo sistemoje didžiausias dėmesys skiriamas kiekvieno darbuotojo veiklos vertinimui, kuris paprastai yra susijęs su atlygiu už pasiektus rezultatus skyrimu ir (arba) siūlymais kelti profesinę kvalifikaciją, atsižvelgiant į vertinimo rezultatus.

94 Pilietiškas elgesys organizacijoje pasireiškia darbuotojo savanoriškais pastangomis didinti organizacijos efektyvumą, nesitikint gauti atlygį pagal organizacijoje veikiančią motyvavimo sistemą.

95 Vidinė motyvacija pasižymintis darbuotojas atlieka savo darbą dėl vidinio pasitenkinimo, kylančio atliekant užduotis, o išoriškai motyvuotas dėl konkretaus atlygio.



Nors viešojo ir privataus sektorių darbuotojai gali būti skirtingai motyvuojami, taikomi veiklos vertinimo procesai yra panašūs abiejų tipų organizacijose. Veiklos vertinimo sistemos paprastai yra grindžiamos tikslų nustatymo teorija, pagal kurią siekiama darbuotojams nustatyti konkrečius, išmatuojamus, pasiekiamus, aktualius ir apribotos trukmės tikslus (SMART kriterijai). SMART grįstos veiklos vertinimo sistemos dažniausiai naudojamos darbų planavimui ir atskaitomybei užtikrinti, todėl akademiniėje bendruomenėje retai minimas šiais principais paremtas stiprinamasis poveikis darbuotojų motyvacijai. Be to, tie, kas analizavo šią temą, didžiausią dėmesį skyrė privačiam sektoriui. Jie pastebėjo tokio veiklos vertinimo teigiamą poveikį tik išorine motyvacija pasižymintiems darbuotojams. Darbuotojams su dominuojančia vidine motyvacija šis poveikis buvo neigiamas (Roopnarain & Lau, 2012; Oh & Lewis, 2009).

Veiklos vertinimo sistemos motyvavimo sėkmė taip pat priklauso nuo vertinamų darbuotojų psichologinių savybių. Remiantis bruožų aktyvacijos teorija (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000), asmens vidinė motyvacija augs, jeigu tam tikros užduoties atlikimas patenkins jo asmenybės bruožuose užkoduotus poreikius. Iš to galima daryti išvadą, kad veiklos vertinimo sistema ir jos funkcionavimas organizacijoje skirtingai motyvuoja / demotyvuoja darbuotojus, atsižvelgiant į jų asmenines savybes. Šio principo pagrindu yra kuriamos psichometrinės priemonės, sėkmingai taikomos žmoniškųjų išteklių valdymo procesuose: darbuotojų atrankoje, kvalifikacijos kėlime, karjeros planavime ir pan. (pvz., Cattell & Mead 2008; Ashton, 2013). Psichologinis asmenybės tipas priklauso nuo asmenybės bruožų, skirstomų į kategorijas. Pagal jį galima parinkti asmeniui tam tikras darbo užduotis ir pasiekti teigiamų rezultatų: didesnio darbo našumo bei aukštesnės darbuotojų motyvacijos. Nors asmenybės vertinimas yra svarbi žmoniškųjų išteklių valdymo dalis, galimas ryšys tarp asmeninių savybių ir veiklos vertinimo sistemų dar nėra pakankamai ištirtas.

Tyrimų apie veiklos vertinimą viešajame sektoriuje trūkumas yra ypač pastebimas, žvelgiant į Lietuvos patirtį. Ramūno Vanago ir Aurimo Tumėno (2008) iniciatyva analizuoti veiklos vertinimo sistemą Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje yra labiau išimtis nei įprasta praktika. Autoriai pastebėjo galimą formalų taisyklių ir kasdienės praktikos nesuderinamumą. Šis reiškinys yra plačiai nagrinėjamas teisės sociologijoje ir vadinamas „atotrūkio problema“<sup>96</sup>. Vis dėlto Tumėnas ir Vanagas neakcentavo šių „atotrūkio problemų“, o jų tyrimas nebuvo empiriškai pagrįstas.

Per paskutinį dešimtmetį veiklos vertinimas valstybės tarnyboje susidūrė su įvairiais iššūkiais visose „veiklos vertinimo režimo“ valstybėse. Net naujosios viešosios vadybos šalininkai pripažįsta didėjančią atotrūkį tarp veiklos vertinimo sistemų rezultatų ir realios padėties. Tai ypač pastebima makro organizaciniame lygmenyje (Norman, 2002; Metawie & Gilman, 2005; Bevan & Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; Radin, 2006; Thomas, 2006; Hood, Dixon & Wilson, 2009; Hoque & Adams, 2008; Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Goh, 2012).

Su „atotrūkio problema“ buvo susidurta ir atliekant šio tyrimo empirinę dalį Lietuvos Respublikos Ministro Pirmininko tarnyboje (MPT). Tyrimo pradžioje buvo sukurtas konceptualus modelis, paaiškinantis santykį tarp veiklos vertinimo sistemos, darbuotojo kompetencijų ir darbo motyvatorių. Tačiau pradiniai rezultatai parodė, kad be formalios

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96 Reikia pastebėti, kad teisės sociologija nenagrinėja vadybinio veiklos vertinimo fenomeno.

sistemos egzistuoja ir neformali, todėl konceptualus modelis buvo atitinkamai pakoreguotas.

**Tyrimo tikslas.** Šio tyrimo tikslas – prisidėti prie viešojo valdymo ir administravimo teorijos ir praktikos 1) padedant geriau suprasti formalią ir neformalią veiklos vertinimo sistemas valstybės tarnyboje, darbo motyvatorius / demotyvatorius abiejose sistemose ir šių sistemų motyvacinį / demotyvacinį poveikį skirtingų asmenybės tipų valstybės tarnybos darbuotojams; 2) sukuriant konceptualią tarpdisciplininių mokslinių tyrimų platformą, apjungiančią skirtingus viešosios vadybos (viešojo sektoriaus darbuotojų ir jų veiklos vertinimo proceso), teisės sociologijos (formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų) ir organizacinės psichologijos (skirtingų asmenybės tipų) sąlyčio taškus.

**Pagrindinis tyrimo klausimas.** Kokiu mastu neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema egzistuoja šalia formalios ir kaip šios abi sistemos, kaip darbo motyvatoriai / demotyvatoriai, veikia skirtingų savybių valstybės tarnautojų tipus?

**Tyrimo klausimai.** Tyrimo klausimai yra padalinti į tris dalis:

I dalis

1 klausimas. Kokia yra formali veiklos vertinimo sistema ir jos vaidmuo Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje?

2 klausimas. Kokia yra neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema ir jos vaidmuo MPT?

3 klausimas. Kaip yra tarpusavyje susijusios formali ir neformali veiklos vertinimo sistemos MPT?

II dalis

4 klausimas. Kokių asmeninių savybių tipų patarėjai dirba MPT?

5 klausimas. Kas motyvuoja skirtingų asmenybės tipų MPT patarėjus?

III dalis

6 klausimas. Kaip skirtingų asmeninių savybių tipų patarėjai priima formalią ir neformalią veiklos vertinimo sistemas MPT?

7 klausimas. Kokią įtaką šios abi sistemos turi MPT patarėjų darbo motyvacijai?

**Ankstesni tyrimai.** Šios disertacijos pagrindą sudaro dvi pagrindinės mokslinių tyrimų sritys: veiklos vertinimas ir darbo motyvacija. Apžvelgoje literatūroje, nagrinėjančioje veiklos vertinimą, didžiausias dėmesys skiriamas personalo vertinimo sistemoms viešajame sektoriuje, tame tarpe ir tai, kas aktualu šiai disertacijai, — ne tik formalios sistemos komponentams, bet ir neformaliai sistemai priskiriamų elementų apraiškom. Apžvelgti darbo motyvacijos tyrimai iš vienos pusės pabrėžia viešojo sektoriaus specifiką, o iš kitos analizuoja ryšį tarp motyvatorių / demotyvatorių suvokimo ir asmenybės bruožų visose veiklose, nepriklausomai nuo sektoriaus.

**Disertacijos struktūra.** Disertaciją sudaro penkios dalys: teorija, formalus veiklos vertinimo Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje kontekstas, rezultatai, analizė, išvados ir siūlymai.

**Teorija.** Šioje dalyje pristatomos teorinės tyrimo modelio gairės. Pirmiausia disertacijos kontekste pristatoma organizacinės kontrolės sąvoka, siejanti tris analizės lygius.

Tuomet aptariamos trys teorinės perspektyvos (teisės sociologija, žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymas ir asmenybės psichologija), atsižvelgiant į jų skirtingą kompetencijos sritį:


visuomenė, jos kultūra ir socialinės–teisinės normos – siekiant atsakyti į tyrimo klausimus, susijusius su formalios ir neformalios kontrolės sistemomis;

administracinė organizacija ir jos žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymas – siekiant analizuoti veiklos vertinimo sistemos vadybinius aspektus;

individas ir jo asmenybė – siekiant suprasti darbuotojų individualius skirtumus bei motyvatorių / demotyvatorių poveikį.

Tokiu būdu atskleidžiamas integruotas požiūris į darbuotojo–darbdavio–organizacijos santykius žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymo srityje bei pabrėžiama jo sąsaja su kitomis socialinių mokslų disciplinomis. Motyvaciniai aspektai, užkoduoti žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymo praktikoje, ypač veiklos vertinime, jo tvarkoje, atlygio sistemose, aptariami atsižvelgiant į darbuotojų asmenybės skirtumus. Psichologinių ir vadybinių tyrimų paradigmos yra taikomos, atsakant į klausimus apie darbuotojo motyvaciją ir elgseną darbo vietoje.


Tyrimo modelis, apimantis veiklos vertinimo sistemų analizės makro, mezo ir mikro lygius bei jų motyvacinį / demotyvacinį poveikį darbuotojams, pabrėžia sociokultūrinę aplinką, turinčią poveikį veiklos vertinimo sistemoms, bei formalią ir neformalią vertinimo sistemas, sukuriančias skirtingus veiklos motyvatorius / demotyvatorius, priklausomai nuo darbuotojo asmenybės tipo. Šis tyrimo modelis yra grafiškai pavaizduotas 1 paveiksle.



1 paveikslas. Tyrimo modelis

**Metodologija.** Disertacijos metodologiją sudaro dvi dalys. Pirmojoje dalyje aprašomi autorės supratimo apie tyrimo objektą, jo komponentus ir pačią disertaciją pokyčiai ir vystymasis. Joje kalbama apie pirminį tyrimo etapą arba apie tai, kaip tyrimas apie formalią veiklos vertinimo sistemą virto neformalios sistemos analize ir kaip disertacijos tema tapo tokia, kokia yra dabar. Šiame tyrimo etape buvo pasitelkta formalių veiklos vertinimo

formų analizė, sudaryta fokus grupė iš MPT patarėjų<sup>97</sup> ir skyrių vadovų, kurios metu išskirtos būtinosios MPT patarėjo kompetencijos, taip pat buvo vykdomos apklausos raštu ir internetu (žr. 2 paveikslą). Visi pirminio tyrimo etapai indikavo, kad formali veiklos vertinimo sistema MPT funkcionuoja ydingai.



2 paveikslas. Pirminio tyrimo etapai

Sprendimui atlikti etnografinį veiklos vertinimo sistemos tyrimą (antroji tyrimo dalis) didelės įtakos turėjo pirminio tyrimo rezultatų ribotumas bei institucijos ir situacijos specifika. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad dokumentų (formalios veiklos vertinimo ataskaitų) analizė parodė, jog veiklos vertinimo formos prastai veikė, tačiau nesuteikė informacijos apie iš tikrųjų taikomus veiklos vertinimo kriterijus, ir tai, kad MPT yra politiškai įtakojama organizacija, kurioje reguliariai keičiasi aukščiausio rango darbuotojai, buvo prieita prie išvados, kad etnografinis stebėjimas ir neformalus interviu bus tinkamiausi tyrimo įrankiai, padėsiantys atsakyti į išsikeltus klausimus. Be to, etnografinio metodo taikymas MPT veiklos vertinimo atskleidimui leido susidaryti platesnį vertinimo sistemos vaizdą, apjungiant visas detales į vieną visumą. Etnografinio tyrimo pasirinkimas leido į tyrimo problematiką pažvelgti giliau nei vien tik kaip į formalių veiklos vertinimo formų skaitinę išraišką ir atskleisti iš dalies nematomą MPT valstybės tarnautojo darbinį gyvenimą. Tyrimo metu paaiškėjo, kad vienoje organizacijoje tuo pat metu veikiant abiem veiklos vertinimo sistemoms, jų savybės turėtų atsispindėti organizacinėje kultūroje ir jas galima būtų perprasti pasitelkiant etnografinio metodo technikas, tokias kaip stebėjimas dalyvaujant ir neformalus interviu.

Stebėjimas dalyvaujant kaip ilgalaikis, detalus ir sistemingas etnografinio tyrimo įrankis leido man dalyvauti tyrime ir atskleisti veiklos vertinimą MPT, matant, girdint ir net jaučiant šios institucijos organizacinės kultūros elementus. Norėdama perteikti savo patirtį akademiniam lygmenyje, laikiausi griežtų stebėjimo planavimo, fiksavimo ir dokumentavimo taisyklių. Mano stebėjimas MPT buvo paremtas iš anksto parengtais klausimais, kuriuose atsispindi pirminio tyrimo patirtis bei teorinis disertacijos pagrindas. Per dvi tyrimo savaites neformaliai kalbėjau, pietavau ir susitikau su MPT darbuotojais (dažniausiai patarėjais ir skyrių vedėjais), kurių metu siekiau rasti atsakymus į kiekvieną iš išsikeltų klausimų. Visi šie susitikimai buvo kruopščiai registruojami tyrimo dienoraštyje.

<sup>97</sup> Nepolitinio pasitikėjimo valstybės tarnautojų.

Be stebėjimo dalyvaujant taip pat buvo atlikti dviejų tipų etnografiniai interviu. Pirmojo, nestruktūruoto interviu, tikslas buvo identifikuoti neformalią veiklos vertinimo sistemą, antrojo, pusiau struktūruoto interviu, – atskleisti, kaip valstybės tarnautojai (patarėjai) suvokia abiejose veiklos vertinimo sistemose glūdinčius darbo motyvatorius / demotyvatorius. Prieš antrojo tipo interviu buvo parengti atviro tipo klausimai apie formalioje ir neformalioje MPT darbuotojų veiklos vertinimo sistemose esančius motyvacinius / demotyvacinius veiksnius. Klausimynas buvo parengtas remiantis stebėjimo dalyvaujant, pirminio tyrimo ir teorinio disertacijos pagrindo duomenimis. Pokalbiams apie darbo motyvatorius / demotyvatorius buvo pasirinkti aštuoni respondentai (po keturis respondentus kiekvienam asmenybės tipui). Sprendimas dėl pokalbio dalyvių skaičiaus buvo priimtas, atsižvelgiant į kokybinių tyrimų metodologijos duomenų prisotinimo kriterijų (pvz., Berg, 2007, Merriam, 2009, Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) ir kiekvieno asmenybės tipo patarėjų bendrąją imtį. Su kiekvienu respondentu atliktas vienas pusiau struktūruotas interviu, trukęs apytiksliai vieną valandą.

Etnografinį tyrimą papildė kiekybinis metodas – t.y. etnografinis metodas buvo įgyvendintas per stebėjimą dalyvaujant ir pusiau struktūruotus interviu, kurių dalyviai buvo pasirinkti pagal asmenybės testo HEXACO PI-R rezultatus. HEXACO PI-R yra psichometrinis asmenybės bruožų vertinimo įrankis, disertacijos rengimo metu išverstas ir adaptuotas į lietuvių kalbą. Jis buvo taikomas, vertinant MPT dirbančių valstybės tarnautojų asmenybės bruožus.

**Formalus veiklos vertinimo kontekstas Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje.** Šioje disertacijoje dalyje pristatomas formalus veiklos vertinimo kontekstas Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje. Tam pasirinkti du skirtingi analizės elementai. Pirmiausia gilinamasi į Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės tarnybos įstatymą, lydimočius teisės aktus, jų priedus ir pataisas, ypatingą dėmesį skiriant straipsniams, reglamentuojantiems veiklos vertinimą valstybės tarnyboje. Antrajame skyriuje pateikiama pagrindinių institucinių organų, t. y. Vyriausybės, Ministro Pirmininko tarnybos, Vidaus reikalų ministerijos ir Valstybės tarnybos departamento vaidmens ir funkcijų, susijusių su Valstybės tarnybos įstatymo rengimu ir įgyvendinimu bei veiklos vertinimo sistema, analizė.

**Rezultatai.** MPT atvejo analizės empiriniai rezultatai pristatomi, dalijant juos į keturias grupes: formali veiklos vertinimo sistema ir jos įgyvendinimas MPT; MPT patarėjų asmenybės bruožų bendros tendencijos; neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema, jos apraiškos ir santykis su formalia veiklos vertinimo sistema MPT; patarėjų asmenybės tipai ir jų suvokimas apie abiejose MPT veiklos vertinimo sistemose glūdinčius motyvatorius / demotyvatorius.

**Analizė.** Rezultatų analizę sudaro trys dalys:

1) Rezultatų analizės individualiajame (mikro) lygmenyje aptariami MPT patarėjų asmenybės tipai ir jų suvokimas apie motyvatorius / demotyvatorius glūdinčius formalioje ir neformalioje veiklos vertinimo sistemose. Šiuo atveju abiejų vertinimo sistemų veiklos vertinimo kriterijai ir pačios sistemos veikia kaip MPT patarėjų darbo motyvatoriai / demotyvatoriai.

2) Rezultatų analizės vadybinis (mezo) lygmuo yra grįstas formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų MPT patirtimi. Abi veiklos vertinimo sistemos yra aptariamose kaip vadybiniai atliekamo darbo kontrolės įrankiai, pagal kurių rezultatus vėliau yra paskirstomos valstybės tarnautojų pareigos ir atlygiai.

3) Baigiamasis rezultatų analizės aptarimas yra interpretuojamas kaip makro lygmens atitikmuo. Teisės sociologijos teorinė perspektyva yra naudojama trečiojoje rezultatų analizės dalyje ir sujungia pagrindinius šios disertacijos elementus. Visų pirma, joje pateikiama Valstybės tarnybos įstatymo (2002), lydimųjų teisės aktų ir priedų, apibūdinančių formalios veiklos vertinimo sistemos esmę ir sudarančio šio tyrimo teisinį kontekstą, analizė. Antra, ji leidžia geriau suvokti įstatymą, jo įvaidį ir poveikį visuomenei, organizacinei kultūrai ir MPT darbuotojams. Galiausiai, nors teisės sociologija vaidina svarbų vaidmenį aiškinant šios disertacijos makro lygmenį, ji taip pat pateikia keletą įžvalgų dėl mikro lygmens, pripažindama poreikį suprasti, kas slypi už žmonių elgesio. Holistinis aiškinimas, apimantis ekonominių, politinių ir socialinių kontrolės šaltinių MPT valdyme supratimą bei darbuotojų asmenybės psichologinių tipų suvokimą įgyvendinant Valstybės tarnybos įstatymą, suteikia žinių, kurių reikia atliekant išsamią šio tyrimo rezultatų analizę.

**Išvados ir siūlymai.** Šios disertacijos išvados yra paremtos atsakymais į septynis sub-klausimus, sudarančius pagrindinį tyrimo klausimą: „Kokiu mastu neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema egzistuoja šalia formalios ir kaip šios abi sistemos, kaip darbo motyvatoriai / demotyvatoriai, veikia skirtingų savybių valstybės tarnautojų tipus?“ Siejant teisės sociologijos, vadybos ir psichologijos teorines perspektyvas gautas dvejetainis (teorinis ir empirinis) indėlis. Pirminis tyrimas parodė, kad Valstybės tarnybos įstatymo (2002) ir lydimųjų teisės aktų reglamentuojamas veiklos vertinimas susiduria su reikšmingomis problemomis MPT. Todėl atliktas išsamus tyrimas, kuriuo siekiama sukurti tarpdisciplininių veiklos vertinimo tyrimų viešajame sektoriuje platformą ir gilinti supratimą apie įstatymo, veiklos vertinimo sistemų ir individualių asmenybės bruožų sąsajas viešojo sektoriaus institucijose. Toks tarpdisciplininis, daugiapakopis metodas suteikė naujų įžvalgų apie problemas žmoniškųjų išteklių valdymo srityje, ypač viešojo sektoriaus organizacijų veiklos vertinime.

### *1. Formali veiklos vertinimo sistema ir jos vaidmuo Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje*

Žmoniškųjų išteklių valdymo perspektyva apibrėžia veiklos vertinimo sistemą ir jos vaidmenį vadyboje (pvz., Beer et al., 1984; Armstrong, 2000, 2001; Beardwell, 2003; Redman & Wilkinson, 2005; Bratton & Gold, 2007; Boxall & Purcell, 2011; Woods & West, 2010). Formali veiklos vertinimo sistema, naudojama Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje, turi panašių elementų į Druckerio (2007) „valdymo remiantis tikslais“ modelį.

Formali veiklos vertinimo sistema Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje atskleista analizuojant Valstybės tarnybos įstatymą (2002), lydimuosius teisės aktus ir oficialias MPT patarėjų veiklos vertinimo ataskaitas. Formalios sistemos pagrindinės dalys yra pasiektų rezultatų ir valstybės tarnautojų kompetencijų vertinimai. Geriausiems (geriausiai įvertintiems) darbuotojams atsilyginama darbo motyvatoriais, įskaitant didesnę atlyginimą, aukštesnes pareigas, priedus ir padėkos raštus. Nors formalios veiklos vertinimo sistemos Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje pagrindinis tikslas yra pateikti esmines gaires skaidraus veiklos valdymo užtikrinimui, MPT pavyzdys rodo, kad sistema turi reikšmingų trūkumų, ribojančių jos efektyvumą. Dėl formalios sistemos trūkumų (pvz., nepakankamai aiškaus kompetencijų rangavimo, nes nėra paaiškinimų, kokie darbuotojo elgsenos skirtumai lemia vertinimo rezultatus nuo 1 iki 5; veiklos pasiekimų rangavimo tarp darbuotojų

nebuvo; formalus veiklos vertinimo ir motyvatorių paskirstymo gairių nebuvimo, organizacijai susidūrus su finansiniais sunkumais) veiklos vertinimas dažnai tebūna formali procedūra, pateisinti sprendimus, priimtus dar prieš patį vertinimą, o ne veiklos valdymo forma.

## *2. Neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema ir jos vaidmuo MPT*

Tyrimas atskleidė, kad MPT egzistuoja neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema, identifikavo jos kriterijus ir veikimo būdus. Neformali sistema yra glaudžiai susijusi su socialinėmis–teisinėmis normomis ir šios institucijos organizacine kultūra. Neformali sistema, atsiradusi susidūrus organizacijos narių socialinėms normoms ir Valstybės tarnybos įstatymo (2002), reglamentuojančio veiklos vertinimą, formaliems standartams, yra organizacinės kontrolės MPT forma. Neformali sistema daro didelę įtaką pagrindiniams žmoniškųjų išteklių valdymo procesams, įskaitant veiklos vertinimą, karjeros planavimą ir atlygio skyrimą.

Teisės sociologijos požiūris paaiškina atotrūkį tarp visuomenėje ir organizacijoje veikiančių formalios (teisės normų) ir neformalios (socialinių normų) socialinės kontrolės sistemų (pvz., Banakar, 2011; Ehrlich, Pound, & Ziegert, 1936; Nelken, 1981; Pound, 1910; Ellickson, 1994; Hydén & Svensson, 2008).

Siekiant atskleisti neformalią sistemą buvo analizuojami vidinis ir išorinis MPT įvaidžiai, organizacinė kultūra, politikos įtaka formaliai veiklos vertinimo sistemai. Dešimtmečius trunkanti organizacinė istorija, didelis ilgą darbo stažą turinčių darbuotojų skaičius ir, tuo pat metu, strateginio valdymo trūkumas, nuolatos besikeičiantys aukščiausio lygio valstybės tarnautojai (dėl politinės kaitos), finansų krizės bei griežto taupymo politika labai padidino neformalios sistemos vaidmenį MPT. Formalus kontekstas arba, kitaip tariant, formali sistema ir jos įgyvendinimas taip pat prisidėjo prie organizacijos veiklos valdymo ir turėjo įtakos valstybės tarnautojų požiūriui į veiklos vertinimą. Todėl penki neformalaus veiklos vertinimo kriterijai – asmeniniai ryšiai, draugystė, socialiniai aspektai, darbo stažas ir elgesys – buvo aiškinami nagrinėjant plačiau ir atsižvelgiant į ekonominę, politinę, socialinę ir teisinę situaciją organizacijoje bei Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje apskritai.

## *3. Sąsaja tarp formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų MPT*

Organizacinės kontrolės samprata paaiškina formalios ir neformalios veiklos valdymo sistemų santykį ir jų vaidmenį skirtingose organizacijose (Selznick, 1948; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992).

Šiame tyrime atskleidžiamas formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų abipusis ryšys MPT, užkoduotas socialinėse–teisinėse normose, esančiose ir pačios neformalios sistemos atsiradimo priežastimi. Abi veiklos vertinimo sistemos veikia MPT vienu metu ir abu normų tipai (socialinės ir teisinės) sudaro šios institucijos organizacinės kultūros pagrindą. Todėl, vertinant veiklą, taikomi skirtingi formalaus ir neformalaus vertinimo kriterijai, priklausomai nuo situacijos ir vadovo pasirinkimo. Tyrimas parodė, kad neformali sistema yra intensyviau taikoma esant politiniams ir struktūriniams pokyčiams organizacijoje, o formalios sistemos naudojimas priklauso nuo skyrių vadovų, jų įsitikinimų ir požiūrio į veiklos vertinimo dalį Valstybės tarnybos įstatyme (2002), taip pat jų



asmeninių vertybių ir patirties. MPT patirtis taip pat atskleidė, kad egzistuoja hibridinė veiklos vertinimo sistema, kai to paties vertinimo proceso metu taikomi ir formalūs, ir neformalūs kriterijai.

#### *4. MPT dirbančių patarėjų asmenybės bruožai*

MPT patarėjų asmenybės bruožų analizės teorinį pagrindą sudaro asmenybės bruožų teorija ir penkių faktorių teorija (Allport, 1937; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Ashton & Lee, 2004).

Asmenybės bruožų vertinimas atliktas naudojant HEXACO PI-R psichometrinį įrankį. HEXACO asmenybės klausimynas yra išverstas ir adaptuotas į lietuvių kalbą, – ir yra integrali šios disertacijos dalis. MPT patarėjų su asmenybe susijusių savybių tendencijos atskleistos vertinant HEXACO skalių įverčius: sąžiningumą ir nuolankumą (H), emocionalumą (E), ekstraversiją (X), sutariamumą (A), disciplinuotumą (C) ir atvirumą patyrimui (O). Remiantis MPT patarėjų intimi, buvo išskirti du priešingi asmenybės tipai: ORGANIZUOTASIS (aukštesni įvertinimai H ir C, žemesni – A skalėje) ir LANKSTUSIS (žemesni įvertinimai H ir C, aukštesni – A skalėje). Dauguma MPT patarėjų yra ORGANIZUOTŲJŲ tipo. Šie rezultatai rodo, kad paprastai MPT patarėjai yra linkę į nuoširdumą, teisingumą, kuklumą, vengiantys godumo (H subdimensijos), jie yra linkę būti organizuoti, stropūs, perfekcionistiški, apdairūs (C subdimensijos), tačiau šiems žmonėms yra būdingesnė tendencija būti neatlaidiems, nekorektiškiems, taip pat nelankstiems ir nesusivaldantiems (A subdimensijos).

#### *5. Skirtingų asmenybės tipų darbuotojų motyvatoriai*

Asmenybės bruožų teorija teigia, kad asmeninės savybės gali padėti numatyti, kas žmogų motyvuoja / demotyvuoja (pvz., Allport, 1961; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Tett & Burnett, 2003). Asmenybės bruožai nurodo įvairius darbuotojų psichologinius poreikius, įskaitant pasiekimų, galios, savarankiškumo, pripažinimo ir priklausomybės poreikį (McClelland, 1987; Murray, 1938), kurie, jeigu yra patenkinami, tampa darbo motyvatoriais. Taip skirtingi darbuotojų asmenybės bruožai indikuoja, kurie stimulai motyvuos darbuotojus. Šio tyrimo metu buvo atlikti pusiau struktūruoti interviu su abiem MPT patarėjų asmenybės tipais. Abiejų tipų patarėjams buvo užduodami klausimai apie neformalių darbo motyvatorių (pvz., mokymus, konferencijas, specialias darbo užduotis ir pan.) ir piniginio atlygio svarbą. Tokiu būdu buvo bandoma sužinoti, ar skiriasi darbo motyvatoriai ORGANIZUOTAJAM ir LANKSČIAJAM asmenybės tipui.

Kokybinis tyrimas atskleidė įvairius darbo motyvatorius (pvz., lanksčios darbo sąlygos, darbo vietos ir sąlygų stabilumas; gera atmosfera komandoje, atviras bendravimas, tiesioginių vadovų įvertinimas, kitų vadovų įvertinimas; galimybė pasiekti apčiuopiamų rezultatų ir matyti teigiamą poveikį visuomenei, atsakomybė už darbo rezultatus; teigiama visuomenės nuomonė apie organizaciją, institucijos prestižas; konferencijos, mokymai, dalyvavimas įvairiose darbo grupėse), tačiau ryšys tarp šių motyvatorių ir konkretaus asmenybės tipo nebuvo rastas. Tyrime taip pat nerastas ryšys tarp patarėjų asmenybės tipo ir piniginio motyvatoriaus.



## *6. Skirtingų psichologinių tipų MPT patarėjų formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų supratimas*

Šis tyrimas atskleidė skirtingą formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų supratimą tarp MPT patarėjų. Vis dėlto šie skirtumai nėra susiję su patarėjų asmenybės bruožais. Pusė apklaustų patarėjų (4 iš 8 valstybės tarnautojų) nurodė, kad neformali sistema egzistuoja. Du iš šių patarėjų buvo ORGANIZUOTOJO tipo, kiti du – LANKSČIOJO, todėl asmenybės bruožų skirtumai nėra lemiamas veiksnys aiškinant šiuos rezultatus. Valstybės tarnautojai, nurodę, kad neformali sistema egzistuoja, išsamiai apibūdino neformalius veiklos vertinimo kriterijus ir suvokė juos esant atskiros ir nepriklausomos vertinimo sistemos dalimi. Kiti patarėjai suvokė pastebėtus neformalios veiklos vertinimo kriterijus kaip daugiau ar mažiau atsitiktines formalios sistemos klaidas. Visi darbuotojai, kalbėję apie neformalią sistemą ir jos vertinimo kriterijus, vertino ją neigiamai, nepriklausomai nuo jų asmenybės tipo. ORGANIZUOTIEJI patarėjai palankiai žiūrėjo į formaliąją veiklos vertinimo sistemą įgyvendinamus vadybinius principus, o LANKSTIEJI patarėjai buvo labiau kritiški jų atžvilgiu.

## *7. MPT patarėjų supratimo apie formalią ir neformalią veiklos vertinimo sistemas pasekmės jų darbo motyvacijai*

MPT patarėjų supratimas apie veiklos vertinimo sistemas atskleidė darbo motyvatorių / demotyvatorių tendencijas, ypač susijusias su formalios ir neformalios veiklos vertinimo sistemų kriterijais. ORGANIZUOTOJO asmenybės tipo patarėjus motyvuoja formalios sistemos standartizuoti, pamatuojami ir rezultatais grįsti kriterijai. ORGANIZUOTIESIEMS patarėjams taip pat labai svarbus formalus ir tiesioginis komunikavimas apie jų kompetencijas ir darbo rezultatus bei bendras sistemos skaidrumas, kurį pabrėžia formali sistema. Nepaisant to, kad realybėje formali sistema ne visada tokia yra, jos vadybinė logika turi teigiamos įtakos ORGANIZUOTŲJŲ valstybės tarnautojų motyvacijai. Pagrindiniai formalios sistemos kriterijai ir principai turi priešingą poveikį LANKSTIESIEMS patarėjams, kurie mažiau vadovaujasi formaliomis taisyklėmis ir yra labiau linkę akcentuoti tarpusavio santykius ir bendradarbiavimą. Šie patarėjai išreiškė savo nepasitenkinimą formalaus veiklos vertinimo griežtais standartais ir kriterijais, kurie verčia juos pamatuoti savo kompetencijas ir darbo rezultatus skaičiais be jokio lankstumo ir kūrybiškumo.

Priešingai nei formali veiklos vertinimo sistema, neformalūs kriterijai nemotyavo MPT patarėjų ir veikė kaip demotyvatoriai, nepriklausomai nuo jų asmenybės tipo.

## **Preliminarios rekomendacijos**

Iš šioje disertacijoje pateikiamų trijų organizacinės kontrolės analizės lygmenų (makro, mezo ir mikro) galima išgryninti rekomendacijas veiklos vertinimo sistemos Lietuvos valstybės tarnyboje tobulinimui.

Visų pirma, gerinant veiklos vertinimo sistemą, apibrėžtą Valstybės tarnybos įstatyme (2002) ir lydimuosiuose teisės aktuose, praverstų tolimesni akademiniai veiklos vertinimo tyrimai, ypač analizuojantys neformalių veiklos vertinimo sistemų egzistavimą ir tolimesnes jų traktavimo organizacijose perspektyvas.

Antra, būtina aiškesnė vidinė komunikacija MPT, didinanti skyrių vedėjų ir aukšto rango vadovų informuotumą apie formalią ir neformalią veiklos vertinimo sistemas ir šios organizacijos skaidrumą. Pavyzdžiui, tam padėtų ir MPT žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymą pagerintų tikslinis veiklos vertinimo proceso, kriterijų ir taikymo aptarimas prieš kasmetinį vertinimą.

Trečia, valstybės tarnautojų psichometrinis vertinimas (naudojant HEXACO PI-R ar panašų įrankį), atskleidžiantis jų asmenybės bruožus, leistų numatyti darbuotojų reakciją į veiklos vertinimo sistemas, įvardinti darbo motyvatorius / demotyvatorius, parengti geresnius karjeros ir individualaus tobulėjimo planus kiekvienam valstybės tarnautojui. Pagal asmenybės bruožus pritaikius tinkamas komunikacijos ir konfliktų valdymo strategijas taip pat pagerėtų komandinis darbas, bendradarbiavimas ir bendravimas organizacijoje.

## AUTORĖS MOKSLINIŲ PUBLIKACIJŲ DISERTACIJOS TEMA SĄRAŠAS

1. Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė, A. Formal and Informal Systems of Performance Evaluation as Work Motivators for Different Types of Personality in Public Sector. Konferencijos „Doktorantų stažuotės užsienio mokslo centruose 2012-2013” tezės, 2013 spalio 11 d, Vilnius, Lietuva (ISBN 978-9955-613-64-0).
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5. Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė A., Skaržauskienė A. Vadovo kompetencijos ir jų matavimo instrumentai. Konferencijos „Verslo psichologijos problemos” tezės, 2010 balandžio 16 d., Vilnius, Lietuva (ISBN 978-9955-880-63-9).

## GYVENIMO APRAŠYMAS

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### IŠSILAVINIMAS

2009-dabartis      Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Vadybos ir administravimo krypties doktorantūros studijos  
2012                Lund universitetas, Švedija, akademinė praktika Teisės sociologijos departamente  
2007-2009        Vilniaus universitetas, organizacinės psichologijos magistro laipsnis  
2007-2008        Paul-Valéry Montpellier III universitetas, Prancūzija, akademinė praktika organizacinės psichologijos srityje  
2006-2007        Poitiers universitetas, Prancūzija, studijos pagal Erasmus programą  
2003-2007        Vilniaus universitetas, psichologijos bakalauro laipsnis

### DARBO PATIRTIS

2013 – dabartis      CBM solutions steigėja ir direktorė

Pagrindinės atsakomybės: įmonės steigimas ir administravimas, verslo modelio įgyvendinimas, organizacijos pajamingumo ir pelningumo užtikrinimas, marketinginiai sprendimai, įmonių konsultavimas diegiant kompetencijomis grįstą valdymą, seminarų vedimas.

2010 – dabartis      Mykolo Romerio universitetas, lektorė  
Dėstomi dalykai lietuvių ir anglų kalbomis: „Psichologijos įvadas“, „Vadovavimo psichologija“ ir „Pozityvioji psichologija“

Pagrindinės atsakomybės: mokymų struktūros ir plano sudarymas, paskaitų skaitymas ir seminarų vedimas lietuvių bei anglų kalbomis, vadovavimas studentų kursiniams darbams ir studentų praktikai.

2009 – dabartis      European Leadership Institute, tyrimų ir vystymo vadovė

Pagrindinės atsakomybės: mokymų struktūros ir plano sudarymas, mokymų proceso organizavimas, mokymų metodikų kūrimas ir vystymas, psichometrinių metodikų adaptavimas, seminarų vedimas.

2008–2010        Lietuvos edukologijos universitetas, asistentė  
Dėstomas kursas: „Raidos ir pedagoginė psichologija“

Pagrindinės atsakomybės: mokymo programos paruošimas, metodikos parinkimas, seminarų vedimas, renginių organizavimas.

2008                Oxford Psychologists Press, Mokslinių tyrimų ir plėtros padalinio praktikantė

Pagrindinės atsakomybės: dalyvavimas personalo atrankos ir konsultavimo projektuose, asmenybės įvertinimo analizės, rinkos analizės ir tyrimai, psichometrinių tyrimų plėtojimas.

## KONFERENCIJOS IR PRANEŠIMAI

- 2013 Konferencija „Doktorantų stažuotės užsienio mokslo centruose 2012-2013”  
Pranešimo tema: „Formali ir neformali veiklos vertinimo sistemos kaip darbo motyvatoriai skirtingiems asmenybės tipams viešajame sektoriuje”  
2013 m. spalio 11 d., Vilnius, Lietuva
- 2013 Tarptautinė jaunųjų tyrėjų konferencija „Socialinės transformacijos šiuolaikinėje visuomenėje 2013”  
Pranešimo tema: „Formali ir neformali veiklos vertinimo sistemos kaip darbo motyvatoriai skirtingiems asmenybės tipams viešajame sektoriuje”  
2013 m. birželio 5-6 d. d., Vilnius, Lietuva
- 2012 Jaunųjų tyrėjų konferencija „Socialinių transformacijų raiška”  
Pranešimo tema: „Ryšys tarp patarėjų kompetencijų modelio ir veiklos efektyvumo Lietuvos Ministro Pirmininko tarnyboje”  
2012 m. birželio 6 d., Vilnius, Lietuva
- 2012 Konferencija „Augustin Cournot doktorantų dienos (ACDD)”  
Pranešimo tema „Ar kompetencijų modeliai nuspėja veiklos efektyvumą individualiame ir organizaciniame lygiuose?”  
2012 m. gegužės 9-11 d. d., Strasbūras, Prancūzija
- 2012 Lietuvos psichologų kongresas „Mokslas praktikai – praktika mokslui”  
Pranešimo tema: „Šešių faktorių asmenybės klausimyno HEXACO PI-R psichometrinės charakteristikos”  
2012 m. gegužės 13 d., Klaipėda, Lietuva
- 2011 Tarptautinė doktorantų konferencija „Socialinių inovacijų plėtra: tarpdisciplininiai tyrimai”  
Pranešimo tema: „Kompetencijų modeliai ir jų taikymas viešojo sektoriaus institucijose”  
2011 m. birželio 8 d., Vilnius, Lietuva
- 2010 Konferencija „Verslo psichologijos problemos”  
Pranešimo tema: „Vadovo kompetencijos ir jų matavimo instrumentai”  
2010 m. balandžio 16 d., Vilnius, Lietuva
- 2009 IV Jaunųjų mokslininkų psichologų konferencija „Žmogus XXI amžiuje: kas naujo?”  
Pranešimo tema: „Namuose ir biure dirbančių informacinių technologijų specialistų asmenybės skirtumai”  
2009 m. gegužės 8 d., Vilnius, Lietuva

## UŽSIENIO KALBOS

Anglų – puikiai (žodžiu ir raštu), prancūzų – gerai (DELTA 2 sertifikatas), vokiečių – pradmenys

## PAGRINDINĖS MOKSLINIŲ INTERESŲ SRITYS

Veiklos valdymas, kompetencijomis grįstas valdymas, darbo motyvacija, psichometrinis asmenybės vertinimas

ANALYSIS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: THE CASE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF LITHUANIA: doctoral dissertation – Vilnius: Mykolas Romeris University, 2014. 173 p.

Bibliogr. 113–129 p.

ISBN 978-9955-19-654-9

*System of performance evaluation is an essential part of performance management and a major source of organizational control. Discussion about motivational/demotivational power of the formal and informal systems of performance evaluation for different personality types of employees opens a new page in the studies of human resource management. The following research question reflects the core of this thesis "To what extent the informal system of performance evaluation exists beside the formal system of performance evaluation and how do they operate as work motivators/demotivators for civil servants of different psychological types?". The formal and informal systems of performance evaluation in the Office of the Prime Minister of Lithuania (OPML) are analysed using the theoretical research framework based on three different perspectives: sociology of law, human resource management and psychology. An ethnographic research, supplemented by the psychometric instrument HEXACO PI-R, is conducted to unfold the informal system of performance evaluation and to investigate its motivational/demotivation impact on two different personality types of OPML advisers (ORGANIZED and FLEXIBLE). The formal system is found to be a motivator for the ORGANIZED civil servants and demotivator for the FLEXIBLE advisers, while the informal system served as demotivator for all of the advisers who admitted its existence. In-depth interpretations of the doctoral dissertation research results are provided and conclusions drawn.*

*Veiklos vertinimo sistema yra neatskiriama veiklos valdymo dalis ir svarbus organizacinės kontrolės įrankis. Diskusijos apie formalios ir neformalios vertinimo sistemų motyvavimo / demotyvavimo galią skirtingų asmenybės tipų darbuotojams atveria naujas perspektyvas žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymo tyrimuose. Šios disertacijos esmę atspindi tyrimo klausimas „Kiek neformali veiklos vertinimo sistema egzistuoja šalia formalios veiklos vertinimo sistemos, ir kaip jos, kaip darbo motyvatoriai / demotyvatoriai, veikia skirtingų asmenybės tipų viešojo sektoriaus darbuotojus?“. Formali ir neformali veiklos vertinimo sistemos Lietuvos Respublikos Ministro Pirmininko tarnyboje (MPT) analizuojamos pasitelkiant teorinį tyrimo pagrindą, kuris yra paremtas trimis skirtingomis perspektyvomis: teisės sociologija, žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymu ir psichologija. Etnografinis tyrimas, kurį papildo psichometrinis įrankis HEXACO PI-R, atliktas siekiant identifikuoti neformalią veiklos vertinimo sistemą ir ištirti jos motyvacinį / demotyvacinį poveikį dviejų skirtingų asmenybės tipų (ORGANIZUOTIESIEMS ir LANKSTIESIEMS) MPT patarėjams. Nustatyta, kad formali sistema veikia kaip motyvatorius ORGANIZUOTIESIEMS patarėjams ir kaip demotyvatorius LANKSTIESIEMS valstybės tarnautojams, o neformali sistema demotyvuoja visus patarėjus, kurie pripažino, kad tokia sistema egzistuoja. Darbe analizuojami atlikto tyrimo rezultatai ir pateikiamos išvados.*

Aistė Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė

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